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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
1. The Shi’a of Iraq: The New Alqamis? 
On 30 April 2003, the London Arab daily Al-Quds Al-Arabi published a letter 
from Saddam Hussein to the people of Iraq, the first such letter to be released following 
the American invasion.  In the letter, Saddam compares the fall of Baghdad to the 
Americans to the Mongol conquest of the city in 1258.   
Just as Hulagu entered Baghdad, so did the criminal Bush enter Baghdad, 
with the help of [traitor from within] ‘Alqami-indeed, even more than one 
‘Alqami.   
They did not vanquish you, you who refuse to accept occupation and 
humiliation, and you, who have Arabism and Islam in your hearts and 
minds, [they did not defeat you] except through treachery.1 
By referencing the traitor ‘Alqami, Saddam draws on Iraqis’ “cultural memory”2 
of an ancient betrayal, implying that a similar betrayal aided the American invasion.  The 
last Sunni Abbasid caliph, Al-Musta’sim, was allegedly betrayed by a Shi’i vizier, 
Mu’ayyad Al-Din Muhammad ibn Al-‘Alqami, in a conspiracy to assist Hulagu Khan in 
his conquest, with disastrous consequences for the caliphate.3 Thus the point of 
comparison between then and now is that the traitor(s) both then and now were Shi’a 
while the supreme rulers betrayed were both Sunnis.  Saddam points by implication to the 
Shi’a as complicit in the toppling of his regime by foreign invaders who resemble the 
conquering hordes of Hulagu Khan.  In the process, by specifying “indeed, even more 
than one ‘Alqami,” Saddam indicts all Shi’a: in their welcoming of the Americans, all are 
traitors. 
                                                 
1 Open Source Center, “Saddam Husayn Urges Iraqis to Rise Against ‘Infidel Occupier,’” 
GMP20030430000037, 30 April 2003. 
2 William Beeman distinguishes “cultural memory” from “scientific history”: the former occurs when 
“events are ‘remembered’ in a way that creates a causal link between the present and the past, whether 
these memories are accurate or not…When they are widely believed,” he continues, “such memories have 
the force of fact, and can be strong motivators for public action.”  William Beeman, “The U.S.-Shiite 
Relationship in a New Iraq: Better Than the British?” Strategic Insights, Volume III, Issue 5 (May 2004). 
3 Michael S. Doran, “Intimate Enemies,” Washington Post, 18 February 2004, A19. 
2 
In this instance, the foreign invaders referenced by Saddam referred were 
American.  There is truth to Saddam’s accusation: the United States did base its plans on 
its own perceptions of the Shi’i community and close cooperation with a very small 
number of sympathetic Shi’i actors.  These perceptions soon proved misguided, however, 
and the collaborators proved to have very limited influence.   Instead, other Shi’a rose to 
prominence, but they too have become objects of suspicion by both domestic and foreign 
observers, not for their ties to America, but for their connections with Iran.  Particularly 
noteworthy have been the accusations from Sunni allies of America such as King 
Abdullah of Jordan, who has warned of a developing “Shi’a Crescent;” Prince Sultan of 
Saudi Arabia, who has said that U.S. policy is turning Iraqi over to Iran; and President 
Mubarak of Egypt, who has said that the Arab Shi’a are more loyal to Iran that to their 
own nations. 
2. The Status of the Shi’a in Iraq 
Roughly 60-65% of the 26 million citizens of Iraq are Shi’a,4 but until 30 January 
2005, they were denied the political power representative of their numbers.  Ever since 
the final triumph of the Ottoman Empire over the Safavids in 1638, Sunnis had controlled 
their territory.  Thus, while the recent conclusion of relatively free and fair elections 
marked an initial step toward a possible Iraqi democracy, it had far more concrete and 
immediate implications in terms of sectarian power.  Vali Nasr terms this revolution the 
“Shi’a Revival”: the Shi’i political awakening throughout Iraq and the greater Middle 
East.5   
3. The Two Pillars of Shi’i Iraq: The United States and Iran 
In his letter Saddam associates the Shi’a with only one source of their support, the 
American invaders.  Two foreign sponsors, the United States and Iran, form the most 
important potential partners for the Shi’a of Iraq.  America overthrew the Sunni regime 
and enabled the Shi’a to achieve power. Recently, however, the United States has sought 
to impose some limits on Shi’i ascendancy, and even threatened to withdraw support if 
certain conditions are not met. The Shi’a remember the American “betrayal” during their 
                                                 
4 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Iraq, 10 January 2006, 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iz.html (accessed 12 June 2006).  
5 Vali Nasr, “Regional Implications of Shi'a Revival in Iraq,” The Washington Quarterly, Volume 27, 
Issue 3 (Summer 2004), 7. 
3 
1991 uprising against the Ba'ath regime, when America abandoned them to severe 
repression.  Thus today, their leaders complain with rising stridency of current U.S. 
restraints which limit their ability to protect themselves.  They are particularly critical of 
U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, an Afghan-American Sunni Muslim who they 
increasingly view as a partisan of his Iraqi co-religionists.  Thus, more and more, the 
Shi’a question America’s reliability. 
The Islamic Republic of Iran is the other external supporter of the Iraqi Shi’a.  
Since 2003, the Iranians have sponsored a wide swath of the community, while remaining 
flexible enough to take advantage of emerging opportunities.  Iranian representatives 
have met repeatedly with Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the most powerful figure in 
Shi’i Iraq, while Sistani has declined to meet with American officials,6 or even to read a 
letter recently sent personally to him by President Bush.7  Sistani refuses American 
visitors while receiving Iranian ones both because of religious tradition and to avoid 
legitimizing the American presence in Iraq.  Shi’i Iraqi politicians of all factions have 
also traveled to Iran, and some have pledged to defend Iran from any outside attack.  As 
America’s influence seems to be on the wane in Iraq, Iran’s appears to be on the rise. 
B. PURPOSE 
This research seeks to determine the primary loyalties of the Shi’a of Iraq.  
Because religious forces now dominate Shi’i Iraqi politics, this thesis examines the 
history of Shi’i religious authority in Iraq and Iran.8  It studies the relationship between 
the Shi’i communities in Iraq and Iran both in the recent past and in the present.  It then 
assesses possible future developments within and between the two countries and provides 
policy recommendations for U.S. decision makers. 
C. RELEVANCE 
It is difficult to overestimate the importance of developments in Iraq for U.S. 
foreign policy.  The White House defines the war in Iraq as “the central front in the 
                                                 
6 Geoffrey Kemp, Iran and Iraq: The Shia Connection, Soft Power, and the Nuclear Factor Special 
Report No. 156, (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, November 2005), 1. 
7 Qassim Abdul-Zahra, “Shiite Ayatollah Ignores Letter from Bush,” Associated Press, 30 March 
2006. 
8 This thesis will use the term “Muslim” to refer to one who practices the religion of Islam and the 
word “Islamist” to refer to one who seeks to organize the state according to one interpretation of Islamic 
law. 
4 
global war on terror” and asserts “we will do everything it takes to win.”9  In the three 
years since Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. policymakers have been surprised by many 
events in Iraq, including the rise of armed resistance and the outbreak of sectarian 
violence.   No result stands to upset the status quo in the Middle East more than the 
erosion of Sunni Arab political dominance.  The effects of this transformation may rival 
or even eclipse the significance of the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement, the rise of Arab 
nationalism, the 1970s oil boom, and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the shaping of 
the Middle East. 
If a Shi’i-led government comes to power permanently in Iraq, it will mark the 
first time that an Arab country has come under Shi’i rule.10  Thus, political developments 
there may set an example for events in other nations with large Shi’a populations, such as 
Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, or even Iran.  Arab states may be forced to confront 
demands for more communal rights, while Iran’s leaders may have to contend with the 
demonstrative effect of popular elections and alternate religious leadership.  It is possible 
that sectarian tensions could lead to a civil war in Iraq, and, consequently, regional 
sectarian war.  Shi’i dominance in Iraq could also enable Iran to proceed with its nuclear 
weapons development without fear of outside interference.  Iraq thus marks an important 
test case for Shi’a-Sunni relations, Arab-Iranian relations, and intra-Shi’a relations. To 
properly assess and prepare for future developments within Iraq and the greater Middle 
East, policy makers must examine the Shi’i communities within Iraq and Iran, consider 
their ties to one another, attempt to determine their likely political goals, and consider 
how they may influence one another. 
1. Major Debates about the Issue 
The major debate surrounding Iran's involvement in Shi’i Iraqi political affairs 
centers on whether the Shi’a of Iraq are most loyal to Iran or to their own country.  
Although this debate has been largely confined to the Arab world, events in Iraq may 
soon propel it to a wider audience. 
 
                                                 
9 National Security Council, National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (November 2005), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/iraq_strategy_nov2005.html (accessed 12 June 2006). 
10 Nasr, “Regional Implications of Shi'a Revival in Iraq,” 16. 
5 
a. Arab Sunni Views of Shi’i Loyalty 
Neighboring Sunni governments have questioned both the general loyalty 
of Arab Shi’a and the specific allegiances of Iraqi Shi’a. In December 2004, King 
Abdullah of Jordan articulated the greater concern when he expressed his fear of a “Shi’a 
Crescent” emerging in the aftermath of the Iraq War that would span from Lebanon to 
Pakistan, and center on the "horseshoe" of oil fields rimming the Persian Gulf.   
If Iraq goes Islamic Republic, then, yes, we've opened ourselves to a 
whole new set of problems that will not be limited to the borders of 
Iraq…Even Saudi Arabia is not immune from this.  It would be a major 
problem.  And then that would propel the possibility of a Shi’i-Sunni 
conflict even more, as you're taking it out of the borders of Iraq.11  
Other prominent Sunnis echoed King Abdullah's concerns.  President 
Hosni Mubarak of Egypt recently claimed in an interview on al-Arabiya television, for 
example, that “Shiites are mostly always loyal to Iran and not the countries where they 
live.”12 
Some Sunni Arabs focus more specifically on Iranian efforts in Iraq.  In 
late September 2005, in address to the Council on Foreign Relations, Saudi Foreign 
Minister Prince Faisal warned that Iran was essentially taking power in Iraq: 
Now, the south is pretty much pacified. There is no conflict in there, 
because those who could cause conflicts, whether they’re supporters of 
Iran or others, are happy with the situation that is happening. The Iranians 
now go in this pacified area that the American forces have pacified, and 
they go into every government of Iraq, pay money, install their own 
people, put their own—even establish police forces for them, arms and 
militias that are there and reinforce their presence in these areas. And they 
are being protected in doing this by the British and the American forces in 
the area.  
                                                 
11 Quoted in Robin Wright and Peter Baker, “Iraq, Jordan See Threat to Election from Iran; Leaders 
Warn Against Forming Religious State,” Washington Post, 8 December 2004, A1. 
12 Quoted in Edward Wong, “Iraqis Denounce Mubarak’s Remarks on Strife,” New York Times, 10 
April 2006, A6. 
6 
Now, this is—(laughs)—to us it seems out of this world that you do this. 
We fought a war together to keep Iran from occupying Iraq after Iraq was 
driven out of Kuwait. Now we are handing the whole country over to Iran 
without reason. 13  (Emphasis added) 
Iraq’s Sunni neighbors have varying reasons to be suspicious of Iranian 
activities in Iraq.  The most extremist Salafi and Wahhabi jihadis see Shi'ism as an even 
greater threat to Muslims than Israel.  While this is not the mainstream view within the 
Sunni community, it tends to spread as sectarian tensions increase.  In addition, many 
Sunni-led Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain, have large or even 
majority-Shi’i populations or regions.  Those regimes fear the spillover effects of a 
growing Shi’i movement, particularly one allegedly loyal to Iran. 
b. Western Views of Iran's Influence in Iraq 
Western observers and officials also worry publicly about Iraqi Shi’i 
politics and Iranian influence within Iraq.  Even before the invasion, Vice President 
Cheney voiced his concern about a potential “Iranian-style theocracy” in Iraq and 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld echoed his concerns.14  In April of 2004, 
American neoconservative Michael Rubin accused Moqtada al-Sadr of being supported 
by Iran shortly after Sadr began deploying his Mahdi Army.15  Other conservatives such 
as William Safire, David Brooks, and Michael Ledeen soon repeated those allegations.16  
In a recent interview, Ambassador Khalilzad claimed that Iran is pursuing a two-track 
strategy in Iraq: “on the one hand in terms of state-to-state relations, Iran is supporting 
the government in Iraq, and on the other hand, part of the Iranian government, some of its 
institutions, are providing assistance to extremist groups, to militias, and are being 
unhelpful to Iraq in this difficult transition that the country is going through.”17 
                                                 
13 Prince Saud al-Faisal, “The Fight against Extremism and the Search for Peace” (Speech at the 
Council on Foreign Relations, New York, New York, 20 September 2005), transcript available at 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/8908/fight_against_extremism_and_the_search_for_peace_rush_transcript_
federal_news_service_inc.html (accessed 12 June 2006).  
14 Beeman. 
15 Michael Rubin, “Sadr Signs,” National Review Online, 6 April 2004 
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/rubin200404060834.asp (accessed 12 June 2006). 
16 Beeman. 
17 Zalmay Khalizad, “Newsmaker: Zalmay Khalilzad,” Interview by Gwen Ifill, The NewsHour with 
Jim Lehrer, 21 February 2006. 
7 
 
2. Survey of Prior Work on the Question 
The literature dealing with sectarian and political identities in Iraq and Iran is 
extensive and growing as the issues increase in relevance.  Some studies focus on Iran's 
current influence in Iraq, while others detail the history and identity of Iraqi Shi’ism and 
its relationship to that of Iran. 
Three recent short papers present a consensus of many informed observers 
regarding Iranian influence in Iraq:  International Crisis Group’s (ICG) Iran in Iraq: How 
Much Influence?, Geoffrey Kemp’s Iran and Iraq: The Shia Connection, Soft Power, and 
the Nuclear Factor, and Kenneth Katzman’s report to Congress, Iran’s Influence in Iraq. 
These papers generally agree that Sunni Arab allegations of Iranian dominance among 
the Shi’a of Iraq oversimplify and exaggerate the situation.  These reports identify the 
main interests that Iran seeks to promote in Iraq:  the prevention of the fragmentation of 
Iraq into smaller entities, the promotion of a central government strong enough to enforce 
order but too weak to pose a threat to Iran, and the prevention of the encirclement of Iran 
by U.S. forces.18  Katzman describes Iran’s strategy in Iraq as an attempt “to engineer 
and perpetuate domination of Iraq’s government by pro-Iranian Shi’i Islamist movements 
that would, in Iran’s view, likely align Iraq’s foreign policy with that of Iran.”19  The 
three reports then maintain that Iran is pursuing a strategy of “managed chaos” in Iraq by 
supporting a “diversified portfolio” of clients.20  The reports also note that Iran has little 
margin for error in its strategy, as either violent chaos or a successful, prosperous 
democracy may reverberate negatively back onto the Iranian regime.21  According to the 
reports, it is very difficult to quantify exactly how Iran is influencing events in Iraq, 
because the ambiguous nature of many actors, combined with the covert practices to 
which many of them adhere, obscures the situation.22  According to Katzman, Iran works 
                                                 
18 International Crisis Group, Iran in Iraq: How Much Influence? Crisis Group Middle East Report 
No. 38, (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 21 March 2005), 10-11 and Kemp, 3. 
19 Kenneth Katzman, Iran’s Influence in Iraq, Congressional Research Service RS 22323, 15 
November 2005, 2. 
20 International Crisis Group, Iran in Iraq: How Much Influence?, 22 and Kemp, 2 and Katzman, 
Iran’s Influence in Iraq, 6. 
21 International Crisis Group, Iran in Iraq: How Much Influence?, 23 and Kemp, 5. 
22 International Crisis Group, Iran in Iraq: How Much Influence?, 13 and Kemp, 5. 
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primarily through two client organizations, the Supreme Council for the Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq and the Dawa Party, and Iran enjoys less cooperation from Grand 
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and Moqtada al-Sadr.23   
The literature regarding the Iraqi Shi’i community and the history of its relations 
with Iran generally highlights the diversity of the community and the divisions between 
the Arab and the Persian Shi’a.  As such, it suggests that Iraqis have not historically 
demonstrated primary loyalty to Iran.  Even so, it also demonstrates that there are 
significant shared interests between the two communities and powerful actors from each 
side who support one another. 
The scholarship on Iraqi Shi’ism is extensive and paints a portrait of a diverse 
community.  Hanna Batatu notes in The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary 
Movements of Iraq that Iraqi national identity has always had difficulty incorporating the 
Shi’a.24  He also notes in a chapter of Shi’ism and Social Protest that “Iraq’s Shi’is are 
clearly more comfortable with their own kind and prefer that real leadership should be in 
the hands of the Shi’is who are Iraq.”25  Yitzak Nakash’s The Shi’is of Iraq emphasizes 
the tribal Arab background of most Shi’i Iraqis and concludes that there are significant 
divisions between them and their Iranian counterparts.26  Faleh A. Jabar’s The Shiite 
Movement in Iraq likewise posits that, despite the close ties between Iraqi and Iranian 
Shi’i ulama, the communities themselves are quite different and have separate interests.27   
In A History of Iraq, Charles Tripp argues that in recent decades Saddam Hussein sought 
to divide the Iraqi and Iranian Shi’a by promoting factionalism and encouraging divisions 
within the Iraqi Shi’i community.28  These divisions, Tripp believes, were most manifest 
in the 1991 rebellion in which underground Islamic parties and urban communities 
revolted against the Ba’athist regime, while some of the prominent Shi’i tribal sheiks 
                                                 
23 Katzman, Iran’s Influence in Iraq, 2. 
24 Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1978), 36. 
25 Hanna Batatu, “al Da’wah al-Islamiyah and al-Mujahidin,” in Shi’ism and Social Protest, ed. Juan 
R.I. Cole and Nikkie Keddie (New Haven” Yale University Press, 1986), 199. 
26 Yitzhak Nakash, The Shi’is of Iraq (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), xviii. 
27 Faleh A. Jabar, The Shi’ite Movement in Iraq (London: Saqi Books, 2003), 13. 
28 Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 245. 
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supported government forces.29  The Arab Shia, by Graham Fuller and Rend Rahim 
Francke, argues that the Iraqi Shi’a are not monolithic, but rather are marked by serious 
divisions and are likely to become even more fractured in a democratic environment.30   
Joyce Wiley asserts in The Islamic Movement of Iraqi Shi’as that the Shi’a of Iraq  are 
not likely to advocate the break-up of the Iraqi state: because of their numbers, they enjoy 
a level of influence within Iraq that they would not have in any Iranian-led “greater-
Shi’a” state.31 
Several works published since the downfall of Saddam Hussein specifically 
address contemporary Iraqi Shi’i politics and relations with Iran.  Most conclude that Iraq 
is not likely to be dominated by Iran.  Larry Diamond, a former advisor to the Coalition 
Provisional Authority, asserts in his book Squandered Victory, that most Iraqi Shi’a want 
neither a political system based on the Iranian model of vilayat al-faqih (guardianship of 
the jurisconsult) nor direct domination by Iran.  Diamond notes, however, that significant 
minorities currently do enjoy large Iranian sponsorship and also promote vilayat al-
faqih.32  Toby Dodge, in Iraq’s Future: The Aftermath of Regime Change, argues that the 
three main elements of the Iraqi Shi’i community, the ulama (the religious establishment, 
especially the senior Ayatollahs), the urban middle class, and the merchant class are 
united by their strong Iraqi nationalism and their commitment to a strong Iraqi state.33  At 
the same time, he says that Iran is pursuing a long-term strategy to influence events 
within Iraq and has developed a mechanism to destabilize Iraq if events proceed contrary 
to its interests.  Dodge concludes that Iran’s influence may currently be constraining Iraqi 
Shi’i leaders from pursuing policies they prefer but that may not be favored by Iran.34   
Collectively, the literature suggests overall that the Shi’a of Iraq have their own 
identity and are loyal to their own nation.  It also demonstrates, however, that there may 
                                                 
29 Tripp, 256. 
30 Graham E. Fuller and Rend Rahim Francke, The Arab Shi’a: The Forgotten Muslims (New York: 
Palgrave, 1999), 116. 
31 Joyce N. Wiley, The Islamic Movement of Iraqi Shi’as (Boulder, Co.: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 
1992), 151-2. 
32 Larry Diamond, Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring 
Democracy to Iraq  (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2005), 382. 
33 Toby Dodge, Iraq’s Future: The Aftermath of Regime Change (New York: Routledge, 2005), 48. 
34 Ibid., 62. 
10 
be powerful actors who give priority to Iranian interests and who may be able to oppose 
the will of the majority, as some now do within Iran. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Main Question 
Are the Shi’a of Iraq most loyal to Iran, or to their own country? 
2. Subordinate Questions 
Who are the Shi’a of Iraq?  How did their identity emerge?  How did the 
emergence of Shi’i fundamentalism in the 1970s affect the political situation in Iran and 
Iraq, and the relations between Iranians and Iraqi Shi’a?  How did the Iran-Iraq War 
demonstrate the loyalty the Shi’a of Iraq?  What effect did the failed rebellion of 1991, 
the worsening economic conditions, and the resurgence of tribalism and religion in the 
1990s have on the identity of the Shi’a of Iraq?  How did events in the 1990s highlight 
the potential weaknesses of the Islamic Revolution in Iran?  Which Shi’i actors took 
prominence after the 2003 U.S. invasion, and where do they stand today in regard to 
Iran?  What political, economic, and religious barriers preclude Iranian dominance of the 
Shi’a of Iraq?  What do the Shi’a of Iraq want from Iran, and what does it want from 
them? What does the answer portend for the developing dynamic between those two 
nations?  How should the United States react to this dynamic? 
E. MAIN ARGUMENT: IRAQI SHI’A ARE LOYAL TO IRAQ, NOT IRAN  
This thesis argues that the Shi’a of Iraq are not primarily loyal to Iran. The Shi’a 
are loyal to Iraq, but under their own terms, not those of Sunnis or Kurds.  The Shi’a are 
not part of any “Shi’a Crescent” loyal to Iran; there is no such entity.  The Shi’a act in 
their own perceived interest. 
Historically, members of the Iraqi Shi’i population have not defined themselves 
primarily by their sectarian affiliation.  Current events on the ground seem to be unifying 
the community through an “ascribed identity” imposed both by actors external to the 
community and by political entrepreneurs within it who seek to build their power through 
sectarian strength.  More specifically, SCIRI, the Dawa Party, and the Sadr movement 
have established control over the community through their mosque networks and are 
poised to take control of the permanent government. 
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Nonetheless, the Iranian government does influence the Iraqi Shi’i community.  
Indeed, its “soft power” is greater within Iraq than it has been for many years.  Iran has 
historical, geographic, economic, ethnic, economic, religious, and political ties to Iraq 
and manipulates these ties positively or negatively according to its interests.  Its former 
clients, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), form a large 
bloc in the ruling United Iraqi Alliance (UIA).  SCIRI's militia, the Badr Organization, 
was formed and trained under the sponsorship of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps 
(IRGC).  Badr is now alleged to have heavily infiltrated the Interior Ministry and to have 
used this institution to propagate sectarian violence.  Portions of another UIA faction, the 
Dawa party, also enjoy close ties with Tehran.  
To date, Iran has pursued an ambiguous policy in Iraq, supporting almost all sides 
in an effort to hedge its bets. Its fear of a strong, pro-Western Iraq seems to have 
dissipated since the results of the December 2005 elections. Recently, Iran has proposed 
cooperation on an oil pipeline from Basra to Abadan and has offered to finance major 
new airports in Basra and Najaf. 
Though certain circumstances unify the Iraqi Shi’i community and tie it to Iran, 
Iraqi allegiance to Iran is limited by linguistic, cultural, economic, political, and religious 
rivalries which become subsumed in periods of sectarian violence only to regain 
importance as security concerns diminish.  Among the most powerful potential dynamics 
is the emergence of a possible rival Shi’i religious establishment centered on the Najaf 
hawza (the Shi’i institution of learning supervised by Ayatollah Sistani).  Indeed, rather 
than accepting Iranian control, Iraqi Shi’i factions may eventually assert their own claim 
to the leadership of the global Shi’i community.   
This thesis shows that Iraqi Shi’a have an identity that distinguishes them from 
Iranians and a concept of religious authority that bridges national boundaries at some 
levels, but in practice is subject to many of the same parochial interests and divisions that 
characterize Sunni Islam.  Certainly Sunni-led countries have shown little interest in 




is little reason to assume that any theoretical pan-Shi’i movement led by Iran and the 
Shi’a of Iraq would be any more successful in suppressing conflict among its 
constituents. 
This thesis argues that in the long term Iran is pursuing a classical realist foreign 
policy; its goal is to overturn the regional status quo of U.S. and Sunni Arab hegemony.  
Ironically, the United States may have inadvertently given this effort an initial push by 
initiating the “Shi’a Revival” as one of the outcomes of Operation Iraqi Freedom.  For the 
short term, however, a stable, Shi’a-led Iraqi state will satisfy Iran’s basic policy goals; 
the specific composition of the Iraqi government is of much less relative importance.     
This thesis offers five policy proposals for U.S. decision makers.  First, to the 
greatest extent possible, the United States should avoid alienating the Iraqi Shi’i 
leadership. Most importantly, it should not push Shi’i actors into Iran’s embrace by 
labeling them servants of Iran.  Inadvertently or not, the United States facilitated the rise 
to power of these actors and should not allow Iran to reap the benefits.  Thus, the second 
proposal is that the American officials find ways to cooperate, if only indirectly, with 
Sadr and Sistani to prevent the emergence of a Shi’i “super-region” in the southern 
provinces that could call into question the viability of the Iraqi state.  This effort would 
also require corresponding diplomacy to discourage the Kurds from moving to virtual 
independence.  Fourth, the United States should facilitate talks with Iraq's neighbors, 
including Iran and Syria, aimed at minimizing the chance of regional sectarian conflict.  
Such talks should encourage cross-sectarian dialogue, address the Sunni crisis of 
confidence, and reassure Sunni allies that America is not abandoning them or turning 
against them.  In any such talks, the U.S. government should play a discrete role, rather 
than seeking to publicly dominate the discussion.  Finally, the U.S. administration should 
consider a bold diplomatic outreach effort with Iran that addresses the full range of U.S.-
Iranian challenges and opportunities.  Iraq should form a major topic in any such move.  
In adopting these policies, U.S. government officials should avoid a direct 
confrontation over Iran’s plans for Iraq.  Rather, by encouraging democratic institutions 
and actors who place Iraqi nationalism above sectarian identity, the United States will 
indirectly undermine Iran’s aspirations in Iraq.  Most of all, the United States must 
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recognize that Iraqi Shi’i cooperation with Iran is based largely on security concerns and 
that Iran has legitimate interests in Iraq. Accommodating those legitimate interests will 
build goodwill and may reveal potential U.S. allies in Iran.  Ideally, the existence of a 
vibrant, diverse, and prosperous Shi’i community at the head of a just and representative 
Iraqi political system could produce repercussions within Iran itself and encourage the 
growth of an anti-regime movement in that country. 
F. METHODOLOGY 
1. Case Study: The Development of Shi’i Identity in Iraq 
“To a searing degree [in Iraq], the feelings engendered by distant and more recent 
pasts live today; history and the present are intertwined.”  So writes journalist Anthony 
Shadid, one of the foremost western reporters in Iraq.35  Accordingly, this thesis 
examines present developments in light of Iraqi history.  For its case study, this thesis 
explores the history of Shi’ism in Iraq, emphasizing the development of Shi’i political 
activism from the 1970s to the present time, and the role of Iran in that development.  
Chapter II discusses the history of Shi’ism in Iraq and the roots of Shi’i fundamentalism.  
Chapter III examines Shi’i political activism in the 1970s and ‘80s, from the death of 
Grand Ayatollah Hakim to the start of the first Gulf War, and demonstrates that the 
networks of the "Shi’i International" in Iraq and Iran reached their zenith during Iran’s 
Islamic Revolution.  The chapter argues that the Iran-Iraq War is counter intuitively the 
weakest evidence of the separate identity of Iranian and Iraqi Shi’a, and that those who 
cite it as definitive evidence of their enmity risk confusing correlation with causation.  
Chapter IV reviews Iraqi political activism from the 1991Gulf War to the 2003 American 
invasion.  It evaluates the decline of Iraq’s middle class in the wake of international 
sanctions and the increasing influence of tribalism and other forms of identity politics, 
and compares Iraqi Shi’i exiles abroad with activists who remained in the country.  The 
chapter argues that those who stayed, while suffering extreme persecution, acquired a 
popular legitimacy that would later pay off following the fall of Saddam.  Chapter V 
examines events from the beginning of the American invasion to the present.  It discusses 
U.S. misperceptions of the Shi’i Iraqi community and details the post-invasion power 
struggles between the various Shi’i factions, charting the evolution of the current power 
                                                 
35 Anthony Shadid, Night Draws Near: Iraq’s People in the Shadow of America’s War (New York: 
Henry Holt and Company, 2005), 164. 
14 
structure.  The chapter argues that the rise of figures such as Sistani and Sadr show that 
Iraqi Shi’a and their authority figures have not demonstrated primary allegiance to Iran.  
Chapter VI concludes the thesis, closing with recommendations for U.S. policy makers 
that urge them to accommodate the enduring interests of the people of Iraq while 
remaining aware that tensions between the Iran and the Shi’a of Iraq mean that the Shi’a 
























II. THE ROOTS OF SHI’I ACTIVISM IN IRAQ AND IRAN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As the birthplace of Shi’ism, Iraq has always formed the frontier between the 
Shi’i and Sunni worlds.  Current concerns over Shi’i loyalty in Iraq are based on a long 
history of interaction between Iraq and Iran, and on the broader history of Sunni-Shi’i 
tension.   
This chapter discusses the origins of Shi’ism, stressing its Arab origins, its growth 
within both Iraq and Iran, its increasingly political tone in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, and the developing movements that were associated with the key figures of 
Shi’i activism: the Ayatollahs Mohammad Baqir Sadr in Iraq and Ruhollah Khomeini in 
Iran.  These historical dynamics gave rise to very different manifestations of Shi’ism in 
Iran and Iraq and, in the modern era, different pathways to Shi’i activism.  By examining 
this history, it will be apparent that the Shi’a of Iraq have a very different identity from 
their Persian neighbors, and have consistently demonstrated allegiance to their own 
community and nation. 
B. SHI’ISM IN IRAQ: A BRIEF HISTORY  
As far back as 993 C.E, Abu Bakr al-Khawarizmi jealously noted that the 
inhabitants of what is today Iraq were blessed, for “in their midst are the tomb-
sanctuaries of the Commander of the Faithful…and of Husain, the lord of martyrs…and 
because Shi’ism is Iraqi.”36  Indeed, no country can claim more intimate attachment to 
the faith. 
1. The Sunni-Shi’i Split 
a. The Succession and Ali 
As Muslims, the Shi’a believe in the message of the Prophet Mohammed, 
an Arab.  They consider the Quran, delivered by God in Arabic, as their most holy text.  
The conflict between Sunni and Shi’i Muslims began as a struggle to determine who 
would lead the umma (community of the faithful) after the death of the Prophet 
Mohammed.  The Shi’at Ali (partisans of Ali) believed that religious authority passed 
from Mohammed to his daughter Fatima and her husband Ali ibn Abi Talib, and their 
                                                 
36 Quoted in Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, 39. 
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descendents. Thus, they held that the leader of the faithful must be of the family of the 
Prophet.  The Shi’a supported Ali because of his personal merit and excellence, believing 
that he was infallible through divine guidance.  Sunnis, however, supported a pattern of 
succession in which the leader was chosen by a representative segment of believers, as 
was the case for the first three caliphs, Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman.37  
Many of the events that would shape Shi’ism took place in what is now 
Iraq.   Foremost among these were the caliphate of Ali, the martyrdom of Husayn, and 
the occultation of the Twelfth Imam.  When Ali succeeded Uthman as caliph in the year 
656 C.E., he moved the Islamic capital from Medina to Kufa, near Najaf, in present-day 
Iraq.  Kufa's central location was crucial to the consolidation and control of the 
expanding Islamic empire.  Ali's rival Mu'awiya ibn Abi Sufyan, the governor of Syria, 
plotted against him and raised an army to oppose him.  Though this threat was eventually 
defused through negotiations, some of Ali's supporters, the Kharijites, became 
disillusioned, and in 661 one of them murdered him.  The Shi’a later deemed Ali to be 
the first Imam, an infallible leader subordinate only to Mohammed.38  Unlike caliphs, 
who to Sunnis were merely first among equals in a strictly temporal sense, Imams to 
Shi’a were both the Hujjat Allah (Proof of God) and the Ayat Allah (Sign of God), 
demonstrating through their presence on Earth the existence of God.39  Ali was the only 
Imam to have both religious and political authority: all of his heirs would all suffer 
persecution.40 
b. The Martyrdom of Husayn  
Ali's son Hasan, the Second Imam, assumed the caliphate after his father’s 
death, but after only six months, he turned the office over to Mu'awiya, his father’s 
                                                 
37 Frederick Matheson Denny, An Introduction to Islam (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice 
Hall, 2006),  82.  Today, the three names are particularly relevant, as Sunnis named for these caliphs are 
often threatened or even killed on the basis of their sectarian identity.  See Rick Jervis and Zaid Sabah,  
“Danger Attaches to Sunni Names,” USA Today,  27 April 2006,  7.   Some Shi’i Iraqis refer to 
Ambassador Khalilzad, as “Abu Omar” (Father of Omar) because of his alleged favoritism toward his 
fellow Sunnis.  See Nibras Kazimi, “’Abu Omar’ Versus the Shias,” New York Sun, 21 April 2006. Sunnis, 
especially Salafis, also insult Shi’a, calling them Rafida (the Rejectors), a reference to the Shi’i rejection of 
Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and other companions of the Prophet who opposed Ali.  See Moojan Momen, 
An Introduction  to Shi’i Islam (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 73.   
38 Denny,  79-81. 
39 Momen, 150. 
40 Wiley, 120. 
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former rival.  Mu'awiya then established the Umayyad dynasty.41  As Mu'awiya 
consolidated his rule, Hasan's brother Husayn attempted to reclaim the caliphate for his 
family.  Mu'awiya died in 680 C.E. and was succeeded by his son Yazid.  That same 
year, as Husayn journeyed toward Kufa to meet with potential supporters, he was 
ambushed at Karbala.  On the 10th day of the month of Muharram, a date known 
thereafter as Ashura,42 Yazid’s forces attacked Husayn and his followers, killing them all 
and taking the women and children as captives.  That slaughter marked the beginning of 
Shi'ism, imbuing the movement with a strong sense of martyrdom, sacrifice, and 
tragedy,43 and causing the name Yazid to be associated ever after with unjust rulers.44 
The Shi’i movement drew on the symbolism of the Karbala martyrdom, 
attracting many new adherents. It also benefited from the general belief that the 
Umayyads, the Arab dictators, ruled non-Arabs as oppressed peoples.  Shi'ism 
represented a chance to regain the egalitarianism of the early Muslims, who, under 
Mohammed, lived in relative equality.45   
c. The Twelfth Imam  
While most Shi’a believed in Twelve Imams, some sects branched off to 
follow intermediate Imams.  The Ithan Ashari (Twelver) Shi’a, the most popular sect, 
believed that the Eleventh Imam, who died in 873 C.E., apparently without leaving an 
heir, had in fact secretly had a son,46  Muhammad Ibn Hasan, the Twelfth Imam, born in 
Samarra in 870 C.E.  The Shi’a believed that he went into “occultation” in 873 C.E. in 
Samarra to escape execution.47  According to this doctrine, he did not die, but was merely 
hidden from human sight.  Believers hold that God will reveal the Twelfth Imam shortly 
before the Day of Judgment, when he will return to Kufa as the Mahdi (the Rightly-
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Guided One) to lead the righteous against the evil in an apocalyptic struggle.48  Thus Iraq 
holds tremendous significance for the future of Shi’ism, much as it has hosted its history. 
From 873 to 941 C.E., a period termed the Era of the Lesser Occultation, 
the Mahdi continued to contact believers through designated agents.  In 941 C.E., the last 
of his agents informed believers that he would have no more successors, thus beginning 
the Greater Occultation.  This epoch, which continues today, is notable in that religious 
authority no longer rests in defunct agents of the Hidden Imam, but rather in the ulama.49  
In general, the ulama recognize the political authority of Sunni leaders, though they have 
not reached consensus on what constitutes truly desirable political leadership in the 
absence of the Hidden Imam.50  Even while ceding most political authority, however, at 
various points in history the Shi’i ulama have used their station as representatives of the 
Hidden Imam to intervene in politics in order to oppose unjust rulers.51  This tradition 
continues to this day. 
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on the individual mujtahid, but typically revolves around mas’ala-sazi (constructing hypothetical 
examples) that test the students ability to argue in support of their knowledge.  See Momen, 200-202.   
The triumph of Usuli (rationalist) school of jurisprudence in the eighteenth century over the Akhbari 
(traditionalist) movement created the current structure of Shi’ism.  The advocates of the Usuli school 
supported four sources of religious authority: quranic and traditional laws, ijma (consensus), and aql 
(reason).  They believed that mujtahids could discern religious law through their own reason, and urged 
believers to emulate living mujtahids.  The Usulis supported itjihad (independent legal interpretation), 
leading to an ongoing evolution in jurisprudence not see in the Sunni world.  See Wiley, 121. 
50 Ibid., 121. 
51 Momen, 171. 
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2. The Persian-Arab Struggle for Mesopotamia 
Iraq also hosted centuries of conflict between Sunnis and Shi’a, conflict easily 
recalled today.  In 750, the Abbasids defeated the Umayyads and Abu al-‘Abbas became 
the first Abbasid caliph.  Four years later, Abbas’ older brother Abu Jafar took the throne.  
He established the new capital city of Baghdad in 758.  The Abbasid period is the most 
celebrated period of Islam, marked by advances in jurisprudence, theology, Arabic 
grammar and rhetoric, philosophy, literature, and medicine.52 
As Saddam’s letter recalls, Hulagu’s conquest in 1258 brought the Abbasid 
caliphate to a disastrous end.    The office of caliphate was then transferred to Cairo, but 
drifted into obscurity until it was revived in 1517 by the Ottomans,53 who would soon 
come into conflict with the Safavids of Iran.  Isma'il, the first Safavid ruler, established 
Twelver Shi'ism as the state religion in 1501, at the same time he announced himself as 
the Safavid shah (king).  Lacking an indigenous Shi’i religious establishment, Isma'il 
imported clerics from Arab lands, particularly Lebanon.  Shi'ism became embedded 
within the Iranian populace and began to constitute a perceived threat to the Sunni 
Ottomans.  The tensions between the Sunni and Shi’i states increased sectarian tensions 
throughout the umma.54 
Shah Isma’il occupied Baghdad in 1508, and the Safavids held the city until the 
Ottoman Sultan Murat IV reconquered it in 1638.  During that period, the two states vied 
for control of what is now Iraq, much of which was under Safavid control when Isma’il 
proclaimed Twelver Shi’ism as the state religion.  Sunni mosques in Iraq were 
subsequently destroyed or converted to Shi’i institutions, which offended the Ottomans, 
the champions of Sunni Islam; and in 1534 their leader Suleyman the Magnificent re-took 
Baghdad.  When Isma’il died in 1524, the Safavid Empire went into decline under 
pressure from the Turks in the east and the Ottomans in the west.  It experienced renewed 
power with the ascension of Shah Abbas in 1587, but then slowly declined again until it 
was subdued in 1722 by Afghan invaders. Shah Abbas conquered Baghdad for the 
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Safavids in 1624, slaughtering many Sunnis in the aftermath.  In 1638, after an 
unsuccessful series of sieges, Sultan Murat IV reclaimed Baghdad once again for the 
Ottomans, who then held the city until the British invasion in 1917.55  Sunnis would rule 
Iraq until 2003. 
3. The Pattern of Conversion in Iraq 
Iran became predominantly Shi’i several centuries before the rise of Shi’ism in 
Iraq, which remained predominantly Sunni.  Those Iraqis who would become Shi’i would 
not convert for several more centuries.  Their eventual conversion had a very different 
pattern and resulted in a much different identity not dependent on Iran. 
Despite the predominance of Sunnis, as the birthplace of Shi'ism, Iraq enjoyed a 
strong presence of Shi’i ulama and benefited from the robust pilgrimage and burial 
trades.  The majority of the population remained Sunni, however, until the threat of 
Wahhabi invaders in the early nineteenth century motivated the ulama to convert more 
followers for their own protection.56  After twice laying siege to Najaf, the Wahhabis 
conquered Karbala in 1801.  Believing shrines to be against the monotheism of Islam, 
they ransacked the Shrines of Imam Husayn and Abbas, taking all the gold and 
valuables.57  The threat from the Wahhabis did not diminish until 1811, when 
Muhammad Ali began to exert pressure on them from Egypt.58  This is the historical 
background of the current strife between the Wahhabi/Salafi insurgents and the Shi’i 
militias.  Not surprisingly, events such as the bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra 
on 22 February 2006 viscerally evoke this memory among the Shi’a. 
The Iraqi shrine cities developed an economy based on religious donations and 
the pilgrimage and burial trades, financial support that came mainly from Iranian bazaari 
class.  This economic structure empowered the mujtahids (those clerics authorized to 
practice independent legal reasoning) to build patronage networks to serve their interests, 
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but left them vulnerable when any interruptions in contact with foreign nations, 
particularly Iran, broke the necessary flow of commerce.59   
With the establishment of the Safavid state in 1501 C.E. and the conversion of the 
Iranian people to Shi’ism, Ali’s tomb in Najaf became a major pilgrimage site.60  It also 
served as the focal point for the hawza. 61  The first madrasa (religious college) was 
established there in 1056 C.E. by Abu Ja’far Muhammad al-Tusi.62  Shi’a sought to be 
buried at the nearby cemetery, the Wadi al-Salam (Valley of Peace), to be close to Ali63   
In the centuries-long struggle between the Ottomans and Iran, Iraq became a 
frontier zone, with diffuse and ambiguous sources of authority.64  Najaf in particular 
enjoyed considerable independence under the Ottomans.65  By 1919, an estimated 80,000 
Iranians lived in Iraq.  Like many foreign populations in Ottoman territories, Iranians 
were not subject to local laws, and instead fell under Iranian jurisdiction.66  Iranians were 
particularly drawn to Karbala in part for its association with the martyrdom of Husayn, 
martyrdom being a recurring theme in Iranian religiosity. Thus, Husayn's shrine became 
another popular pilgrimage and burial site.  67 
Following the destruction of Karbala and the assaults on Najaf by the Wahhbis, 
the ulama became determined to raise a tribal army for defense.  Converting local tribes 
potentially offered both security and economic benefits.  Instead of interfering with 
pilgrims from Iran and other nations, tribal Shi’a could be expected to perform 
pilgrimages themselves and thus to contribute to the mosque networks.68  
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Iraq’s configuration of tribes solidified in the nineteenth century, as tribes fled 
north from Arabia in fear of the Wahhabis.  These relative latecomers to Iraq would form 
the majority of the subsequent Shi’i population after their conversion.69  In the end, the 
ulama converted only those tribes who were willing to give up nomadic life and settle in 
accordance with Ottoman policy, particularly its Land Code of 1869.  The tribes that 
refused settlement and remained in the desert mostly remain Sunni to this day.70  Tribes 
that settled chose areas near Najaf and Karbala which had reliable water sources for 
farming.71    
Because settlement destroyed much of their traditional way of life, the tribes 
looked to Shi'ism in their search for a new collective identity.72  Even under the new 
Shi’i way of life, genealogy remained of the highest importance to the tribes and tribal 
law superseded religious law.73  The agents of conversion conformed Shi’i rituals to fit 
traditional Arab values, particularly those that revolved around muruwwa (manhood): 
valor, pride, honor, and chivalry.  Rituals incorporated tribal practices such as, for 
example, the hosa, which celebrated proficiency on horseback and the discharging of 
rifles into the air.  In concert with the tribal emphasis on muruwwa, emissaries 
emphasized the bravery, simplicity, and integrity of both Ali and his son Abbas, the half-
brother of Husayn.  Tribal descriptions of Abbas emphasized his physical prowess and 
personal heroism, rather than his religious devotion.74  The tribes also celebrated their 
roots by the way they performed the commemoration plays of the battle of Karbala.  In 
Iran, the plays stressed dialogue and celebrated martyrdom; in Iraq the actors used 
theatricality to focus on themes of manhood.75 
It is the tribal character of Shi’ism in Iraq that distinguishes it most from Iranian 
Shi’ism.  In Iran, the influence of Sufism gave Shi’ism a mystical quality that it lacked in 
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Iraq.76  Iranian believers dwelled throughout the year on the martyrdom of Husayn, while 
in Iraq discussions of martyrdom generally occurred only around Ashura.77 
Even with the effort that the mujtahids put into conversion during the nineteenth 
century, the Shi’a did not make up the majority of the population in Iraq until well into 
the twentieth century.  As late as 1919, Shi’a constituted a bare majority of 53 percent, 
increasing only to 56 percent by 1932.78  Generally, the Sunni-Shi’i religious division 
also marked an economic division, with the Shi’a confined to the lower classes.79 
C. SHI’A ACTIVISM IN IRAQ 
1. First Incidents of Political Action 
Having built a more substantial base of support, the Shi’i ulama were then better 
prepared to take an active role in political life.  They first exercised this ability during the 
1891-92 crisis over the Tobacco Concession in Iran.  A mass movement led by 
Muhammad Hasan Shirazi, the main marja’at-taqlid, resisted this concession to the 
British.  In December 1891, Shirazai circulated a fatwa forbidding tobacco use, thereby 
personifying the political aspirations of the ulama.80  Although based in Samarra, Shirazi 
was powerful because of his close connections with and support from the Iranian 
bazaar.81  With tobacco effectively boycotted by the entire Iranian population, the British 
concession became worthless and was rescinded by the Shah.  The ulama thus realized 
the extent of their power.82 
By the time of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911, this new 
political activism on the part of Shi’i ulama became institutionalized.  Up to this point, 
the mujtahids had lacked a coherent political philosophy to guide their actions, but now 
their leadership in political events became unremarkable.83  A political vision emerged  
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during the revolution when the Second Amendment to the Iranian Constitution dictated 
that a supervising council of five mujtahids review legislation and assure its compatibility 
with the shari'a.   
The events of the Revolution damaged relations between religious students and 
the mujtahids, and in retrospect formed a high water mark for political activism.  The 
mutjahids largely supported the interests of the Iranian business class, but when the 
businessmen had achieved their objectives they reduced their contributions to the holy 
cities.  Ottoman officials were also wary of the connections between the mujtahids and 
Iranian factions and suspicious of Persian influence, and so sought to undermine the 
ulama by restricting pilgrimage, madrassa students, and other sources of support.84 
The Iranian Constitutional era left a legacy of political debate and activism in the 
Iraqi shrine cities, though the debate was largely confined to the Iranian expatriate 
community.85 A majority of the Arab Shi’a considered the Iranian Constitutional 
Revolution an internal matter to Iran, and took little inspiration from it.  They did not 
become more active until after the Young Turk Revolution, which opened up political 
space and exposed Iraqis to ideas from Islamic modernists and other thinkers.86   
Britain occupied Iraq during World War One, and refused to allow a local 
delegation to represent Iraq at the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919.  A secret society, 
the Independence Guard, formed to protest this denial.  The Guard demanded 
independence for Iraq, which it defined as the three Ottoman provinces.  It was composed 
of both military and civilians, and drew from a relatively broad swath of society.  
Because of its diverse nature, the Independence Guard brought together both Sunni and 
Shi'i activists to oppose British plans for Iraq.87  The majority of members were Shiite, 
however, and it was led by Muhammad al-Sadr, son of the senior mujtahid Ayatollah 
Hasan al-Sadr of al-Kazimiyya.  The organization was also closely linked with Mirza 
Muhammad Rida, and his father, the mujjtahid Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi al-Shirazi.88 
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Iraqi Shi’i political activism reached its peak during the Revolt of 1920.  The mujtahids 
instigated the rebellion in response to British policies in both Iraq and Iran that to their 
minds threatened their status and economic well-being.  In Iran, the British sought 
economic concessions that called into question the independence of the Iranian 
government and jeopardized the interests of the Iranian bazaari class that was vital to the 
welfare of the mujtahids.  In Iraq, the British sought to control the pilgrimages and the 
burial trade, significantly reducing the independence of the mujtahids.  Underlying all 
these motives was the mujtahids’ perception of the occupation of Iraq by the Christian 
British as an indication of the decline of the Islamic civilization.89  As part of a pattern of 
cooperation between the Shi’i religious establishment and the Sunni Sharifians, the senior 
mujtahid, Shirazi, successfully united Sunni and Shi’i elements of the population.90  The 
Revolt thus galvanized feeling of Iraqi national unity to an unprecedented degree.91  
Through the Revolt the mujtahids sought to create an independent Islamic government.92  
The Revolt was crushed by the British within several months, however, and there was a 
sharp decline in the ulama’s power.  Instead of gaining political supremacy, the ulama 
began an eighty year slide into relative obscurity.93   
After the trauma of the 1920 Revolt, the British decided to install the Hashemite 
Faysal as king, and on the first anniversary of the outbreak of the Revolt he left his family 
home in Mecca to take his new throne in Baghdad.94  As Faysal consolidated power in 
the early 1920s, he feared the power of the mujtahids and sought to contain them.95  He 
changed the Law of Immigration on 9 June 1923 in a move to expose the largely Iranian 
clerical class to potential legal jeopardy.  On 25 June, senior cleric Mahdi al-Khalisi was 
arrested and deported to Aden.  The nine most prominent Iranian members of the ulama 
departed Iraq for Iran in protest on 2 July and proceeded to Qom.  After a period of 
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embarrassing negotiations, they returned in April of 1924, on the condition of political 
submission to Faysal.96  The king recognized the importance of the Shi’i community, and 
actively promoted a strong Shi’i presence in the civil service.97 
The League of Nations mandatory period and the monarchy that followed resulted 
in key reductions of Iran’s influence in Iraq, as Iranians there now fell under the Iraqi 
legal jurisdiction, without the rights granted formerly under the Ottomans.98  Among the 
Iraqi government’s efforts to limit the influence of Iranians within Iraq were the 1924 
Iraqi Nationality Law, which automatically made Iranian residents Iraqi nationals unless 
they renounced that nationality by a given date; a 1927 law prohibiting the employment 
of foreigners in government positions; a 1929 law regulating civil and religious judges; 
and the Holy Shrine Regulations 25 and 42 of 1948 and1950, respectively, which 
regulated the management of shrines. 99  The effectiveness of these and other such 
measures can be seen in the fact that while in the early 1900s, Iranians composed 75 
percent of the population  of Karbala, by 1957 they constituted only 12 per cent.100 
2. Period of Relative Quietism 
a. The Rise of Qom and the Decline of Najaf 
The Iranian city of Qom, the site of the shrine of Ma'sumeh, sister of the 
eighth Imam, had been a main center of Shi’i learning from the tenth century, but after 
the Afghan invasion of Iran in the sixteenth century it declined in importance. It was then 
eclipsed by Najaf and Karbala.  Qom became noted once again as center of education, 
however,  with the arrival of Shaykh Abdul-Karim Ha'iri-Yazdi, who journeyed there on 
pilgrimage in 1921 and was personally welcomed by Ahmad Shah, the last Qajar king, 
who invited him to stay and teach.101  As relations between the two countries deteriorated 
in the 1920s, the pilgrimage from Iran to Iraq diminished substantially, furthering the 
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decline of Najaf and the rise of Qom.102  Qom also benefited from the diversion of funds 
which had previously flowed to Najaf and Karbala.103  As it assumed its place as a 
leading center of learning, Qom differed from Najaf in its homogenous student 
population, quite different from the international diversity seen in Najaf.104  Among the 
many students in the newly revitalized city was the young Ruhollah Khomeini, who 
earned his certificate as a mujtahid in the early 1930s.105  Qom’s student population grew 
from 1,000 in 1937 to 5,000 in the 1950s.106   
When Hairi-Yazdi died in 1937, his role in promoting Qom was assumed 
by Ayatollahs Sayyid Muhammad Taqi Khwansari, Sayyid Ali Hujjat, and Sayyid 
Sadru’d-Din Sadr.107  After the death of Abu al-Hasan Isfahani in 1946 and the rise of 
Husayn Burujirdi as marja al-taqlid, the marja’iyya (religious leadership) shifted 
decisively from Najaf to Qom.108   
Meanwhile, the Iraqi religious establishment suffered.  Its scholars had 
dropped in number from 12,000 in the early 1900s to 1,954 in 1957, only 326 of whom 
were actually Iraqis.109 Among the Iraq-based ulama, only Mushin al-Hakim and Abu al-
Qasim Khu’i continued to enjoy funding after 1950 from the Iranian bazaar, but even 
they had to keep most of their funds outside Iraq.110 
b. Shi’i Politics and Religion in the Modern Iraqi State  
As the Shi’i religious establishment in Iraq declined, leaders of the modern 
Iraqi state successfully separated the Shi’i tribal leaders from the ulama. This further 
reduced the ability of these elites to coordinate action on behalf of the Shi’i 
community.111 
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In the 1920s many southern Iraqis flocked to Baghdad, a wave of 
migration that continued throughout the monarchy.  The migrants fled the countryside 
because of the lack of development inherent in the land tenure system and sought the 
growing economic opportunities of the capital.  This wave of migration made Shi’a the 
majority in Baghdad: their percentage in the metropolitan area went from 20 percent in 
1940 to more than 50 percent in 1958.112 
While phenomena such as new water management schemes and the 
exodus of the Jewish mercantile class enriched some Shi’a by the middle of the twentieth 
century, the vast majority remained in extreme poverty.113  They were thus ripe for a 
revolutionary movement. 
The Shi’i Iraqis saw pan-Arabism as a movement that excluded them and 
favored Sunnis; thus they promoted Iraqi nationalism instead.114  For example, they 
protested a government academic curriculum that excluded any mention of the 1920 
Revolt as a key episode of Sunni-Shi’i cooperation and instead presented it as a Sunni 
initiative.115  Pan-Arab politicians tried to reduce the power of the religious forces by 
promoting Shi’i actors within the secular education system and attacking the objections 
of the mujtahids to secular and female education.116 The Sunni-Shi’i tension in this 
period was largely due to a usually unsuccessful quest by many Shi’a for government 
employment.117  Traditionally, Shi’i religious leaders had disapproved of service in a 
Sunni government such as that of the Ottoman Empire.118  With the decline of the 
ulama’s influence, however, the Shi’a were more inclined to attain government service, 
Sunni or not.  
With the forces of Islam in decline and opportunities through pan-Arabism 
seemingly denied them, many Shi’a turned to communism.  Most members of the Iraqi  
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Communist Party were Shi’i, and, among senior officials in the party, Shi’i representation 
grew from 21 percent in 1949 to 47 percent in 1955. 119  Shi’a also dominated the lower 
ranks of the party.120 
D. RESURGENT STIRRINGS OF SHI’I ACTIVISM 
1. Mohammed Baqir Sadr, “The First Martyr” of the Sadr Movement; 
and the Roots of Hizb al-Da’wa al-Islamiyya 
Shi’i fundamentalism in Iraq dates to 1958, when a military coup overthrew the 
monarchy.  In the aftermath, the new president, Abd al-Karim Qasim, used Communist 
networks to oppose his Arab nationalist rivals.  Soon, the Communists dominated the 
political scene, infiltrating even the Shi’i holy cities, Najaf, Karbala, and Kadhimiyya.  
The Shi’i religious establishment realized that it had to act swiftly and decisively if it was 
to survive the tide of atheism seemingly sweeping the nation.121 
At the time, the ulama were divided between those who sought to avoid politics 
altogether until the return of the Mahdi and more activists clerics who saw a need to take 
a stand and therefore formed the Jama'at al-Ulama (Association of Religious Scholars) in 
Najaf as part of their effort. 122   As communism became a growing presence in Iraq, 
particularly among the young, Shi'i activists founded the Hizb al-Da’wa al-Islamiyya 
(Islamic Call Party).123   
Over time, Islam replaced communism as the favored Shi’i ideology.124  The 
Islamist movement based its support in two constituencies: the young lay intellectuals 
and the urban poor.125  Because Islamic activists often had far more impressive 
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educations than the ruling officials of the Ba’athist government,126 they were often 
frustrated at the lack of economic opportunities open to them.  While the large numbers 
of educational institutions meant a greater concentration of young people who could be 
mobilized, the increasing urbanization meant an increase in the number of urban poor.127 
One main figure, Mohammad Baqir Sadr, came to personify the intellectual 
movement that swept through Najaf from the 1950s to the 1980s. 128 Sadr was born in the 
early 1930s in the holy city of Kazimiya, but in 1945, his family moved to Najaf, where 
he spent the rest of his life.129  His publication in 1959 of Falsafatuna (Our Philosophy) 
and in 1961 of Iqtidaduna (Our Economics) made him the leading figure of the Islamic 
intelligentsia.130  Ultimately, he would become “the mastermind behind a program that 
aimed to establish an Islamic state not only in Iraq, but throughout the Islamic world:”131  
a program that has been amazingly successful in revolutionary Iran, but was quickly 
crushed in Iraq.  As one sign of Sadr’s great popularity, before the obliteration of the 
program, he was seen by his followers as the “future Khomeini” of Iraq.132 
As he gained stature, Sadr found himself caught in the middle of appealing but 
conflicting ideologies: drawn to the traditional religious culture of the shrine cities, but 
also influenced by communism’s stand and appeal for social justice.133  In an attempt to 
combine these influences, Sadr became active in the Da’wa Party and, in time, became its 
leader and faqih al-hizb (supreme jurisconsult).  He promoted a party vision that 
sponsored revolutionaries and called for overthrow of the Iraqi regime, the formation of  
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an Islamic state, and the promotion of Islamic revolution around the world.  To begin this 
process and facilitate clandestine operations, Sadr restructured the party into a cellular 
organization.134   
At the same time that Sadr promoted political action through his leadership of the 
Da’wa party, he also improved his religious stature, becoming a leading mujtahid in 
Najaf.  Senior clerics in the hawza, who determined the future leaders, did not want to 
attract government scrutiny by promoting an activist and political party member.  Thus 
Sadr was forced to abandon his personal affiliation with Da’wa, although he retained 
close ties with its members.  Once he committed to the hawza, he attempted to reform it, 
proposing new textbooks and study methods that reflected modern academia.135 
On 8 February 1963, Arab nationalists in the army joined members of the Ba’ath 
Party in a successful coup against President Qasim.136  Even though the Ba’ath Party had 
a large if not majority of Shi’a in its leadership and membership,137 Shi’i Communist 
strongholds in Baghdad fought fiercely against the Ba’athists, despite but were 
overcome.138  The Arab nationalists then ousted the Ba’athists in November 1963, and 
installed Abd al-Salam Arif as the new head of government.139  From 1964 to 1968, Shi’i 
political actors in Iraq enjoyed a “golden age”.  Under the sponsorship of the Arif regime, 
which appreciated their help in overthrowing Qasim, and with the help of anti-
Communist ulama, Shi’i politicians enjoyed a brief period of political open space.  The 
Da’wa Party in particular prospered in this new environment.140 
This period came to an end, however, when the Ba’athists regained power on 17 
July 1968.  The new Ba’athist regime perceived the Shi’i religious establishment as an 
unacceptable alternative to its leadership and took tentative steps to restrict its power.  It 
closed some educational institutions and publishing houses, expelled foreigners from the 
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Najaf hawza, and forced hawza students to join the military.141  The Ba’ath Party was 
dominated by Sunnis by this point, having lost the sense of Sunni-Shi’i unity that it had 
possessed prior to 1963.142 
In April of 1969, Ba’athist President Ahmed Hasan al-Bakr appealed to Ayatollah 
Mushin al-Hakim, the senior mujtahid, for support in a disagreement with Iran over the 
Shatt al-‘Arab, the waterway that separates Iraq and Iran in the south.  When Hakim 
declined to cooperate, Bakr retaliated against the ulama.  In the context of dealing with 
the so-called “Iranian threat,” Bakr deported Iranian religious students and an estimated 
20,000 others of Iranian descent.  He also shut down Kufa University, which had 
operated independent of government oversight.143 
In June of 1969, Ayatollah Mushin al-Hakim marched from Najaf to Baghdad 
drawing thousands of supporters to his side along the way.  Frightened by that show of 
strength, the regime arrested his son, Sayyid Mahdi al-Hakim, and accused him of spying 
for Israel.  The government also arrested prominent ulama and stopped religious 
broadcasts and instruction.144  Sheikh abd al-Aziz al-Badri, a Sunni cleric who had 
preached in defense of Mahdi al-Hakim, was tortured and killed in an attempt to prevent 
Sunni-Shi’i cooperation, thus becoming the first modern Islamic martyr in Iraq.145 Mahdi 
al-Hakim escaped abroad, and the clergy settled into political silence, which would be 
broken only when Sadr promoted overt political action in the 1970s.146 
2. Khomeini and Shi’i Activism in Iran 
Despite repression under the Pahlavi shah, in the latter half of the twentieth 
century  religious forces increased in Iran, largely due to increasing urbanization.  
Between 1956 and 1976, the urban population increased threefold, while the rural  
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population grew by only a third.  Religious forces grew particularly strong in two 
constituencies; the lower middle class bazaaris, and recent arrivals from the 
countryside.147 
Having completed his studies in Qom, Khomeini practiced religion in relative 
obscurity until 1962 when he became one of the leading figures in Iran to oppose the 
Shah’s “White Revolution.”  He led major public demonstrations, but the Shah not only 
effectively repressed his followers, nut also jailed and then exiled Khomeini himself.  
Throughout 1964 Khomeini found refuge in Turkey. In 1965, the Arif regime invited 
Khomeini to come to Najaf.148   
Once in Iraq, Khomeini tried to pressure the ulama into active opposition to the 
Shah, but was rebuffed by Ayatollah al-Hakim.  Under Hakim’s leadership, the ulama of 
Najaf remained convinced that peaceful and gradual change would be accomplished 
through education and individual action.149  Beginning in 1970, Khomeini would speak 
out firmly in favor of a much more active role for the ulama. 
E. CONCLUSION 
An examination of Shi’i history in Iraq and Iran reveals many insights into the 
differences in Shi’ism in the two countries.  The story of Iraqi Shi’ism is the history of an 
Arab, tribal, and distinctly Iraqi identity.  Iranian Shi’i history, meanwhile, revolves 
around the religion of the state and uniquely Persian themes.   Early Shi’i history 
was largely Arab, as important events took place in what is now Iraq, not Iran.  Historical 
regional sectarian struggles also occurred mostly in Iraq, leaving a bitter legacy often 
evoked by the current conflict.  The different pattern of conversion in Iraq and Iran led to 
different religious practices and themes and rival religious centers.  Around the turn of 
the twentieth century, Shi’i activists based in Iraq instigated actions in both Iran and Iraq, 
but were then effectively suppressed for many years. After several decades, modern 
Islamist leadership emerged from the two countries, but again in separate ways.  
Khomeini developed his movement in opposition to the Shah, while Sadr sought to 
oppose communism and then to promote Islam within the diverse context of Iraq.  The 
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implications of these all differences became manifest in the 1970s with the success of 
























III.  THE RISE AND DECLINE OF SHI’I ACTIVISM IN IRAQ AND 
IRAN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Current critics of Shi’i loyalty in Iraq fear the triumph of a transnational Shi’i 
identity that would upset the balance of power in the Middle East.  In the 1970s, the apex 
of the Left in the Middle East, such religious activism seemed to go against the secular 
and modern spirit of the age.  In the early 1970s the Ba’athist regime firmly held power 
throughout Iraq and so on the surface at least had little to fear from the Shi’i religious 
establishment.  No one could foresee that within ten years adherents of a reactionary 
ideology harkening back to one thousand years of religious tradition would seize power.  
Even so, at the end of the decade the Islamists overthrew the Shah of Iran.  They 
consolidated their Islamic state in the fight against secular Arab nationalists, most notably 
Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, but in doing so would strengthen Iraqi nationalism.   
These events came to a head in 1980, when, with Saddam Hussein’s execution of 
Mohammed Baqir Sadr and invasion of Iran, fundamentalism began to decline.  As he 
moved against the revolutionary mullahs in Tehran, Saddam counted on the support of 
the Arab inhabitants of the Iranian province of Khuzestan and paid heavily for that 
miscalculation.  Instead of falling apart, the Iranian mullahs used the war to consolidate 
their power at the expense of the secular nationalists and other rivals. They too made a 
dangerous mistake, however, as they plunged into a reckless counter-invasion of Iraq.  
Instead of rallying to support their Iranian co-religionists, Iraqi Shi’a fought strongly 
against them. Ironically, however, even as the war seemed to reveal the strength of Iraqi 
nationalism, it broke down the secular, statist model of governance promoted by the 
Ba’athist regime.  In Iran, meanwhile, after Khomeini’s death the succession process 
called into question the religious basis of the Islamic government.  In retrospect, while 
the experience of Shi’i activism during the 1970s and ‘80s demonstrated the close 
interaction between the Islamists of both nations, it also brought into sharp relief the 
importance of national identity. 
The two decades have specific relevance for contemporary Iraqi politics.  The 
organizations now vying for power within the Shi’i United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) all trace 
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their origins back to movements that reached prominence with the rise of Shi’i 
fundamentalism in the 1970s, were formed during that period, or emerged in its 
immediate aftermath.  The Dawa party reached its maximum power in the 1970s.  The 
current Sadr movement has inherited the legacy and reconstituted the networks that 
Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr developed in the 1970s.  The Supreme Council for the Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) was formed in Iran in 1982 as an organization of Shi’i exiles 
who had escaped the repression of the Ba’athist regime in Iraq.  Thus virtually all of the 
prominent actors in contemporary Shi’i Iraqi politics trace their origins back to this 
period. 
B. SHI’I ACTIVISM IN THE 1970S 
1. The Death of Hakim and the Rise of Sadr 
Grand Ayatollah Mushin al-Hakim died in the summer of 1970, clearing the way 
for more activist ulama to take the lead.  Many of Hakim’s followers transferred their 
loyalty to Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr, allowing him to take a more bold 
leadership role.  Even as a newly designated  marja, Sadr was opposed by much of the 
religious establishment because of what they perceived as his extreme ideas, but he 
enjoyed tremendous popular support.  The new chief mujtahid, Grand Ayatollah Abu al 
Qasim al-Kho’i, remained a quietest, however, and also enjoyed widespread support.150 
Within several years of his rise to the highest ranks of the ulama, Sadr was generally 
acknowledged as the likely successor to Kho’i.151   
2. Khomeini and Vilayat-i Faqih 
In early 1970, while still in exile in Najaf, Ayatollah Khomeini delivered several 
lectures describing his concept of Islamic governance, which centered on his theory of 
vilayat-i faqih (Mandate of the Jurist).  The lectures advocated the establishment of an 
Islamic state, rejected the separation of religion from politics, and argued that political 
power should be wielded by qualified Shi’i clerics.152  This theory marked a radical 
innovation in traditional Shi’i doctrine.  The Iraqi government tolerated such rhetoric 
because Khomeini focused his ire on the Shah of his native Iran.  His ideas reverberated 
within Iraq as well, however, as they articulated a means for defending Islam, especially                                                  
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Shi’ism, against the secular, Sunni-led Ba’athist regime.153  Khomeini was not close to 
the Iraq ulama, however; despite living in the same city for fourteen years, for instance, 
he never met with Sadr.154 
3. Ba’athist Repression of the Islamists 
In early 1970, the regime announced the discovery of an allegedly Iranian-
inspired plot to overthrow the government.  As they had in the past, the Ba’athists raised 
the specter of an “Iranian threat,” and the security services arrested and executed many 
suspected regime opponents and expelled many “Iranians.”155 
Having quieted the hawza with the arrest and expulsion of Mahdi al-Hakim, the 
Ba’athists then turned to the Dawa Party.  In 1972, they rounded up many Dawa 
members and sentenced them to prison terms of up to five years.  The regime also 
arrested Sadr briefly in 1972, and worked to undermine Shi’i communal identity and 
loyalty by establishing patronage networks independent of traditional loyalties.156 
In 1974, after riots at a protest held during the traditional procession from Najaf to 
Karbala commemorating Imam Husayn’s martyrdom, the regime arrested seventy-five 
members of the Dawa party and sentenced five to death, including three members of the 
ulama.157  To avoid any further precedents of executing clergy, Sadr prohibited the 
ulama from party membership.  He was again arrested, but was soon released.158 Amid 
the turmoil, the hawza sank deeper into decline.  In the years immediately prior to the 
Iranian revolution, the number of students at Iraqi seminaries dropped from 3,000 to 
600.159 
In 1977, when the Ba’athist regime attempted to prevent the Muharram 
procession altogether, riots broke out in Najaf and tens of thousands began to march.  The 
regime responded with military force, killing and imprisoning hundreds.  A Special 
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Revolutionary Court was formed, which sentenced seven to death and fifteen others, 
including Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, to life in prison.  Sadr was arrested and sent to 
Baghdad, but had to be released to prevent more rioting.160 
In October 1978, at the urging of the Shah, the Ba’athist regime expelled 
Khomeini from Najaf.  The Iraqis honored the Shah’s request in part because they feared 
Khomeini’s influence over dissident Shi’a.  Khomeini’s expulsion backfired, however, as 
once he was in the West Khomeini had access to the global media, which would 
eventually play a significant role in enabling his triumphant return to Iran.161    
4. The Islamic Revolution in Iran 
The Iranian revolution succeeded in the manner and time that it did not so much 
because of the strength of the revolutionaries, particularly the Islamists, but because of 
the weakness and indecision of the Shah.  In its aftermath, however, the Islamists claimed 
its success as an indicator of the righteousness and inevitable victory of their cause.  In 
doing so, they minimized the role of nationalism in the revolution and so failed to see that 
their success could not be reproduced, particularly in the dissimilar political context of 
Iraq.  The Islamists failed to differentiate the nationalist sentiments that united the Iranian 
revolutionaries from the ethnic and sectarian cleavages used by Iraqi political leaders to 
divide and rule.  They also failed to distinguish the Shah’s hesitancy and passivity from 
Saddam’s brutality and ruthless determination.  These misperceptions would lead them to 
encourage Iraqi Islamists to follow their example, with disastrous consequences. 
Resistance to the Shah developed in the latter half of the 1970s due to increasing 
economic setbacks and a lack of political and economic liberalization.  The opposition 
groups benefited from the Carter Administration’s human right policies and the fact that 
the Shah knew he was dying of cancer.162  Opposition grew throughout 1977 and 1978.  
The Shah declared martial law on 8 September 1978, but vacillated between harsh 
repression and political liberalization.163  By the end of November 1978, the Islamists 
controlled Qom and Mashad and announced the formation of an Islamic republic.   The                                                  
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Shah refused to employ the army to put down the massive demonstrations on 10 and 11 
December 1978, which that year marked the eve and anniversary (Tasu’a and Ashura) of 
Husayn’s martyrdom, in the religiously significant month of Moharram 1399. 164  The 
success of those protests spelled the end of the Shah’s rule.  The demonstration on 11 
December effectively spread that political reality to the rest of the country, and, by the 
end of the month, the Islamists exercised some control over Isfahan, Khorramshahr, and 
Tabriz. In the last few days of the year, the Shah announced his imminent departure from 
the country.165   
On 12 January 1979, Khomeini established a Council of Islamic Revolution for 
the purpose of planning a new government.166  He returned to Iran on 1 February 1979.  
The revolutionary committees consolidated their power throughout February, combining 
Islamist and secular forces.167  Despite their later losses, non-religious forces, particularly 
leftist guerrillas, played a key role in overthrowing the Shah.168  To avoid alarming these 
actors, Khomeini and his followers downplayed the idea of vilayat-i faqih, suppressed the 
publication of his lectures on the subject, and emphasized that ulama would not hold 
direct power in the new government.169 
Throughout the rest of 1979, Khomeini developed the Islamist faction at the 
expense of other revolutionaries.  This effort culminated in the seizure of the American 
Embassy in Tehran by Islamic “Students Following the Line of the Imam” on 4 
November 1979, which led to the fall of the secular revolutionary government and its 
replacement by the Islamist Revolutionary Council.  The country united in anti-
Americanism, and on 2 December approved by referendum the new constitution, thereby 
instituting a theocracy and what was termed “the Second Islamic Revolution.”170  This  
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began a four-year process to remove all secular revolutionary elements from the 
government, which received an additional boost from the need for national unity during 
the Iran-Iraq War.171 
As Khomeini moved to implement his theory of vilayat-i faqih, many Shi’i clerics 
including Grand Ayatollahs Kho’i, Qomi, and Shari’at-madri, and Ayatollahs Baha al-
Din Mahallati, Sadeq Ruhani, Ahmad Zanjani, Ali Tehrani, and Mortaza Haeri Yazdi 
voiced doctrinal objections.  They cited two basic reasons for rejecting Khomeini’s plan: 
first, that the authority of Shi’i clerics does not extend to political issues, but is instead 
restricted to religious affairs; and second, that religious authority is to be shared among 
the entire clerical class, not focused in a single supreme leader.  Several of these clerics 
were close associates or students of Khomeini, making their criticism particularly 
biting.172 
5. Sadr’s Reaction to the Revolution 
The Iranian Revolution inspired Islamists throughout the world; Sadr was one of 
the first to celebrate it.  He issued statements of support, sent emissaries to the 
revolutionaries, and asked the Arab Iranians in Khuzestan to set aside their ethnicity and 
support the Islamic Republic.  In response to questions from Lebanese ulama about the 
construction of an Islamic state, Sadr also published six essays on Islamic governance, 
later entitled al-Islam Yaqud al-Hayat (Islam Governs Life).  The essays profoundly 
influenced the writers of the new Iranian constitution, who incorporated his ideas about 
the structure and function of the Islamic state and the responsibilities and absolute 
authority of the marja.173  He also began to promote his concept of vilayat-i ummah (rule 
of the people), which would contrast with Khomeini’s ideas on Islamic governance.174  
Sadr's ideas on Islamic governance combined Western-style elections of a president and 
parliament with a special place for mujtahids charged with defending Islamic law.175   
Sadr’s would support democratic elections until his death.176  While Ayatollah 
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Khomeini's 1970 series of lectures on vilayat-i faqih lacked a conceptual concreteness 
that could lead to execution, some of Sadr's ideas were incorporated directly into Chapter 
Seven, "Leadership,” of the new Iranian Constitution.177   
Despite his support for the revolution in Iran, however, Sadr did not support its 
duplication in Iraq.  He did not believe that conditions there favored revolutionaries.  
Eventually, however, his hand would be forced by both Khomeini and other Islamists 
within Iraq, all of whom misread the situation and promoted action prematurely.178 
C. THE CULMINATING POINT: 1979 AND 1980 
1. The Iraqi Shi’i Islamist Response to the Iranian Revolution 
In the beginning, the Iraqi regime greeted the new Islamic republic with overtures 
of friendship.  Instead of taking advantage of the chaos of the early revolutionary period, 
Saddam invited Iran to join the Non-Aligned Movement.  His regime even praised the 
revolutionaries for acting in support of the “deep historical relations” between the two 
countries.  Khomeini was allowed to broadcast his messages on Iraqi radio and to meet 
with potential Iraqi confederates.  While Khomeini enjoyed Ba’athist resources, however, 
their use did not endear the regime to him and the friendly gestures soon proved naïve.179 
The Islamic Revolution’s success in Iran inspired Dawa and other Iraqi Shi’i 
movements, which began a small-scale campaign of resistance.  The Ba’athist regime, 
now fearful of suffering the Shah’s fate, quickly responded with overwhelming force.  In 
June 1979, Sadr was placed under house arrest.  Major demonstrations resulted, rippling 
through Najaf, Karbala, Kufa, and Madinat al-Thawra (Revolutionary City, later called 
Saddam City, and now known as Sadr City).   For a time the regime lost complete control 
of Madinat al-Thawra.  Eventually, the security services arrested nearly 5,000 people, 
including prominent Shi’i and even Sunni clergy.  Many prisoners were executed, while 
others were expelled.  Sadr’s supporters circumvented his house arrest by circulating 
tapes of his antiregime sermons.180     
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This context combined with other domestic and foreign threats to prompt Saddam 
Hussein to seize power in July of 1979.181  As he consolidated his control, Saddam 
sought to unify the country with an identity centered on his person, and so he suppressed 
other forms of identity, especially ethnic or religious ones.  In his search for historical 
legitimacy, he traced his heritage back to the Abbasid caliphs, and even further back to 
the kings of Mesopotamia.182 
2. The Execution of Sadr and the Eradication of Iraqi Islamism 
In October of 1979, the Jama'at al-Ulama endorsed a call for violent resistance 
from Dawa and other Islamist groups, such as Jund al-Imam and the Islamic Task 
Organization.  Meanwhile, Sadr greatly increased his personal exposure to danger by 
forbidding Muslims to join the Ba'ath Party.  In messages heard by millions, Khomeini, 
Iran’s new leader, encouraged Sadr to stay in Iraq despite government persecution, in 
effect goading him into action.183  Khomeini essentially refused to shelter Sadr, and 
called him by the dismissive title Hujjat al-Islam, even as Sadr referred to him as 
Ayatollah.184  Thus pressured, Sadr proclaimed that he intended to remain and fight.  
When demonstrations subsequently broke out throughout Iraq in support of Khomeini 
and Sadr, Sadr sought to dampen them to minimize his supporters’ exposure to 
repression.  Saddam’s security forces then arrested him, along with hundreds of Dawa 
members.  This sparked even larger demonstrations, instigated by Sadr’s sister, Bint al-
Huda, and riots erupted all over the country.185 
The popular response to Sadr’s imprisonment made his influence clear to the 
regime, which now became convinced that he constituted an unacceptable threat.  The 
Ba’athists could no longer blame Islamist revolutionary activities solely on Iranian 
elements.  They had deported some 130,000 Iraqis with Iranian roots, but Sadr came from 
a prominent Iraqi family.  Unable, therefore, to simply export the Islamic militancy 
problem, the regime determined to eliminate it altogether.  It redoubled its repression of 
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Dawa, of its associates, and of all Shi’i leaders.  It kept Sadr under house arrest, where he 
soon became convinced that martyrdom was eminent.186  
On 1 April 1980, a member of the Islamic Task Organization failed in an attempt 
to assassinate the Ba’athist Deputy Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz.187  The Ba’ath Party 
responded by sentencing all past and present members of Dawa to death.  On 5 April, the 
security services arrested Sadr and his troublesome sister Bint al-Huda.  They were both 
tortured, and three days later his body was given to his cousin Mohammed Sadiq Sadr.188  
The next several weeks saw another failed assassination attempt, this time on the Iraqi 
Minister of Information, Latif Nesseif al-Jasim, and an Islamist bombing campaign that 
ultimately killed twenty Iraqi government officers.189   
By killing such a prominent religious figure as Sadr, an act unprecedented in Iraqi 
history, the regime served notice of its determination to subdue the Shi’i resistance.  
Ayatollah al-Kho’i was placed under de facto house arrest, and throughout 1980 up to 
40,000 more “Iranians” were deported.  As he suppressed the traditional leaders of the 
Shi’i community, Saddam created new patronage networks in an effort to develop a new 
class of leaders loyal to him.190 
D. THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR AND SHI’I LOYALTY 
The eight-year war between Iran and Iraq was the most traumatic interaction 
between the two populations in modern history.  It exposed the limitations of 
transnational Islamism.  Most importantly, it showed the folly of the Iranian leadership’s 
discounting of nationalism in their own revolution and their failure to recognize the 
political context of Iraq, similar to their error in helping instigate the revolutionary 
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1. Saddam’s Motives 
Saddam viewed the suppression of Iraqi sectarian identities as crucial to his 
maintenance of power.  Repression of the Shi’a antagonized Iran, however, particularly 
as the Islamic Revolution consolidated.  The Iranian leaders depicted Saddam as the 
personification of the forces of secularism and socialism that their revolution sought to 
obliterate.  For his part, Saddam perceived the Iranians’ position as a confirmation of his 
fears regarding the Shi’a of Iraq.191  His confrontation with Iran also confirmed 
Saddam’s credentials as a leading figure in the Arab world and evoked loyalty from 
Iraq’s Sunni population.192   
Nevertheless, Saddam was hesitant to take action, knowing that any conflict was 
likely to jeopardize Iraq’s new-found prosperity, a result of the oil boom of the 1970s.  
Iraqi oil revenues had risen sharply over the decade, from $1 billion in 1972 to $21 
billion in 1979 and $26 billion in 1980.  The funds allowed the regime to generously 
increase social spending, which led to a rise in the standard of living for almost all Iraqis.   
Even in the face of such risks, however, Saddam viewed the revolutionary 
government in Tehran as increasingly extreme and uncompromising, and thus an 
unprecedented threat.193 In its official rationale for the attack on Iran in September 1980, 
the Iraqi government claimed to be retaliating for “terrorist acts and sabotage by 
infiltrators who came in from Iran, by Iranian residents in Iraq, and by other people of 
Iranian origin, who set about committing a large number of murders and injuries from 
explosions.”194   
2. The Start of the War 
Tensions between the two nations increased throughout 1980, as Saddam pressed 
for complete sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab, and clashes erupted along the border.  
On 17 September 1980, Iraq disavowed the 1975 treaty demarcating the border along the  
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Shatt al-Arab, and claimed full control of the waterway.  On 22 September, Iraqi Air 
Force units conducted strikes on Iranian air bases and Iraqi ground forces commenced an 
invasion. 195  
Saddam’s military objective was apparently to win rapid and decisive battlefield 
victories that would force the Iranian government to sue for peace and agree to territorial 
concessions.  This plan, however, failed to take into account both the limitations of the 
Iraqi military and the tenacity of the Iranian defenders.  The Iranian regime was able to 
use the invasion to mobilize the Iranian public and to consolidate the rule of the 
mullahs.196  Meanwhile, Saddam's ambitious gamble to achieve only limited ends failed 
spectacularly.  Most disappointing, his hopes that the Arabs of Khuzestan would rise up 
against the Iranian government quickly proved unfounded,197 suggesting that ethnic or 
sectarian factions may not be as amenable to separatist tendencies as outsiders may 
assume. 
The main effort of the Iraqi attack focused on Khuzestan, in an attempt to carve 
out an enclave to protect Iraq’s possession of the Shatt al-Arab.  Iraqi forces soon 
besieged the Iranian cities of Khorramshar and Abadan.198 As he sought only limited 
objectives, Saddam did not push his forces to achieve maximum gains.  Instead, he halted 
their advance after less than a week of offensive operations, declaring that he was ready 
for negotiations.199 
The Iranians quickly struck back, and did so in a manner that clearly indicated 
their unwillingness to discuss compromises.  On 24 September 1980, their naval forces 
destroyed two oil terminals near Fao, seriously disrupting Iraq's ability to export oil, and 
then pressed on to attack Basra.  They targeted Baghdad repeatedly, conducting eight air 
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raids there by 1 October 1980.200  They defended Khorramshar so tenaciously that it did 
not fall to Iraq until 24 October 1980.201 
When Khorramshar finally fell to the Iraqis both sides ceased offensive operations 
for eight months.  Iran consolidated its positions and embarked upon a crash program to 
rebuild its military. It formed the youth movement, Basji e-Mustazafin (Mobilization of 
the Deprived), which would later conduct famous human-wave attacks. Iraq set a 
defense, and on 7 December 1980 Saddam announced that Iraq would not initiate any 
further attacks. 202   
In the spring of 1981, Iran began the slow process of driving Iraq from its 
territory.  When its forces finally expelled the Iraqis from Khorramshar in late May 1982, 
taking 12,000 prisoners in the process, Saddam realized that he needed to withdraw 
altogether if he was to save any of his army.  In June, without Saddam’s approval, the 
Iraqi military command and the Ba’ath Party’s regional and national commands proposed 
a cease-fire agreement to the Iranians.  Ayatollah Khomeini dismissed the offer, however, 
thereby greatly strengthening support for Saddam in Iraq.  Instead of pursuing a reckless 
military adventure, Iraq’s armed forces, including its many Shi’i members, were now 
seen as simply protecting their homeland against the Iranian counterattack. 203  On 20 
June, Saddam announced the withdrawal of the Iraqi military.   
3. Iran’s Counteroffensive 
Saddam’s announcement did not satisfy the Iranian leadership any more than had 
the proposal from the Iraqi military and the Ba’ath Party.  Iran pressed home its 
advantage by demanding not only Saddam’s ouster, but also reparations totaling $US 150 
billion and the return to Iraq of 100,000 Shi’a thrown out before the war.  The day after 
Saddam’s withdrawal announcement, Ayatollah Khomeini hinted that he would invade 
Iraq.  The day after that, Iranian Chief of Staff Shirazi vowed to “continue the war until 
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Saddam Hussein is overthrown so that we can pray at Karbala and Jerusalem.”  The 
Iranians attacked on 13 July 1982, pushing toward Basra.204 
A revitalized Iraqi army repelled five human-wave assaults throughout the 
summer of 1982, turning back an Iranian force of roughly 100,000 troops.  Iraq also 
began to experiment with the use of tear gas, setting a precedent for future chemical 
weapons use.  The Iranian army leaders sought to end the offensive at this point, but were 
rebuffed by the more aggressive mullahs, led by the Speaker of parliament, Ali Akbar 
Hashemi-Rafsanjani.  The mullahs forced the army to stage two more attacks in the fall 
of 1982, but these efforts came too little as well.205  
Iraq turned back a particularly strong Iranian offensive toward Basra in late spring 
1984 only through extreme measures, including the use of mustard gas and Sarin nerve 
agent.206  In 1985, Iran’s Operation Badr caused heavy Iraqi casualties and temporarily 
cut the Basra-Baghdad highway.  In response to that major threat, Saddam ordered the 
heaviest use yet of chemical weapons and attacked thirty Iranian towns and cities.  He 
also heavily targeted the oil facilities on Kharq Island, conducting almost sixty air strikes 
in a campaign viewed by Iran as more of a strategic threat than any potential Iraqi 
offensive.  Once again the war settled into stalemate.207 
Iran broke the stalemate on 9 February 1986, when its Operation Dawn 8 
managed to capture the Fao Peninsula.  Iraq unsuccessfully attempted to retake the 
peninsula, pouring forces into the area and expending vast amounts of ordnance in the 
effort.  The Iranians then pushed north from Fao to Umm Qasr, threatening to cut off 
Iraq’s access to the Persian Gulf, but ultimately failed in the attack.208 
4. War’s End 
As Iran continued to press its assault on Iraq, the Iraqi army leaders challenged 
Saddam, demanding the authority to prosecute the war in accordance with professional 
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military standards and their own professional expertise.  When Saddam acceded to their 
demands, the Iraqi situation began to improve. 209   
By early 1988, the Iranian war effort seemed to be in serious decline, with support 
at home waning.  In February of that year, Saddam began the fifth and most brutal series 
of strikes on Iranian cities, launching more than two hundred surface-to-surface missiles 
over two months.  This effort finally pushed the Iranians to their limit.  Civilians and 
government officials fled Tehran, and the Iranian military lost its morale.  In a forty-eight 
hour campaign in mid-April, Iraq retook the Fao Peninsula.  It quickly capitalized on this 
success by attacking along other fronts.  In concert with a large American presence in the 
Persian Gulf, which ultimately led to the shooting down of an Iranian airliner on 3 June 
1998, the Iraqi offensives placed unbearable pressure on Iran.   
The shoot down incident proved to be the excuse the Iranian leadership needed to 
accept a ceasefire, providing them with a narrative of martyrdom at the hands of a brutal 
and overwhelming aggressor.  On 17 July 1988, President Khameini accepted the U.N. 
proposal for a cease-fire.210   
5. The Formation of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in 
Iraq and the Badr Army 
In its fight against the Ba’athist state, the Iranian regime sought to exploit the 
capabilities of the many Iraqi exiles in Iran.  This effort came to fruition with the 
founding of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq.  While SCIRI would 
serve Iranian interests, however, its close connection with the mullahs discredited it 
among many other Iraqi groups.  After escaping persecution in Iraq, Muhammad Baqir 
al-Hakim sought refuge in Iran.  He soon led the Jama’at al-Ulama al-Mujahidin fil Iraq 
(Society of Militant Ulama in Iraq), and then Maktab al-Thawra al-Islamiya fil Iraq (The 
Bureau of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq), but enjoyed only limited success.211   Hakim 
founded SCIRI in Tehran on 17 November 1982.  The organization fulfilled Iran’s desire 
for an Iraqi body to oppose Saddam’s regime and to fill the political vacuum created by 
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the martyrdom of Mohammed Baqir Sadr. 212  Sayyid Ali Khamenei, Khomeini’s 
representative in the higher Defense Council and the leader of Friday prayers in Tehran, 
played a key role in developing SCIRI from its origins in the Maktab.  Hakim and 
Mahmud al-Hashimi, two followers among the four or five ulama chosen by Sadr as his 
al-qiyada al-na’iba (vice leadership), became speaker and president respectively of 
SCIRI.213  Hakim lacked deep roots in the Iraqi exile community, however, and his rise 
to prominence in Iran was due largely to his sponsors in the regime.214  
SCIRI was established in part to exploit Iran’s success in the war with Iraq.  By 
April 1982, the Iraqi army had been driven from Iran, and the Iranians were finalizing 
plans to invade Iraq.  If they were able to seize Basra, they hoped to establish there an 
Iraqi Islamic regime.215 Because of the larger context of the Iran-Iraq War and the fact 
that its material resources came from Iran, SCIRI naturally assumed a direct role in the 
war effort.216   
In its first iteration, SCIRI represented an Iranian effort to unite the divided Iraqi 
Shi’i Islamist expatriate factions.217  In time, it attempted to draw in Sunnis and Kurdish 
factions as well.218  While SCIRI boasted an assembly that purported to represent its 
members, authority actually rested in an executive committee tightly controlled by 
Hakim.  This made SCIRI a tool both for Iranian influence and for political patronage for 
Hakim.219 SCIRI marked the first attempt by Iraqi Islamist groups to institutionalize an 
effort to achieve an Islamic state in Iraq based Khomeini’s vision of vilayat-i faqih.220  
Other Shi’i groups disagreed with that doctrine, and thus viewed SCIRI with suspicion.  
The close ties between SCIRI and the Iranian government heightened their concerns. 221  
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Iran judged all Iraqi exile groups on the basis of their adherence to vilayat-i faqih, 
banning groups that opposed the doctrine and sponsoring groups like SCIRI that 
advocated it.222 
The Faylaq Badr, or Badr Army, was named after a battle fought by Mohammed 
and his followers against their opponents from Mecca and was composed of Iraqi exiles 
and Iraqi POW volunteers.  The POWs had to be granted amnesty by Hakim or another  
religious figure before they could be admitted.  Badr was, in reality, a branch of the 
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and was organized, trained, equipped, and 
employed by Iran.223 
Badr grew out of an initial organization of two hundred recruits into “The Forces 
of Imam al-Sadr.”  Between 1979 and 1983, this organization trained several thousand 
volunteers.  With the establishment of SCIRI in 1982, the volunteers were redesignated 
“Liwa al-Sadr” (The al-Sadr Regiment) and, later, Regiment Badr Nine.  In 1987, the 
IRGC expanded Regiment Badr Nine into a division-level unit composed of several 
thousand members.  Badr was commanded by an Iranian colonel, which undermined 
SCIRI’s promotion of it as an Iraqi organization, even though Iraqis occupied crucial 
posts on its general staff.224  
Faced with this new challenge to his regime, in the spring of 1983 Saddam 
arrested ninety members of the Hakim family, and executed six of them.  He sent a 
message to the exiled Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, warning him that there would be more 
executions if insurgent attacks did not stop.  Two years later Saddam killed ten more 
members of the Hakim family.225  Nonetheless, SCIRI pressed on with its operations 
throughout the Iran-Iraq war. 
6. The Trial of Iraqi Shi’i Loyalty 
The Iraqi Army was composed largely of Shi’i conscripts.  The regime was 
determined to prevent their developing ties with their Iranian Shia opponents, but 
Saddam had to act carefully in his treatment of Iraq’s Shi’i citizens.  The Iraqi 
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government sought to rally the Shi’i community while, at the same time, Iran stressed its 
Shi’i identity and thereby its commonality with Shi’i Iraqis.  In an attempt to prevent 
such common traits from leading to tangible bonds, the Iraqi government stepped up its 
efforts to separate Iraqi and Iranian identities, and to draw attention to differences within 
the Iraqi Shi’i community.226   
In 1981, the Iraqi government began a campaign to encourage Iraqi men with so-
called “Iranian” wives to divorce them.  The wives were typically the relatives of 
individuals already exiled in Iran.  The regime also began to seek direct control of Shi’i 
clerical activities: approving sermons, promoting religious figures, making clerics 
employees of the state, and physically monitoring mosques and other religious 
facilities.227   
The regime generated propaganda that appealed to the loyalty of Shi’i soldiers by 
emphasizing Iraqi unity, the Arab heritage of Iraq’s Shia, and the alleged lineage of 
Saddam Hussein, which was said to be traceable directly to Ali.  Regime propaganda also 
promoted historical symbols such as the battle of Qadisiyya in 637 C.E, in which Arabs 
defeated Persians.228  While it is difficult to judge the effectiveness of such propaganda, 
the Iraqi Shi’i did fight courageously and effectively for throughout the war.229 
During this period, there were also several Shi’i-led assassination attempts and 
military conspiracies against Saddam Hussein.230  Though Saddam’s threats against the 
Hakims failed to stop isolated terrorist incidents, the Shi’i population as a whole 
demonstrated its loyalty to the Iraqi nation throughout the war.  Saddam reciprocated by 
ensuring that 40 percent of the Iraqi parliament was Shi’i, that Shi’i living standards were 
improved, and that Shi’i shrines, particularly the Tomb of Ali in Najaf, were 
renovated.231  The Iraqi Army had always been dominated by its Sunni officer corps, but 
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as the war progressed, more and more Shi’a were promoted to important positions. 
Through their performance, they demonstrated their allegiance to the nation.  
E. THE WAR’S AFTERMATH 
1. The Weakening of the Secular Socialist Iraqi State 
The war destroyed the economic achievements of the Ba’athists.  Most Iraqis now 
saw the 1970s as an economic golden age, recalled later with the saw nostalgia as the 
Abbasid era.  Oil revenues had jumped from $476 million in 1968 to $26 billion in 1980.  
Political oppression increased, but economic progress was real and its benefits 
widespread.232   
In keeping with his optimistic, short-term focus, Saddam at first sought to protect 
the Iraqi people from the cost of the war.  Social spending rose during the early years of 
the conflict, increasing from $21 billion in 1980 to $29.5 billion in 1982.  The Iraqi 
populace continued to enjoy imported consumer goods, ongoing public works projects, a 
steady food supply, and new opportunities for women in the workforce, as well as 
expatriate labor to replace men at the front.  These measures could not hide the casualties, 
estimated at twelve hundred a month, but they could reduce their impact on the stability 
of the regime.233 
After the Iraqi reversal in 1982, Saddam was forced to abandon the subsidies to 
the civilian economy.  Mounting military expenditures, a global oversupply of oil, and 
the loss of a pipeline through Iranian-allied Syria combined to devastate the Iraqi 
treasury.  Its foreign reserves went from $35 billion before the war to $3 billion in 1983, 
prompting severe spending reductions.234 
Despite these setbacks, however, once the war moved onto Iraqi soil Saddam 
began to enjoy increased public support.  He constructed a heroic narrative, positing 
himself as the defender, not merely of the nation, but of the entire Arab world.  The 
Iranians complemented the story by their continuous rejections of Saddam’s calls for 
peace. 235   
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The cosmopolitan, modern nature of society, particularly within Baghdad, 
changed over the course of the war.  In its place, the values of the rif (countryside), of 
hard and brutal places such as Tikrit and Fallujah became predominant.236  The war was 
seen by many as changing the akhlaq (morality) of the nation.  One Baghdadi argued that 
“War makes people change.  Really.  The killing, blood, it makes people different.  It 
changes their psychology.  The war gives them an excuse to do anything.”237 
By the time the war ended, Iraq was devastated and in need of serious 
reconstruction.  Two hundred thousand Iraqis had been killed, 400,000 wounded, and 
70,000 captured.  Iraq in 1988 held $80 billion in debt, an amount equal to twice its 
annual gross national product.  Such debt also made foreign creditors extremely hesitant 
to lend money for Iraq’s reconstruction238 and left Saddam unable to play the regional 
leadership role that he so coveted. 239   
Estimated costs for the reconstruction of Iraq totaled $230 billion.  In a best-case 
scenario, devoting all its available oil revenue solely to such costs would still have 
resulted in a twenty-year effort.  In fact, the regime continued its deficit spending, 
importing $12 billion in civilian goods and $5 billion in military hardware, paying only 
$5 billion against its debts, and funding $1 billion in salary remittances for expatriate 
labor.  Meanwhile, Iraq’s oil revenues totaled only $13 billion.240   
These economic consequences of the war thus left the regime’s patronage and 
subsidy-based power structure unable to function effectively. 241  The dire economic 
conditions posed a clear threat to Saddam’s rule.  In February 1990, Saddam asked King 
Hussein of Jordan and President Mubarak of Egypt to notify Iraq’s Arab creditors that 
Iraq was now demanding complete loan forgiveness and a cash donation of $30 billion.  
“Let the Gulf regimes know,” he told the two leaders, “that if they will not give this 
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money to me, I will know how to get it.”242 After failing to convince the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the Gulf states to raise oil prices and to 
forgive Iraq’s debt, Hussein began to consider other options.243 
2. Iran’s Postwar Politics: Retreat from the Export of Revolution and 
the Death of Khomeini 
The war also brought Iran’s revolutionary mission into question.  It failed to 
overturn the secular Ba’athists, and the Iranian revolutionary model was soon rejected by 
most Sunni Islamists.  By war’s end, Iran was forced to give up its dream of transforming 
the Middle East and accept the status quo established during the reign of the hated 
Shah.244 
Iran’s postwar domestic political scene also brought the revolution’s Islamic 
credentials into question.  In January 1988, Khomeini turned the clerical world on its 
head with his shocking claim that the priorities of the Islamic state took precedence over 
Islamic jurisprudence.  In that same year, Ayatollah Montazeri, who had been selected as 
Khomeini’s successor in 1985 by the Assembly of Experts, lost favor when he objected 
to the execution of thousands of political prisoners and declared that Iran should no 
longer seek to export its revolution.  In February, Khomeini dismissed Montazeri, who 
was eventually put under house arrest in Qom.245 
In April 1989, at the direction of Khomeini, Khameini changed the constitution to 
reduce the required religious qualifications of the faqih, recognizing that no current grand 
ayatollahs completely accepted vilayat-i faqih.  The political authority of the faqih was 
made more explicit, an acknowledgement that Khomeini’s successor would not enjoy the 
same informal authority as he had.246  
The negative effects of Khomeini’s politicization of the Iranian religious 
establishment became appear in the succession process following his death.247  Khomeini 
                                                 
242 Karsh, 90. 
243 Tripp, 252. 
244 Karsh, 85-86. 
245 Keddie, 260. 
246 Ibid., 261. 
247 Hadad, 18. 
55 
died on 3 June 1989.  Two days later, the Assembly of Experts declared Khameini the 
new faqih.  He was quickly designated as an ayatollah, despite his relatively weak 
religious credentials.  Tacitly acknowledging his tenuous religious authority, Khamieini 
focused his efforts on expanding his political power base in the IRGC and the Foundation 
of the Dispossessed.  In any case, the new constitution gave him the power to ignore the 
decisions of more senior clerics.  Rafsanjani was named to replace him as president.248  
By tying religious authority to political expediency, Khomeini inadvertently brought into 
question the structure of the religious establishment.  Thus, though the Islamic revolution 
outlived Khomeini, its chief proponent, much of its legitimacy died with him. 
3. Iraqi Islamists’ Loss of Legitimacy 
By collaborating with the Iranians in their war with Iraq, Iraqi Islamists forfeited 
some of their claim to nationalist legitimacy.  They failed to recognize the important role 
that nationalism had played in the Iranian Revolution, and did not acknowledge the 
relevance of the nationalist credentials that Ayatollah Khomeini had developed over the 
decades in his opposition to the United States.   
Iranian Islamism was a primarily nationalist cause with a secondary effort in the 
international arena; whereas Iraqi Islamism appealed first to an international movement, 
placing nationalism second.  Particularly after the Iranians had pursued the Iraqi 
aggressors back into their own territory, the Islamists made a conscious choice to place 
sect above nation.249  They miscalculated in assuming that their perceived religious 
legitimacy would outweigh their anti-Iraqi actions in the minds of the Shi’a of Iraq.  
Mohammed Baqir Hakim, for example, refused to use terms such as watan (homeland), 
believing them to be un-Islamic.250  Even while working against the Iraqi state, however, 
most Islamists remained conscious of the nation-state as the basic unit of political life.251  
This suggested that they sought an Islamic Iraq rather than a new pan-Shi’i state. 
Within Iraq, meanwhile, traces of the Islamist movement remained, and members 
who stayed in the country functioned as best they could.  Before he was executed, 
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Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr had helped his cousin Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr (Sadr II) to 
become a respected Islamic scholar.  In 1977, Sadr II received his credentials as 
independent scholar of legal reasoning.252  He was apparently “appointed” by the 
government as a marja after his cousin's death.  The regime saw his promotion as a way 
to accentuate ethnic differences within the religious establishment and to diminish the 
stature of the “Persians”, al-Khoei and, later, Sistani.  Throughout the 1980s, Sadr II built 
a network of emulators and assistants, an effort that at first did not seem to constitute a 
threat to the government.253  In fact, it seemed in keeping with the increasing role of 
religion in the state and society during the Iran-Iraq War.254  In the 1990s, however, Sadr 
II would come to constitute a perceived threat to the Ba’athist state. 
F. THE FRAGMENTATION OF DAWA 
Over the course of the 1970s and ‘80s, Dawa fragmented into four splinter 
groups.  The Jund Imam faction broke away in 1971-72, believing that the struggle 
should focus not on achieving an Islamic state, but on preparing for the return of the 
Twelfth Imam.  A second faction, Dawa Islamiya, broke away in 1980-82 in protest 
against the legitimacy of organizational elections.  The Iraqi branch of this new faction 
established close ties with Iran and SCIRI.  A third splinter group was led by the faqih of 
the party, Kazim Hai’ri, who advocated a lead role for the ulama in the Islamist 
movement and argued that Iran should be recognized as the leader of the transnational 
Shi’i community.  These two positions allowed him to enjoy increased authority and 
patronage from his Iranian sponsors, but resulted in his expulsion from the main Dawa 
party.  He subsequently founded the Dawa Party (Jurisprudent Council).  A final division, 
the most important split, occurred in 1990.  A group of leading intellectuals expressed 
frustration with the close ties between Iran and the Iraq expatriate groups in Iran, and 
advocated a movement that promoted Iraqi nationalism.  Their effort became Kawadir 
Hizb Dawa (The Dawa Party Cadres), which then operated out of Damascus.255 
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Dawa members in London built in Sadr’s concept of Islamic democracy by 
publishing Barnamajuna (Our Program).  Perhaps motivated by negative experiences in 
Tehran, these activists turned firmly against vilayat-i faqih and other bastions of the 
Iranian revolution.  Dawa leaders expressed a desire to accommodate popular will in the 
implementation of Islamic governance, believing it un-Islamic to force measures that the 
public did not approve.256 
G. CONCLUSION 
The Islamists gathered political power throughout the 1970s, an effort that 
reached a crescendo during the Iranian Revolution.  Within Iraq, however, the 
burgeoning Islamist movement was quickly seen as a threat by the Ba’athist regime, and 
was suppressed with increasing ruthlessness.  The Iranian revolution succeeded based on 
local conditions, but its example led to a series of miscalculations by both Islamists and 
their opponents that were to shape the 1980s, primarily through the Iran-Iraq War.  
Islamists rose in revolt in Iraq, but were thoroughly crushed for their failure to understand 
their environment.  Saddam launched a self-destructive war to pre-empt the threat from 
revolutionary Iran, but wound up with a devastated economy and a weakened power 
base.  The war strengthened the revolutionary regime in Iran, but not enough to preserve 
its religious legitimacy after Khomeini’s death.   
Throughout the 1990s, Islamic forces would rebuild quietly within Iraq, 
independently of Iran.  At the same time, within Iran struggles increased between those 
who sought to maintain the iron grip of the revolutionary religious establishment and 
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IV. THE PERSIAN GULF WAR TO OPERATION IRAQI 
FREEDOM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
By 1990, Islamism had been effectively suppressed in Iraq and had diminished 
legitimacy in Iran. During the 1990s, this trend continued, as a Shiite rebellion was 
crushed in Iraq and new political voices threatened the power of the mullahs in Iran. 
Growing beneath the surface, however, in both countries, were seeds that would come to 
fruition in the reemergence of sectarian religious activism. Thus, the current relations 
between the two nations are rooted in the changing circumstances in Iraq and Iran in the 
1990s. 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the 1990–91 Gulf War in Kuwait and its 
aftermath. It argues that the resulting Shi’i intifada failed for three main reasons: the 
divisiveness and disorganization within the rebellion itself, the effectiveness of the 
Saddamists’ evolving survival and resistance strategies, and the lack of American 
support. The chapter details how the postwar economic sanctions and other circumstances 
weakened Iraq’s central authority, destroyed the modern, more secular Iraqi society, and 
caused people to turn to sectarian and tribal identities. As the Iraqi economic situation 
deteriorated, the social structure fractured and central authority declined, forcing the 
population to find a sense of order and stability in its diverse tribal and religious 
identities. These phenomena set the stage for the eventual rise of sectarian and tribal 
forces to fill the sociological vacuum following the 2003 overthrow of the Saddam 
regime.   
The chapter also shows how, in Iran, the political developments held out a 
promise of democracy that, once quelled, led to a more concentrated repression of the 
forces of reform.  In Iran, meanwhile, relatively minor, but promising, economic and 
political changes initially roused the hopes of reformers. But that possibility of new 
opportunities soon faded as, in the end, the reformers were unable to dislodge the ruling 
mullahs from power. And, having survived that challenge to their power, Iran’s 
conservative rulers were now free to spread their influence into post-Saddam Iraq in 
support of their SCIRI and Dawa allies. Isolated from both societies, the United States’ 
60 
failure to fully appreciate the changing dynamics in Iraq and Iran put it at a distinct 
disadvantage in the burgeoning competition for authority in Iraq.  
B. THE INVASION OF KUWAIT  
1. The Road to War 
By 1990, the Iraqi economy had been devastated, primarily by the overwhelming 
costs and losses of the Iraq–Iran War, and Iraq desperately needed to increase its oil 
revenues. In February, the Iraqi oil minister requested that Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the 
other Gulf states stop exceeding the oil-sale quotas set for its members by the OPEC, 
thereby greatly reducing the states’ oil revenues. Still refusing to honor either Iraq’s 
request of the OPEC quotas, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates instead greatly 
exceeded them.257   
In July, Iraq made a second series of demands on Kuwait, this time buttressed by 
military maneuvers along their common border.  Kuwait, ignoring Saddam’s threatening 
maneuvers, even stood its troops down from alert on 19 July. Although both the Egyptian 
president, Hosni Mubarak, and the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, received 
assurances from Saddam that Iraq would not conduct military operations, those soon 
proved to be empty promises.258   
2. The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait and Operations Desert Shield/Desert 
Storm 
On 2 August 1990, Saddam ordered Iraqi forces to invade Kuwait. The invasion 
was abrupt and fast, taking only one day, but Iraq failed to anticipate the regional and 
international reactions to what was perceived by the international community as an 
unprovoked act of aggression. The United Nations Security Council reacted quickly, 
passing UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 660, condemning the invasion and 
demanding the withdrawal of Iraqi forces.259  Saddam was trapped: he could not stay in 
Kuwait and he feared his regime would not survive if he voluntarily withdrew.260  Over  
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the next several months, the Security Council passed Resolution 661, imposing an 
economic embargo on Iraq, and 678, setting a deadline of January 15, 1991 for Iraqi 
withdrawal.261 
When the deadline passed with Iraqi troops still in Kuwait, U.S.-led 
coalition forces began an air campaign and, on 24 February, a ground 
attack. Although the allied attack at first appeared decisive, it stopped 
short of unconditional victory. The main allied thrust from the west was 
poorly synchronized with the drive into Kuwait, and coalition leaders 
failed to extend the offensive until it had surrounded Basra, thus allowing 
a substantial number of Iraqi forces with heavy weapons to escape the 
planned entrapment.262   
More than ten years later, in the wake of the 2003 American invasion of Iraq, in a 
statement full of irony, former national security advisor, Brent Scowcroft, and the first 
President Bush outlined the reasons the First Gulf War allies had not continued the attack 
by further invading Iraq: 
We would have been forced to occupy Baghdad and, in effect, rule Iraq. 
Had we gone the invasion route, the United States could conceivably still 
be an occupying power in a bitterly hostile land.263 
Later, in their memoirs, both the commander of the 1990-91 Gulf war, General 
Norman Schwarzkopf, 264 and the then-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin 
Powell,265 expressed their agreement with the Bush–Scowcroft statement. The U.S. 
ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Charles Freeman, also argued at the time that it was “not in 
our interest to destroy Iraq or weaken it to the point that Iran and/or Syria are not 
constrained by it.”266    
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3. The Safwan Cease-Fire Talks  
The coalition may have weakened Saddam’s position as a national leader, but it 
did not eliminate Iraq as a threat to Iran. While Saddam’s personal survival seemed in 
jeopardy for a time, American cease fire concessions enabled him to regain supremacy, at 
least over his own people.  
With no guidance from Washington for the cease-fire talks, Schwarzkopf 
perceived them as solely a military matter.267  As he entered the meeting room at Safwan 
Airfield, he told Tom Brokaw, “This isn’t a negotiation.  I don’t plan to give them 
anything.  I’m here to tell them exactly what we expect them to do.”268  The Iraqi 
delegate, General Ahmad, without seeking advice or permission from Baghdad, simply 
agreed to all the American demands.269  When invited to discuss or question issues, 
Ahmad asked for only one concession. “You might know very well know the situation of 
the roads and bridges and communications.  We would like to agree that helicopter flights 
sometimes are needed to carry some of the officials, government officials, or any member 
that is needed to be transported from one place to another because the roads and bridges 
are out.”  General Schwarzkopf, foreseeing no threat to coalition forces from the Iraqi 
helicopters, agreed. When Ahmad expressed his surprise, Schwarzkopf again responded 
positively.270   
The concession that seemed only a token gesture to the Americans, but in the end 
proved to be a dreadful weapon in the hands of the Iraqi regime. It would use the 
helicopters, not to carry officials here and there, but to destroy the Iraqis who dared to 
rise in protest against them. Strangely, considering the stakes, the U.S. military 
negotiators seemed almost uninterested in the events taking place at the time and soon 
after in Iraq.271 
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C. THE SHI’I INTIFADA 
1. Roots of Rebellion 
On February 15, the final day set by the UN for Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait, 
President Bush, in a televised address, urged “the Iraqi military and the Iraqi people to 
take matters into their own hands and force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside.”  
While this may have been intended to provoke a military coup, it was taken by many in 
the Iraqi army to mean that the United States would support and assist an uprising and 
popular revolt against the Saddam Hussein regime.272   
The allied bombing and electronic warfare efforts had destroyed the regime’s 
ability to jam international radio broadcasts, and so Iraqis heard Bush’s call for regime 
change and descriptions of the Iraqi military defeat.  It thus seemed an opportune moment 
for rebellion.273  As the president announced the cease-fire negotiations, he once again 
directly addressed the Iraqi citizenry: “The Iraqi people should put him [Saddam] aside 
and that would facilitate the resolution of all these problems that exist, and certainly 
would facilitate the acceptance of Iraq back into the family of peace-loving nations.”274 
When the people responded, erupting in rebellion after the Iraqi defeat in Kuwait, 
it placed extreme stress on the regime.  The Shi’i rebellion failed all too soon, due to a 
combination of factors-the insurgents’ own lack of focus, Saddam’s overwhelming 
brutality, and American indifference.  The intifada would shape Iraq, however, providing 
Saddam with the impetus to transform his ideology and his instruments of coercion, and 
leaving the Shi’a with a lingering bitterness toward the United States.  It is likely that the 
intifada was less an expression of sectarian identity than a rebellion against the dominant 
Sunni-led political structure and the historical legacy of its Sunni predecessors.275  
2. The Intifada Begins 
The uprising began in earnest on the last day of February, as Iraqi tanks fleeing 
Kuwait stopped in Sa’ad Square in Basra, in front of a giant portrait of Saddam.  The lead 
tank commander, rising from the hatch and yelled at the image: “What has befallen us of 
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defeat, shame, and humiliation, Saddam, is the result of your follies, your 
miscalculations, and your irresponsible actions!”  As a crowd gathered, he fired the 
tank’s main cannon again and again at the portrait.  Authority began to break down very 
quickly throughout the south after this affront to Saddam.276 
On 1 March, the intifada reached Basra; on 2 March, Suq al-Shuyukh; on 4 
March, Nasiriya and Najaf; and on 7 March Karbala.  From there it spread to Amara, 
Hillah, Kut, and other locations throughout the south.277  The outbreaks of violence 
seemed mostly spontaneous, driven largely, but not solely, by local Islamist leaders from 
parties such as Dawa278   
Many southern Shi’i tribes joined as well, motivated by traditional resentment of 
the Sunni-dominated political structure and anger over the economic neglect of the south 
or purely local issues involving specific tribes.  Some tribes were ambivalent, unable to 
commit one way or the other.  Some were concerned that the uprising took place at the 
beginning of harvest season.  Other tribes continued to support Saddam, responding 
perhaps to regime appeals that evoked their common Arab heritage.  Such propaganda 
was unintentionally reinforced by the infiltration of thousands of Badr militia members 
from Iran, most of them exiled Iraqis returning to their homeland.  Still other regime 
supporters were ensnared in long-term patronage networks developed by the regime, and 
their leaders sought to avoid jeopardizing their favored status.  Even passive tribal 
support made it easier for the regime to crush the intifada.  As it was increasingly and 
brutally suppressed, large numbers of Iraqis abandoned their neutrality or reversed sides 
to support the regime.279 
The various factions among the rebels shared neither a coherent strategy and 
structure of command and control nor common goals.  Indeed, they alienated each other, 
with SCIRI propaganda playing especially poorly because of its prominent featuring of 
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images of Khomeini.280  SCIRI ordered that “all Iraqi forces should submit to and obey 
SCIRI orders,” adding that “no idea except the rightful Islamic ones should be 
disseminated.”  This bid for leadership may well have doomed the southern uprising by 
making it unacceptable to the United States, which feared SCIRI’s Iranian 
sponsorship.281 
In the midst of the strife, Ayatollah al-Kho’i approved the formation of a 
committee to preserve order and security, but the rebellion continued to lack leadership 
and a common focus.282  At most locations, retreating soldiers, joined by urban 
insurgents, targeted local Ba’ath party headquarters, secret police buildings, prisons, and 
other regime facilities.283  One rebel operating out of Najaf described the unfocused 
nature of the uprising: “At first we were a little crazy…we believed that even the traffic 
lights represented Saddam Hussein, so we wrecked them.”284   
3. The Regime Response 
As the southern Shia rebelled, so did the Kurds in the north.  At their height the 
twin rebellions would control sixteen of Iraq’s eighteen provinces.285  For three days 
after the war over Kuwait ended, the rebels met little government opposition.  Soon, 
however, the regime once again organized its forces. Much of its army field headquarters 
had survived intact, allowing for sufficient command and control to organize a coherent 
response.286 With insufficient force to put down both the Shi’i and the Kurdish rebellions 
at the same time, the government forces prioritized by countering the Shi’a first.287  
Ba’athist security services allegedly intercepted communications between Shi’i rebels 
and the Americans.  In response to the Shi’a plea for help, the Americans were said to 
respond, “We are not going to support you because you are Shia and are collaborating 
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with Iran.”288  Hearing this renewed the Ba’athists confidence that they could safely 
confront the Shi’a without fear of American intervention. 
Because the Republican Guard was designed to counter such uprisings, Guard 
units were quickly dispatched to the affected areas.289  On 8 March Iraqi forces staged a 
combined arms attack, using armor, attack helicopters, and artillery fire, against 
insurgents in Karbala armed only with light weapons and rocket-propelled grenades.290  
In a sign of the regime’s fear, Iraqi Mi-8 helicopters deployed twelve to thirty-two 
munitions containing Sarin nerve agent, a risky move given the proximity of U.S. forces.  
The chemical bombs apparently malfunctioned and the incident was not reported to the 
Americans.291  In any case, resistance was soon crushed, and thousands fled the city.292   
On 9 March, government forces assaulted Najaf, the city that served as the base of 
much of the resistance and its various leaders.  They too were soon overwhelmed, and the 
survivors fled south, seeking the shelter and support of the victorious allies.  American 
troops posted along Highway Eight between An Nasiriyah and Basra treated many Iraq 
civilians who told horrific stories of the deliberate targeting of noncombatants and of 
attacks on mosques serving as shelter for those seeking to escape the fighting.  The 
Americans wanted nothing to do with the rebellion, however. Instead of giving captured 
stocks of Iraqi arms to the insurgents, they destroyed them.293  On 21 March Grand 
Ayatollah Kho’i was forced to appear on television with Saddam, pledging his support 
for the regime and calling for the rebellion to end.294   
Though the Intifada illustrated the lack of central leadership among the Shia, it 
also demonstrated the dangers that appeared to await the Sunnis in the event of Saddam’s 
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fall.295  Some military experts see the Shi’i intifada as the formative influence on 
Saddam’s survival strategy throughout the rest of the 1990s.296   
4. The “Great Betrayal” 
For some of the survivors, the negotiating site at Safwan became a refugee camp, 
sheltering 11,500 Iraqis who pleaded for American shelter and appeared before numerous 
international news organizations then on the site.  In public interviews, many of them, 
like Shi’i refugee Mehdy Nathil, asked: “Bush told us to revolt against Saddam.  We 
revolt against Saddam.  But where is Bush?  Where is he?”297  Such pleas for help were 
all the more remarkable considering that, before the revolt, the rebels had also suffered 
under the six-week allied bombing campaign.  They were now begging for assistance 
from the same forces that had attacked their communities.  Thus began the narrative of 
America’s “Great Betrayal,” a narrative that would shape future interaction between the 
United States and the Shi’a of Iraq. 
The Iraqi helicopter flights provoked sustained controversy.  On 13 March, 
President Bush publicly denounced them as a violation of the cease-fire, only to be 
corrected by his advisors.  Though Scowcroft disapproved of Schwarzkopf’s concession 
permitting the Iraqis to fly helicopters, he was alarmed by the possibility that the Shi’i 
rebels might succeed.  He therefore argued against supporting them on the grounds of 
what he would later termed “geopolitics.”298  To Scowcroft and his colleagues, Iraq was 
a check on Iranian power: “My view was that there was a real danger in the first few days 
that the country would fall apart and I was fundamentally not interested in seeing that.  
But I did not want to see the converse: that the Iraqis should be able to go after the 
Shiites.”299  The Administration finally decided to shelve any efforts to support the 
Shiites or to deny Iraqi helicopter overflights, telling the press that such efforts would 
offend the United States’ Arab and Turkish allies.  In fact, Turkish President Turqut Ozal 
supported efforts to aid the Shi’a, as did the Saudis.300 
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In their memoirs, both Bush and Scowcroft claimed that they never promised to 
assist any uprising by the Iraqi people and voiced concerns about such support: 
We were concerned about the long-term balance of power at the head of 
the Gulf.  Breaking up the Iraqi state would pose its own destabilization 
problems…However admirable self-determination for the Kurds or 
Shi’ites might have been in principle, the practical aspects of this 
particular situation dictated this policy.  For these reasons alone, the 
uprisings distressed us, but they also offered Saddam an opportunity to 
reassert himself and rally his army.  Instead of toppling him as the cause 
of its humiliating defeat, the Iraqi military was put to work to suppress the 
rebellions.  It was a serious disappointment.301   
Colin Powell, in commenting on both the Shi’i revolt in the south and the Kurdish 
one in the north, later wrote: 
Neither revolt had a chance.  Nor, frankly, was their success a goal of our 
policy.  President Bush’s rhetoric urging the Iraqis to overthrow Saddam, 
however, may have given encouragement to the rebels.  But our practical 
intention was to leave Baghdad enough power to survive as a threat to an 
Iran that remained bitterly hostile toward the United States.302 
In a later interview by ABC News anchor Peter Jennings, Scowcroft was asked: 
“Do I state it correctly when you say that having seen the rebellion [in southern and 
northern Iraq]  develop, you would have preferred a coup?”  Scowcroft replied, “Oh yes.  
Yes, we clearly would have preferred a coup.  There’s no question of that.”303   
Politicians and foreign policy decision makers must often make hard choices 
based on the best interests of their constituents. Reasonable analysis could conclude that a 
successful Shi’i uprising was not in the interests of the American people.  Nonetheless, 
the failure of the intifada ensured an outcome not in the interests of Americans: the 
bitterness of the southern Shi’a.  In any case, the desired policy outcome, a military coup, 
was probably unrealistic.  Considerable evidence available at the time suggested that the 
regime was in fact “coup-proof” as a result of its ironclad security apparatus.304 
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5. No-Fly Zones and the Kurdish Safe Haven  
The Iraqi regime successfully subdued the Shia, and then turned to the Kurds.305  
In April 1991, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 688, demanding that Iraq 
cease its internal campaigns of repression.  The resolution led to the creation of a "safe 
haven" north of the 36th parallel and a "no-fly zone" above this line, where Iraqi aircraft 
were prohibited.  These were the first actions of outside powers in support of either the 
Shi’i or Kurdish rebellions. 306  In May, the Bush Administration declared that economic 
sanctions against Iraq would remain until Saddam was no longer in power.307  
D. THE DECLINE OF THE IRAQI STATE 
Max Weber defined the modern state as “a human community that (successfully) 
claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”308  
By this definition, with the creation of the Kurdish safe haven in 1991 Iraq arguably 
ceased to be a state.309  While ceding the monopoly of force altogether in the north, the 
regime also began to lose power in other places and in other ways.  Its security apparatus 
had been weakened two major wars and multiple rebellions over the last twenty years.  
The Ba’ath regime, which governed through fear, personalized its reign of terror by 
demanding that hundreds of thousands of its citizens collaborate in it.310    The regime’s 
coercive power had for twenty years appeared all-knowing and all-powerful.  After the 
Gulf War, however, some Iraqis said that “the barrier of fear was broken.”311  “Under 
such conditions,” Kanan Makiya later wrote, “it was neither effective nor possible to 
shoot and torture everybody.”312  New economic challenges would further erode the 
regime’s direct coercive power.   
The regime was thus forced to reform its ideology and to employ new agents of 
coercion.  Its new ideology would more fully embrace Islam and tribal values; its new                                                  
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instruments of coercion would be found in the tribal sheiks and the Fedayeen Saddam.  
The changes this would cause in Iraqi society would eventually lead to new sources of 
power in post-Saddam Iraq, sources not answerable to Iran or other sponsors.  Because 
the country had been so isolated throughout the 1990s, it was difficult for outsiders to 
predict their emergence. 
1. Economic Challenges to the State 
After its retreat from Kuwait, Iraq found itself in a truly dire economic situation.  
Six weeks of allied bombing had done more damage to the national infrastructure than 
eight years of war with Iran,313 destroying most of the military and civilian achievements 
built by the Ba’ath Party over the preceding twenty years.314  Iraq was now burdened not 
only its pre-war debt, but also with the new burden of reparations for its invasion of 
Kuwait, while sanctions slashed Iraqi exports by 90 percent and cut off international 
loans.315  In addition, technology-transfer concerns over “dual-use” items severely 
limited imports,316 and basic foodstuffs such as meat, flour, and sugar became 
increasingly scarce.  Disease rates grew in the absence of clean water and electricity,317 
and infant mortality rates grew to the highest rates seen in forty years.318  Virtually the 
entire society sank into poverty. 
The Iraqi regime turned quickly toward rebuilding at least some of its damaged 
infrastructure.  The electrical grid, for instance, was rebuilt much faster than Western 
estimates predicted.  Rebuilding the Al Hartha power plant near Basra, for example, took 
only 270 days, instead of the three-year estimated repair period.319  The Iraqi people 
would later contrast such results with the pace of reconstruction under the Americans. 
The country suffered economic sanctions for thirteen years.  In 1980, the per 
capita income in Iraq had been $4,083.  In the 1990s per capita income declined to $300 a 
year, as more than sixty percent of the population sank into poverty.  Hyperinflation                                                  
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destroyed the middle class.320  In the midst of their suffering, Iraqis took note of U.S. 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s response when asked if the cost to the Iraqi 
people was worth the gains achieved by sanctions.  “Yes, I think the price is worth it” 
came her memorable reply.321  Saddam benefited from the outraged reactions to such 
poorly received foreign rhetoric, which united the country as had the war with Iran. 322 
The United Nations instituted an “oil-for-food” program in 1996 under UNSCR 
986, but this perversely increased the rentier character of the state.  The Iraqi people 
became even more dependent on government patronage, which proved a formidable tool 
in the regime’s domestic and international survival strategies.323  The oil-for-food 
program also led to the rise of a huge black market and a resulting dichotomy between 
the very rich merchants of the shadow economy and the vast majority of the Iraqi people 
living in poverty.324 By 2001 and 2002, allowable levels of trade in the oil-for-food 
program gave Iraq $12 billion a year.  Other both authorized and clandestine trade 
brought in another $2 billion a year.  Even this relatively modest level of trade restored 
Iraq as a major regional economic player.325  Iraq slowly eroded the U.N. embargo, by 
initiating civilian flights in 2000, for example.326 
The people of Iraq were also cut off from the rest of the world, as international 
travel was either forbidden or prohibitively expensive, and few foreign visitors traveled 
to the country.  Thus, people had no exposure to the communication revolution 
transforming the rest of the Middle East: no internet, no satellite television, no cell 
phones.327  Conversely, foreigners had little information about developments in Iraq. 
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2. The Direct Solution: New Coercive Institutions 
The intifada showed Saddam that many of his security forces were unreliable or 
ineffective.  He created new institutions, and while these addressed his needs, they also 
indicated his weaknesses.   
In early 1992, Saddam formed the 30,000-member Special Republican Guard, 
designed specifically to protect him and his regime from internal coups.  This gave him 
additional insurance against intrigue, but illustrated his weakness and fear.328   In 1994, 
the regime formed the Fedayeen Saddam militia and placed it under the command of 
Saddam’s son Uday.  This lightly armed militia was created specifically to defend sites 
that the military and security services were unwilling or unable to defend during the Shi’i 
intifada.  To guide its actions, the government drew up a Ba’ath Emergency Plan, in 
effect, a counterinsurgency strategy to prevent or crush potential uprisings.  The plan 
called for the Fedayeen to hold off rebels until the Republican Guard could be summoned 
to put down the insurgency.  In accordance with this plan, each town or village received 
large shipments of light weapons, although ammunition was held back to avoid arming 
potential rebels.329  To fulfill their mandate to “control” the Iraqi population, the 
Fedayeen employed brutal and often random violence, often resorting to summary 
executions. 330  Recent evidence suggests that the Fedyeen later formed the nucleus of the 
post-Saddam insurgency, fighting against the loss of their privileged status to the Shi’a. 
3. Tying Tribalism and Islam to the Ba’athist State 
After the Shi’i intifada, the regime officials saw a need to adjust the government 
ideology.  Whereas, previously, Saddam had forced the Iraqi people to remain unified 
under his leadership, he no longer had the power to compel such unity.331  Instead, he 
sought to retain power by dividing the people and turning them against one another.  To 
construct this new ideology he looked to four forms of identity: Arabism, tribalism, pre-
Islamic Mesopotamian tradition, and Islam.332  Loyalty to one’s tribe and religious sect 
became the most obvious manifestation of this policy.  Most notably, after the Shi’i                                                  
328 Anderson and Stansfield, 104. 
329 Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 62. 
330 Anderson and Stanfield, 108-9. 
331 Makiya, xxx-xxxi. 
332 Baram, 7. 
73 
intifada, Saddam no longer emphasized pan-sectarianism.  Instead, he played on the fears 
of the Sunni populace for what might take his place, were he to be deposed.333 
a. The Regime’s Neo-Tribal Policies 
Public recognition of tribal leaders in Iraq only became common after the 
Gulf War, as Saddam turned to the tribal chiefs in hopes of finding reliable instruments of 
authority.334  He justified the use of tribal agents to his party members by reminding 
them of the Ba’athists’ failure to contain the intifada.  To incorporate his officials into a 
tribal structure, he presented the Ba’ath Party as “the tribe of all the tribes.”335 
On 17 March 1991, select tribes took an oath of allegiance to Saddam; 
soon after, some tribal leaders traveled to Baghdad to meet with regime officials.  Over 
the next several years such contacts and oaths grew in number and significance, 
eventually incorporating elements of traditional tribal ceremonies.336  Saddam and his 
deputies also began to publicize their meetings with tribal leaders, and occasions such as 
tribal funerals became significant political and social events.  The tribal leaders also 
received financial support and other assistance, including provisions of modern small 
arms and even artillery.337   
The Intifada showed that Ba’athist ideology and regime patronage were 
not sufficient to assure national unity in the absence of sectarian equality.  Thus, outreach 
to the Shi’i tribes offered both practical and ideological benefits.  The Shi’i tribal sheiks 
supported the regime in exchange for patronage, and tribal values supported the cross-
sectarian ideology that the regime sought to employ in the south.338 Because the 
destruction of much of the Iraqi army during the Gulf War had removed much of the 
coercion mechanism from the regime, local tribal militias became particularly 
important.339 
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By the mid-1990s Saddam’s power devolution to the tribes had given the 
rural population a sense of autonomy that it had not enjoyed since the 1958 revolution.  
Tribal justice began to parallel and even to supersede the regime’s legal system, and the 
sheiks regained much social prominence.  At the same time, many of the educated urban 
elites who had been hurt by Ba’ath policies that constrained the free market in the late 
1960s were now also denied access to public-sector employment because of the massive 
financial difficulties facing the government.340  
b. The State and the People Turn to Religion 
In the 1980s, Saddam had turned to religion as a tool to oppose Khomeini.  
On the surface, however, much of the nation remained secular, although religion was 
being quietly revived at the popular level.341  After Iraq’s 1991 defeat, the turn to religion 
by both the regime and the people emerged into the open.  Despite the financial burden of 
the sanctions regime, the regime built more than 100 mosques in Baghdad.  The 
government shut down bars and nightclubs, and promoted the veiling of women, advising 
women to stay out of the workforce and instead remain in the home.  The unemployment 
rate made this recommendation particularly effective.  In 1994, at the height of its 
economic difficulties, the regime announced the construction of “The Grand Saddam 
Mosque,” which was to feature the largest and tallest dome in the world, among other 
attributes.342   
Religion also flourished at the popular level.  The mosques saw a massive 
increase in attendance, with the Kazimiya shrine in Baghdad seeing 50,000 daily 
worshippers, three times the prewar level.  More and more people sought the support of 
religious charities for food, medicine, and public safety.343  
c. The Shi’i Religious Revival and the Sadr II Movement 
The turn to religion by both the regime and the general populace provided 
an opening for renewed Shi’i activism, but traditional clerical leaders remained cautious.  
After the 1991 revolt, Grand Ayatollah al-Kho’i was put under house arrest, several of his 
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followers and members of his family were imprisoned, and several were executed.  Al-
Kho’i died in August 1992, after which his sons and other followers were closely 
monitored.344  
Throughout the 1980s, Kho’i had groomed Sistani as his successor.  Born 
in 1930 in Mashad, Iran, the son of a prominent clerical family, Sistani was sent to study 
in Qom at the age of nineteen.  At twenty-one he moved to Najaf, where he became a 
follower of Kho’i, who gave him his certificate as a mujtahid at the young age of thirty-
one.  Sistani inherited Kho’i’s foundation, which, together with Kho’i’s mentoring, made 
him the most respected and best financed cleric in Najaf.345   
Despite following Kho’i’s quietist example, Sistani experienced some of 
the repression of Saddam’s rule.  He was briefly imprisoned after the 1991 intifada, and 
was threatened with expulsion several times. 346   In 1994 he was placed under house 
arrest in order to limit his contact with society.347  He survived two assassination 
attempts, including one close call in 1997, after which Sistani very rarely ventured out in 
public.348     
With the traditional ulama remaining quiet, Mohammed Sadiq Sadr (Sadr 
II) saw an opportunity to assert his leadership.  He established a network of social 
services to step in where the state had retreated, and quickly built a constituency among 
sheiks and emulators.  In effect, he recreated the networks of Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr 
that the Ba’athists had destroyed in 1980.  Sadr II developed his networks quietly and 
seemed for quite a while to pose little threat to the regime.  After the death of Kho’i he 
gained prominence and built powerful constituencies among the peasant, urban lower 
class, and urban middle class, and soon gained strength in Najaf, Baghdad, Nasiriya, 
Basra, and other cities.349  
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Najaf was soon split between supporters of Sistani and supporters of Sadr 
II.  The two sides maintained decorum, but rivalry festered.350  Sadr II referred to the 
Najaf hawza as being split in two, between a hawza natiqa (outspoken hawza), led by 
him, and a hawza samita (silent hawza), led by Ayatollah Sistani.351  In an implicit attack 
on Iranian-born Sistani, Sadr stressed the importance of native Arab leadership.352   
In 1997, Sadr II defied both Saddam and the long-standing Shi’i doctrine 
by organizing Friday prayers.  His services drew as many as 250,000 worshippers,353 and 
photographs and first-person accounts of the Friday crowds reminded observers of the 
first years of the Islamic Revolution in Iran.354  Sadr II would eventually deliver forty-
seven Friday sermons at the Kufah mosque near Najaf that would have a lasting impact 
on the entire Shi’i community.  He spoke in the language of the common man and aimed 
his remarks at the poor and dispossessed.  He also wrote extensively and used scholarly 
language to discuss Islamic topics and the coming of the Mahdi.355  
Sadr II was not a public critic of the Ba’athist regime, but as a populist 
figure, he enjoyed ever-widening loyalty within the Shi’i community.  Thus he posed a 
potential rival to state power, and so became a target of the security apparatus.  In 
February 1999, he and his two elder sons were killed by unidentified assailants in a drive-
by shooting.   
When Sadr II’s death was announced, much of the Shi’i community rioted 
in protest.356  Saddam deployed the Fedayeen and the Republican Guard to contain the 
unrest.  Ali Hassan al-Majid, “Chemical Ali,” led the security forces in an assault on 
Nasiriya, during which he indiscriminately shelled the city with artillery.  In Baghdad, 
twenty-five protestors were killed and fifty wounded.357  Shi’i Iraqi exiles in Iran also 
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vocally commemorated Sadr II’s death, and they physically attacked Mohammed Baqir 
al-Hakim and his associates in SCIRI when they suggested that Sadr II had been a 
government agent.358 
Two days after his assassination, the regime shut down Sadr II’s Najaf 
office, and his son Muqtada was placed under house arrest.   Moqtada went underground, 
joining other young clerics in quietly preserving his father’s networks.359  After Sadr II’s 
assassination, Sistani’s position as most senior mutjahid in Najaf was no longer disputed. 
360   
E. THE ISOLATION OF THE EXILES 
Through violence and intimidation, Saddam had effectively destroyed any 
political open space within which an internal opposition movement might gestate or an 
outside group recruit members.  Therefore, there was no mechanism for exile groups to 
build networks within Iraq, or even to gain significant information about events within 
the country. 361    
Dawa, SCIRI and other exile groups were still able to maintain small efforts at 
resistance, despite the massive repression they suffered after the 1991 rebellion.  Saddam 
City formed one of their remaining strongholds, as did key cities in the south.  In the face 
of continued repression, however, all efforts at resistance remained small and ineffectual, 
useful more for maintaining morale than for seriously challenging the regime. Some 
reports attributed the December 1996 shooting and permanent disabling of Saddam's 
older son Uday and a 1997 assassination attempt on Saddam's younger son Qusay to Shi’i 
Islamists.362   
The various parties that formed the Iraqi opposition met in Vienna in June 1992 to 
form the Iraqi National Congress (INC), an umbrella organization financed by the CIA.  
In October of that same year, the INC held a meeting at Salahuddin, in the autonomous 
                                                 
358 Jabar, 184. 
359 Shadid, 172. 
360 Juan Cole, “Shiite Religious Parties Fill Vacuum in Southern Iraq,” Middle East Report, 22 April 
2003. 
361 Tripp, 276-276. 
362 Ibid., 269. 
78 
Kurdish area of Iraq.  The members formed an assembly to represent almost all of the 
opposition factions, establishing Ahmad Chalabi as the leader.  Chalabi, who came from 
a prominent Shi'i family, left Baghdad in 1958, studied mathematics at MIT, received a 
doctorate in mathematics from the University of Chicago, and was convicted in Jordan in 
absentia in 1992 of embezzlement, theft, and forgery after the collapse of his Amman-
based Petra Bank in 1989.363  He enjoyed significant influence in Washington, but had 
little real authority or influence over the other opposition groups.364  The INC planned to 
establish a base in Kurdish territory and to incite a popular uprising against Saddam.365   
The National Accord (al-Wifaq al Watani) formed in 1990, and consisted largely 
of those opposition figures that had not joined the INC.  It counted former Ba’athists and 
regime defectors among its members, many from the Sunni northwest, the home of many 
intelligence and military leaders.  Ayad Allawi, the founder, is a former Ba’athist, also 
with connections to the CIA, born 1946 in Baghdad.366   The Accord operated first from 
Damascus and later from Amman, and sought to stage a bloodless coup in Iraq, and thus 
replace the current Sunni regime with a new one.367  Like the INC, the Accord faced the 
dilemma of trying to generate legitimacy and run effective operations while being cut off 
from Iraqi society.368  Its members had kinship and other ties to members of the regime, 
but still had difficulty penetrating the government to organize a coup.369  
In the fall of 1998, the U.S. Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act.370  This 
legislation dedicated $100 million to the various Iraqi opposition groups, marked more of 
a symbolic gesture than a realistic effort to generate domestic opposition due to 
conditions on the ground.371   
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F. THE TRIAL OF REVOLUTIONARY FORCES IN IRAN 
The Iranian political situation from 1989 to 2005 can be divided into two 
segments:  the presidency of Hashemi Rafsanjani, and the presidency of Mohammad 
Khatami.  Rafsanjani presided over a period of modest economic reform and foreign 
outreach, but he did not markedly improve the state’s standing at home or abroad.  He 
also declined to change the revolutionary institutions established under Khomeini, or to 
open the political space to actors outside the religious establishment.  Khatami brought 
about a small degree of political liberalization, but failed to support those pushing for 
even more openness and ultimately gave in to a conservative campaign to preserve the 
revolutionary regime.372 
Iran’s economy had been devastated by the war with Iraq, with household income 
down 40 percent since 1979 and main critical infrastructure nodes, such as the 
Khorramshahr port, Abadan refinery, and Kharq loading facility effectively destroyed.373  
Beginning in 1993, Rafsanjani initiated a program of privatization of state industries, but 
achieved only limited success.374  He was reelected in 1993, but the low voter turnout 
indicated the apathy of many Iranians.375   
The constitution limited Rafsanjani to two terms as president, and so the 1997 
elections promised a new set of actors.  That election had two candidates: Ali-Akbar 
Nateq Nuri, the conservative speaker of parliament, and Mohammad Khatami.  Nuri 
enjoyed the support of Leader Khameini and the commander of the IRGC, who ordered 
his forces in writing to vote for Nuri.  Other regime organizations also supported Nuri.  
The resulting conservative coalition intimidated many of the more pragmatic forces, 
however, including many of Rafsanjani’s supporters, who then banded together in 
support of Khatami  Khatami promised increased freedom of expression, greater civil 
rights, and a more robust civil society, which appealed especially to young people, 
students, women, minorities, and the middle class.  Nevertheless, Nuri was widely 
favored.  Voter turnout reached record levels, and delivered Khatami 29.7 million votes 
                                                 
372 Keddie, 263. 
373 Ibid., 263-264. 
374 Ibid., 265. 
375 Ibid., 267. 
80 
to Nuri’s 7 million.376  In the aftermath of the vote, stunned conservative forces 
eventually consolidated in support of Khameini, who in reality had more power than the 
president.   
Despite Khatami’s win, conservatives continued to hold most of the levers of 
power in the regime, and so the new president had to act carefully.  Khatami was able to 
make some progress in improving relations with other countries, most notably by hosting 
the Organization of the Islamic Conference in December 1997 and signing a cooperation 
agreement with Saudi Arabia in May 1998.377  Relations with the United States did not 
improve, however, despite Khatami’s call for a U.S.-Iran “Dialogue of Civilizations.”  
Overall, Khatami enjoyed only modest success with economic reform.  His attempts to 
increase privatization were not helped by the fact that the state still controlled 60 percent 
of the economy, and that 10-20 percent more fell under the control of five foundations 
with connections to Khameini and his supporters.378 
Khatami and his allies faced significant ideological opposition immediately after 
he took office.  In November 1997, Grand Ayatollah Montazeri spoke out in favor of 
measures to curtail the power of the Supreme Leader, favoring an institution that would 
“supervise, not rule.”  Despite his religious prominence, Montazeri was denounced by the 
conservative forces and placed under house arrest.  In April 1998, conservatives 
prosecuted the reformist mayor of Tehran, Gholam Hosein Karbashi, for corruption 
charges.  They impeached the Interior Minister Abdollah Nuri, attacked newspapers and 
demonstrators, and apparently embarked on a campaign of assassination of dissidents.379  
Events heated up after student demonstrations in July 1999 led to violence, possibly due 
to incitement by conservative infiltrators.  Khatami was threatened by the IRGC, and 
forced to denounce the students.  Reformers were disillusioned and dispirited by 
Khatami’s lack of resolution.380 
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In the 2000 parliamentary elections, reform elements faired well, winning 71 
percent of the vote in the first round.  By this time the country had become so tense and 
polarized that little reform was possible, however.381  Reform measures passed by the 
parliament continued to be overturned by the unelected Council of Guardians. Violence 
and persecution of reformists continued throughout 2000 and 2001.  Legal repression was 
led by conservative forces in the judiciary, who were accountable only to Khameini.382   
Khatami won more support in his 2001 reelection victory, but continued to be 
unable or unwilling to translate this support into tangible change.  As time passed, more 
and more reformists ceased to view him as an agent of change.  If nothing else, however, 
his term in power prompted more discussion of democracy and government transparency.  
He also kept the opposition movement nonviolent.383 
G. THE SECOND BUSH ADMINISTRATION 
The major American policy figures who had pushed for the 1998 Iraq Liberation 
Act strongly supported the 2000 presidential campaign of George W. Bush.  Many of 
these individuals took senior positions in the new Bush Administration.  An early Bush 
attempt to reform U.N. policy through the use of “smart sanctions” failed for lack of 
support from regional actors such as Syria, Jordan, and Turkey, and the threat of a 
Russian veto in the Security Council.384  With the United Nations closed as an avenue for 
change, Bush Administration officials began to search for alternate means to deal with 
Iraq.  Some advocated regime change, but this was seen at the time as impractical.385  
Calculations changed, however, in the aftermath of the terror attacks of 11 September.  
Some members of the administration advocated striking Iraq in response, despite the lack 
of evidence of Iraqi links to the attacks.  Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan 
soon put such thoughts to the side, but only temporarily.386  After 11 September, Iran 
assisted American efforts in Afghanistan and supported Hamid Karzai as he instituted the 
                                                 
381 Keddie, 277. 
382 Ibid., 278-279. 
383 Ibid., 280-281. 
384 Tripp, 282. 
385 Ibid., 283 
386 Ibid., 286. 
82 
post-Taliban government.387  Inclusion in President Bush's "Axis of Evil" surprised and 
disappointed Iranians.  They had hoped that their cooperation on Afghanistan had 
garnered goodwill, but now saw that it did not.388 
H. CONCLUSION 
During the 1990s, Iraq and Iran underwent profound changes.  In Iraq, military 
defeat and rebellion exposed the precarious position of Saddam Hussein’s regime.  
Economic sanctions weakened the regime, but by destroying the market economy also 
strengthened its hold over the population.  Saddam adjusted his ideology to incorporate 
old forms of identity, dividing the people in an effort to make them easier to rule.  The 
new sources of identity also produced new leaders who were eventually able to assert 
their power in post-Saddam Iraq.  America, with little knowledge of Iraqi politics, did not 
anticipate the sources of power that would arise in post-Saddam Iraq.  The Bush 
Administration was overly influenced by the exile groups, whose isolation from Iraqi 
society made them unlikely to succeed in post-Saddam Iraq.   
Meanwhile, though events in Iran posed a challenge to the ruling mullahs, the 
Iranian regime proved determined to crush dissent.  The mullahs would be able to 
advance their revolutionary interests in post-Saddam Iraq.  The Americans, unaware of 
conditions on the ground in Iraq and convinced that the Iranian regime remained 
vulnerable to popular uprising, would thus hamstring themselves in the coming 
competition with Iran for the loyalty of the Shia of Iraq.    
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V.  SHI’I ALLEGIANCES AFTER SADDAM 
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is 
enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live 
without other security, than what with their own strength, and their own 
invention shall furnish them withal.  In such condition, there is no place 
for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no 
culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be 
imported by the sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving, 
and removing, such things as require such force; no knowledge of the face 
of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which 
is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of 
man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.389 
      -Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 
Promoting disorder is a legitimate objective for the insurgent.  It helps 
disrupt the economy, hence to produce discontent; it serves to undermine 
the strength and the authority of the counterinsurgent.  Moreover, 
disorder-the normal state of nature-is cheap to create and very costly to 
prevent.390 
    -David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare 
 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Because the Shi’a make up the majority of Iraq’s population, American plans to 
overthrow Saddam rested on a gamble that the Shi’a were more pro-American than pro-
Iranian. This gamble was based on hope more than knowledge and experience.  In reality, 
the United States was always going to face an uphill battle in its quest to win the favor of 
the Shi’a of Iraq.  The Americans were foreigners and non-Muslims, had motives that 
seemed questionable to the Shi’a, and had shown in 1991 that they were unreliable.  Even 
with these disadvantages, however, it was conceivable that the Shi’a could form an 
effective partnership with the United States.  After all, it was the Americans who were to 
overthrow the Sunni regime headed by Saddam, empower Shi’i politicians, and hold out 
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the promise of a reconstructed Iraq.  So far, the Shi’a have proven to be pro-Iraqi, and 
willing to use both American and Iranian resources for their own purposes. 
Chapter IV argued that events in the 1990s transformed Iraqi society in ways not 
readily visible to outsiders.  This chapter shows the consequences of that ignorance.  To 
America’s surprise, the Shi’a did not greet the American invaders with uncritical 
goodwill as predicted, but with wariness.  The chapter explains that the initial period 
following the invasion formed a brief window of opportunity in which American policy 
goals were most achievable. Instead of exploiting this window, however, the United 
States’ inaction created a security vacuum that remains to this day. This vacuum and the 
corresponding slow pace of reconstruction discredited the United States in Shi’i eyes.  
The chapter shows that the Shi’a reacted to this breakdown in security by turning to their 
own sources of authority and security, including influential Shi’i leaders such as Sistani 
and Sadr, whom the Americans hesitated to acknowledge.  Events such as the Abu 
Ghraib prison scandal further shocked and offended Iraqis, adding to anti-American 
sentiment.  The chapter shows that the context of disorder propelled sectarianism and 
ethnic conflict, leading most dangerously to the emergence of regionalism as a divisive 
issue that could conceivably end in a divided Iraq, with the formation of a Shi’i region in 
the south.  While Sadr and Sistani have resisted this trend, their ability to control events 
may be waning.  The Shi’a may be distancing themselves from the United States, 
enabling Iran to increasingly able step more overtly into the resulting void. 
This chapter focuses largely on Americans actions in Iraq, actions that it argues 
have empowered the Shi’a, tested their loyalties, and created conditions that Iran may be 
able to exploit.  The chapter does not seek to use hindsight to fix blame, but rather to 
understand the genesis of current Shi’i attitudes. 
B. THE U.S. INVASION AND THE FIGHT FOR SHI’I LOYALTY 
1. American Assumptions and Plans 
a. “Shiaphilia” and “Sunniphobia” 
Some participants in American initial efforts in post-Saddam Iraq blame at 
least some of the increasing sectarian tension on initial American misperceptions.  U.S. 
officials allegedly began the endeavor with a greater sense of sectarianism than the Iraqis 
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themselves possessed.391  Many of the leading neoconservatives held to a vision of the 
Shi’a, an unrealistic “Shiaphilia” according to Ahmed S. Hashim of the Naval War 
College, which would soon be disproved by reality.392  Ironically, neoconservative 
rhetoric echoed that of Sunnis who accused Shi’a of being “less Arab.”393  Some 
observers even claim that “Shiite power was the key to the whole neoconservative vision 
for Iraq.”394   In due course, that conviction is said to have led Americans to make 
unrealistic promises to the Shi’a,395 thereby creating a scenario in which the Shi’a would 
naturally lose faith in the United States as their expectations were not fulfilled. 
b. ORHA’s Plans 
In January 2003, retired General Jay Garner established the Office of 
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) to supervise the postwar American 
effort.  The organization’s first error was its assumption that Iraq had functioning 
infrastructure.396  In reality, however, the economy “had essentially collapsed by 
2003.”397  Iraqi society was now marked by enormous structural challenges such as high 
illiteracy rates and a youth bulge.398  
In early April, Rumsfeld aide Lawrence Di Rita outlined ORHA’s postwar 
political plan.  “We’re going to stand up an interim Iraqi government, hand power over to 
them, and get out in three to four months,” he said.  “All but twenty-five thousand 
soldiers will be out by the beginning of September.”399  Although Garner had estimated 
in February that reconstruction costs would total no more than $3 billion over three years, 
according to Garner’s aides, in mid-April, Di Rita angrily told him, “We don’t owe these 
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people a thing.  We gave them their freedom.”  Di Rita would later deny making the 
comment.400  In any case, American plans for Iraq’s postconflict governance and 
reconstruction did not at all fit the situation that would soon exist. 
c. Transformational War 
In what would form a crucial element in this mismatch, the Bush 
Administration’s theory of victory did not include the use of large numbers of U.S. forces 
to enforce security.  According to Rumsfeld’s doctrine of “transformation,” smaller, 
lighter forces would bypass resistance and overwhelm the enemy through speed and 
shock.  Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz publicly rejected U.S. Army Chief of 
Staff Eric Shinseki’s estimates of the necessary troop numbers, claiming that Iraq’s 
postwar requirements would be much lower than previous such interventions.401  Deputy 
U.S. Centcom Commander General Abazaid judged U.S troops to be “an antibody” in 
Iraqi society.402  As things turned out, however, the lack of a large enough deployment of 
U.S. troops meant trusting security to Iraqi forces that for various reasons did not exist at 
the time they were most needed.   
2. The Shi’i Reception 
The U.S.-led coalition forces began their attack on Iraq on 20 March 2003.  The 
Shi’a received the American invaders with wariness, dubious of American intentions 
after the “Great Betrayal” of 1991 and suspicious of American rhetoric about 
democracy.403  One son of a senior Najafi ayatollah asked Washington Post 
correspondent Anthony Shadid: “If the Americans had finished the task in 1991, the 
Shiites would have received them with flowers.  We have a previous experience with 
foreigners.  Is it possible to trust them?”404  The Shi’a feared two things: that they would 
be denied a share of political power in proportion to their numbers and that the liberation  
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would turn into an occupation.405  The invading U.S. forces satisfied their commanders’ 
desire for speed, reaching the outskirts of Baghdad on 5 April.  They fully occupied the 
city by 9 April.406   
3. Iranian Infiltration and SCIRI/Badr 
On 9 September 2002, the Iranian National Security Council began planning an 
active campaign for post-Saddam Iraq.407  In early 2003, Iran authorized SCIRI to meet 
with other Iraqi opposition groups and allowed Iraqi exiles based in other nations to come 
to Tehran for meetings with SCIRI and Khameini.408  Badr was divided up into northern, 
central, and southern sections and ordered to infiltrate into Iraq in the immediate 
aftermath of the invasion.  It was to seize government offices and other centers of 
authority.   
As the Americans invaded, up to 12,000 Badr fighters, accompanied by Iranian 
intelligence agents, entered Iraq.  Captured IRGC documents allegedly show that the 
organization reported that Kut and Amarah were soon under their control.  Pay records 
captured by U.S. forces are said to show that the IRGC funded 11,740 Badr members as 
of August 2004.  Badr leader Hadi al-Amri has denied the allegations.409  
Even as he led SCIRI back home, however, Mohammed Baqir Sadr began 
distancing himself from Iran’s revolutionary government, saying, “Neither an Islamic 
government nor a secular administration will work in Iraq but a democratic state that 
respects Islam as the religion of a majority of the population.”410  This stance seemed 
opposed to Iran’s previous demands for vilayat-i faqih. 
4. Sadr’s Power Play 
As the American offensive drew to close in Baghdad, Moqtada al-Sadr saw an 
opening.  On the day American forces entered Baghdad, Sadr supporters expelled Baath 
Party officials from East Baghdad, renamed the district Sadr City, reopened closed 
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mosques, captured arms caches, and began forming militias.411  In contrast to other Shi’i 
movements who waited for security to improve, Sadrist imams immediately led prayers.  
These imams established the rhetorical themes that would propel the movement 
thereafter, preaching that proper Iraqis must live under Islamic law; that foreigners 
should stay out; that Iraqis who sought exile had abandoned their responsibilities; that 
foreign-born clerics such as Sistani could not speak for Iraqis; and that God, not the 
United States, had freed the Iraqi people.412   
Sadr quickly gained at least a reflected religious authority.  On 9 April, his 
father’s designated successor, the Iran-based Ayatollah Kazim al-Hairi, named Sadr as 
his representative in Iraq.  Declaring that his followers should follow only the rulings of 
his late father and Hai'ri, Sadr thus undermined the influence of the Grand Ayatollahs 
Sistani and Hakim.413    
Sadr apparently turned to violence the very next day, as members of his 
movement allegedly killed Abd al-Majid al-Kho’i.  the son of the late ayatollah, who had 
been brought into Iraq by U.S. forces on 3 April in hopes of exerting a moderate 
influence.414    As he sat in a meeting with the custodian of the shrine of Imam Ali, a mob 
entered the building and barricaded the office, demanding that the custodian be turned 
over for summary justice for collaborating with the Ba’athist regime.  Kho’i and the 
custodian surrendered after a ninety-minute stand-off and were taken to see Sadr, 
although it is unclear whether he in fact received them or passed any guidance to his 
followers.  In any case, the crowd turned on the captives, stabbed them death, mutilated 
their bodies, and displayed their corpses in public.415  A subsequent American 
investigation concluded that Kho’i had been killed at Sadr’s command.416 
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Sadr then turned his attention to Ayatollah Muhammad Said al-Hakim, the 
nephew of SCIRI’s Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim, and unsuccessfully attempted to 
intimidate him into giving him his allegiance.  His followers also surrounded Grand 
Ayatollah Sistani’s home in Najaf.  Hakim and Sistani were ordered to leave the city 
immediately, but Sadr’s supporters were driven away by the arrival of 1,500 tribesmen 
loyal to the senior mutjahid. 417 
C. THE STATE OF NATURE REVEALED 
1. Initial Missteps by ORHA and the CPA  
The American occupiers were not prepared for challenges to their authority.  
Though they conquered Iraq easily, unorganized forces promoting disorder soon 
challenged them.  The looting of Baghdad, in particular, undermined American authority.  
When potential insurgents saw the vacuum of security that the looting had exposed, they 
realized that they could organize resistance.  American leaders refused to recognize the 
situation.  The Shi’a, meanwhile, saw that they could not depend on the Americans for 
protection.   
a. The Looting of Baghdad   
Looting broke out in Baghdad as early as the morning of 9 April and 
increased in intensity with each passing day, but the American authorities seemed 
unconcerned. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld commented, “Stuff happens.”418  Even if they 
had wanted to provide security, the Americans lacked the force to do so.  The American 
Third Infantry Division found itself responsible for much of the security of Baghdad.   
While the division had 18,000 troops, only 1,200 were dismounted infantry.  The division 
had only several hundred sets of body armor.  The division’s policing power was diluted 
by the need to provide security to Garner’s team.  “We simply did not have enough forces 
for a city of six or seven million,” said an ORHA official.419 
As Noah Feldman, an advisor to the Coalition Provisional Authority, 
pointed out, “The key to it all was the looting.  That was when it was clear that there was 
no order…  That also told them they could fight against us and we’re not a serious force.”  
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CPA officials later estimated that the damage from the looting totaled more than $12 
billion, and the psychological damage inflicted by the chaos was likely far worse.420   
b. The First Fight for Political Authority   
Garner’s initial meeting met with seventy-five Iraqi leaders on 15 April 
went poorly, as representatives from Dawa and SCIRI boycotted in protest at their lack of 
representation.421  Garner, who favored Chalabi and the Kurds, was uninterested in other 
Iraqi actors.  When a knowledgeable ORHA official attempted several times to convince 
him to engage in dialogue with Sistani, Garner replied, “Why?  Who is this person?”422 
When Garner’s team arrived in Baghdad on 18 April, they quickly found 
that their job was much more challenging than they had expected.  In October 2002, 
Saddam had released many prisoners, and in the chaotic environment they now embarked 
on a crime wave.  Violent crime soared as a result.423  These problems were further 
exacerbated by the failure of Iraq’s infrastructure.  Government ministries had been 
sacked by looters, and telephone exchanges were destroyed or otherwise out of service.  
To prevent serious damage, Iraqi engineers had shut down the electrical grid, but now 
they could not bring it back on line.  Two of three sewage plants in the city were heavily 
damaged.  The Iraqi police had abandoned their posts, and were in any case far more 
corrupt and untrustworthy than the American planners had anticipated.424    Baghdad’s 
two aging electrical plants were on the verge of complete failure, and their intermittent 
service had a dire effect on water, sanitation, air conditioning, and security.  These 
failures eroded Iraqi confidence in American competence,425 especially when compared 
to the recovery instituted by Saddam after the Gulf War.  
America’s initial efforts to organize an Iraqi government also quickly 
failed as the Iraqi exiles immediately began squabbling between themselves.  As Qubad 
Talabani, the son of Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani, said, “We were collectively unable to 
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form this government because of what has plagued Iraq since then, quotas and who gets 
what share and what responsibility.  This sent a message to Washington that the Iraqis 
were unable to administer themselves.”426  In early May, John Sawyer, the senior British 
official in Iraq, sent a secret cable entitled “Iraq: What’s Going Wrong?” back to his 
home office,  He warned that the Americans were losing the support of the Iraqi people, 
and that ORHA was “an unbelievable mess.”427  
2. The Resistance Begins in Earnest 
a. Bremer’s Orders   
On 6 May, the White House announced that Jay Garner, after serving only 
weeks in Iraq, would be replaced by Jerry Bremer.  As part of his agreement to take the 
job, Bremer opted to remove Zalmay Khalilzad from the American mission, thereby 
depriving it of the official who best knew and was most trusted by the Iraqi leaders.428  
Bremer arrived in Baghdad on 12 May and quickly established the Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA).  On 15 May, he overturned a Garner and Khalilzad agreement to 
establish an interim Iraqi government by the end of the month.  Instead Bremer sought a 
two-step program: to first write a constitution; and to only then hold elections.429   
Bremer was to become most famous for the two orders that he issued 
within days of his arrival.  On 16 May, he published Order No.1: “De-Baathification of 
Iraqi Society.”   The order banned all members of the top four levels of the Ba’ath Party 
from public sector employment; which, as the CIA’s Baghdad station chief noted, 
disenfranchised more than 30,000 people.430  On 23 May, Bremer issued Order No. 2: 
“The Dissolution of Entities,” which formally dissolved the Iraqi military, the Defense 
Ministry, and the intelligence services.  This order contradicted the Central Command’s 
prewar planning and was promulgated without any consultation with key figures such as 
Colin Powell, Condoleeza Rice, or the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  Violent protests broke out in 
Baghdad and Mosul.431  As a U.S. official later pointed out, “That was the week we made 
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450,000 enemies on the ground in Iraq.”432  Bremer’s two orders, along with other less-
noted policies toward the Sunnis, soon caused the Sunnis to feel marginalized, and, 
according to a Sunni who became part of Allawi’s interim government, created the 
perception that the United States believed “every Sunni is a terrorist.”433 
b. The Formal Declaration of Occupation   
On 22 May, the United Nations Security Council approved Resolution 
1483, which recognized the United States and Britain as “occupying powers” in Iraq.  
While this provided international recognition of American authority in Iraq, it alienated 
many Iraqis, who considered it an insult to their national pride.434 
3. Alienating the Shia 
a. Disregarding Resident Religious Figures   
When the Americans quickly proved unable or unwilling to enforce the 
law or provide security, the Iraqi people began to look for other sources of authority.  
Given the regional political context of the preceding decades, they saw religious leaders 
as the most obvious source of authority.  In response, the hawza’s network of mosques 
soon created an “imagined community” of Shi’a, which would serve not only their 
religious needs but also their need to act with collectively.435   
This also allowed Moqtada al-Sadr to continue his foray into the 
leadership void.  In a 2003 interview, Sadr proclaimed his leadership of a new movement.  
“I accept the burden and the responsibility,” he said.  “I advise the Americans to ally with 
the Shiites, not to oppose them.”  As the self-proclaimed leader of the Shi’a, Sadr meant 
for the Americans to ally with him.436   
Common people could relate to Sadr.  According to Shadid, “He spoke 
like the dispossessed; he even looked like them.”  He and his family had remained in Iraq 
throughout the political repression and economic decline of the last thirty years and had 
suffered terribly and personally.  Sadr believed that he was the only one speaking up for 
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his constituents: “I found a vacuum, and no one filled that vacuum.”437  As part of an 
effort to reinforce the idea of his legitimacy, his supporters posted many images of Sadr 
and his father together.438  The Sadr movement received funding via the khoms (religious 
taxes) collected in its mosques, estimated in the early days of occupation at $65,000 a 
month.439 
Despite his ambition, Sadr is a mere hujjat al-islam, a junior cleric, not an 
ayatollah, and is much younger than traditional clerical leaders.  Some senior followers 
of Sadr II, who rejected his leadership because of his junior status, formed their own 
factions.440  Sheikh Muhammad al-Yaqubi, a former student of Sadr II, became the 
leader of a dissident branch of the Sadr movement which is now the Fadhila (Islamic 
Virtue) Party.441  Sheikh Ahmad al-Fartusi spun off another Sadr splinter group even 
more militant than Moqtada’s.442 
More importantly, Sistani, his followers and other tradition-based religious 
leaders could not give legitimacy to Sadr, for doing so would negate the basis for their 
own legitimacy.  “Who is he?” Hakim said in response to a question about Sadr, “I don’t 
have any comment on this question.”  Sistani’s son Mohammed Rida, who often 
functions as his father’s spokesman, likewise said, “I don’t have any comment on this 
person.”443 
On 4 June, a United Nations representative met with Sistani and 
Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim in Najaf.  This meeting marked Sistani’s first public 
entrance on the political scene.  Sistani argued that a constitution should be drawn up by 
an elected national assembly, not by an appointed body as Bremer planned.444   
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On 25 July, British envoy John Sawyer wrote another memo, labeled 
“Iraq: Progress Report,” in which he documented the security vacuum, economic 
challenges, and the threat of “well-targeted sabotage of the infrastructure.”  Sawyer 
emphasized that problems with security and services were causing even moderate Shi’a 
to turn against the coalition.  He also warned that Iran was preparing to take advantage of 
any openings provided by the coalition shortcomings.445 
b. Cancelling Elections in the Shi’i South 
As Bremer issued orders in a top-down fashion, he undercut the local 
initiative of the U.S. military.  Most significantly, he cancelled the local elections in 
Najaf that were organized by U.S. troops.  U.S. Marines there had planned the elections 
to be held in mid-summer, but the day before the proposed vote they were suddenly 
cancelled.  Bremer worried that anti-American Islamist candidates might win.  The 
Marines, recalling Administration rhetoric about freedom and democracy, were 
dismayed.  Their commander, General Mattis, later summarized the situation: “A window 
of opportunity existed when the regime fell…Two things then created major problems: 
disbanding the Iraqi army and putting proud soldiers on the street unemployed.  The other 
was shortstopping local elections.”446  Mattis’ supervisor, General Conway, later also 
recalled that, “When we denied Iraqis the opportunities to elect local officials-vice 
appoint them by the area commander-we were increasingly seen as occupiers.”447   
c. Ignoring, Then Antagonizing Sadr 
Having failed to take over the religious establishment by force, throughout 
the summer of 2003, Sadr continued to consolidate his networks and build his militia.  He 
denounced the Iraqi interim government as puppets of the United States during a sermon 
on 18 July 2003,448 and called for a militia to oppose the occupation.449  Although, at this 
point, the Sadr movement was opposed to foreign occupation, it was not necessarily 
committed to fighting the Americans.  When asked his opinion of U.S. intentions, Riyahd 
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al-Nouri, a key leader, responded that he was withholding judgment until he saw whether 
the Americans followed through on promises of reconstruction and democratic 
governance.  Other Sadr leaders were less open to accepting America, however, which 
created confusion about the movement’s overall position.450 
Relations between the Americans and the Shi’a, especially Sadr’s 
followers, deteriorated sharply on 13 August 2003.  In the late morning, about one hour 
before the noon prayers, a U.S. helicopter hovered near a radio tower in Sadr City in an 
attempt to remove a black flag emblazoned with the name of the Mahdi.  By that 
afternoon, images of the incident were being broadcast on al-Arabiya, an Arabic satellite 
television station.  The incident, at first vehemently denied by the U.S. military but later 
verified, greatly angered the entire city.  It soon became a symbol of the growing gap 
between the Americans and the Iraqis.451  
4. Ceding Its Role as Leviathan 
In the months after the invasion, U.S. officials dealt with the deteriorating security 
situation by arguing that they were making progress and that the unrest was the product 
of unorganized and desperate “dead-enders.”  While there may have been some truth to 
that contention at first, as the U.S. military failed to more actively impose security, Iraqi 
resistance began to organize.  As a subset of a broader Iraqi resistance, Sunni terrorists 
began a campaign to discredit the occupation by isolating it from allies, international 
institutions, and the general Iraqi population.  The terrorists then turned on the Shi’a of 
Iraq, both for religious reasons and in hope of sparking a civil war in which the 
Americans might withdraw and the terrorists might take charge of the Sunni population.  
While they would not accomplish these extreme goals, the terrorists did succeed in 
showing the Shi’a that the Americans either could not or would not protect them. 
a. Ignoring the Problem 
On 16 June 2003, the new Centcom commander General Abazaid, 
described the situation in Iraq as a “classical guerilla-type campaign.”  On the 18th, 
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz echoed this observation, telling a 
congressional audience that “There is a guerilla war there, but…we can win it.”  On 30 
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June, Rumsfeld spoke out in contradiction, saying that his assessment of the situation 
“doesn’t make it anything like a guerrilla war or an organized resistance.”452  Rumsfeld’s 
argument was that insurgencies are fought only against sovereign governments, and Iraq 
was not a sovereign state.  When Captain Jesse Sellers of the U.S. Third Armored 
Cavalry Regiment was told by a general that “this is not an insurgency,” he recalled 
thinking, “Well, if you can tell us what it is, that’d be awesome.” 453  Because they did 
not so much as acknowledge the problem, U.S. leaders could not hope to effectively 
address it.  
b. Terror Bombings to Isolate the Occupation from Its Allies   
As the resistance gelled, terror cells began a campaign to discredit the 
occupation.  In August 2003, terrorist bombings destroyed the Jordanian Embassy and the 
local headquarters of the United Nations.  Late in the month, a bomb made from a gas 
cylinder targeted Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Saeed al-Hakim, one of the four senior 
mujtahids, only slightly wounding him.  A week later, a massive car bomb detonated just 
outside the shrine of Imam Ali at the end of Friday prayers, killing Ayatollah Mohammed 
Baqir al-Hakim and eighty-one others.  Hakim’s death deprived American officials of a 
powerful link to the Shi’i community.454   
On 27 October 2003, the first day of Ramadan, a coordinated series of 
bombs destroyed the Baghdad headquarters of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross and several police stations.455  The ambiguous identity of the perpetrators and their 
timing increased the people’s sense of anxiety and made America look like an 
incompetent authority that provoked rather than prevented such incidents.  One wounded 
Iraqi policeman commented, “When I joined the police, I thought the Americans should 
stay to provide us security.  Now they’re just creating risks for us.”  From that point on, 
many Iraqis stopped believing the promises or assurances from America, and instead, 
believed only in the threats of the terrorists.456 
                                                 
452 James Fallows, “Why Iraq has No Army,” Atlantic Monthly 296, Issue 5, December 2005, 60. 
453 George Packer, “The Lesson of Tal Afar,” New Yorker 82, Issue 8, 10 April 2006, 49. 
454 Shadid, 254-5. 
455, Ibid., 266. 
456 Ibid., 270-2. 
97 
If the Ramadan bombings marked a turning point in Iraqi perceptions of 
U.S. competence, the bombings on 2 March 2004, Ashura, in Karbala and Kadhimiya, 
solidified that negative image.  At ten o’clock in the morning, with tens of thousands of 
pilgrims crowding the shrine cities, a series of blasts erupted at Karbala and in 
Kadhimiya.457  Once again, the anonymous nature of the bombers fueled popular 
suspicion of various groups, from Wahhabis and Ba’athists to Americans.  In any case, 
the event made the U.S. forces look weak and inadequate; they were unable to protect the 
Shi’a on their holiest day.458 
5. A Confrontation with Sadr   
In the midst of this tension, U.S. forces finally moved against Sadr.  On 28 March 
2004 they closed down his newspaper, Al Hawzah (The Seminary), accusing it of anti-
Israel and anti-American incitement.  Sadr was not intimidated into silence, as the 
Americans had hoped, but was instead motivated to act.  Protests erupted over the next 
few days.459  On 3 April U.S. forces arrested a Sadr movement leader, Mustafa al-
Yaacoubi, and twelve others on charges related to Khoi’s death.460  Sensing an 
impending attack, Sadr ordered his forces to rebel, and violence erupted in Kufa, Najaf, 
Sadr City, Nasiriyah, Kut, and Basra.461  “The response we got from capturing Yaacoubi 
was unexpected,” said a senior U.S. Army officer.  “We did not expect it to be as broad-
based as it was.”  The next day, Bremer labeled Sadr an outlaw.  Meanwhile, after four 
U.S. contractors were killed by a mob, U.S. forces became involved in a simultaneous 
uprising in the Sunni city of Fallujah.462 
Sadr linked the twin revolts as complementary efforts to expel the occupiers: “the 
union of Sunnis and Shiites toward an independent Iraq, free of terror and occupation.”463  
On 6 April 2004, neighbors in the Sunni neighborhood of Adhamiya marched alongside 
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Sadr supporters, and Sunni groups celebrated his bravery and leadership.  Kadhimiya 
residents held a blood drive for those in Fallujah, and, in Baghdad, people of both sects 
gave refugees from Fallujah food and shelter.464  Sadr’s uprising continued intermittently 
through April and part of May, and then gradually faded away, especially after a major 
battle in Karbala.465 
D. THE SHI’I TAKE POWER 
1. The Iraqi Governing Council 
In the summer of 2003, Bremer appointed an Iraqi Governing Council, whose 
members drafted the Transition Administrative Law that would serve as Iraq’s interim 
constitution.  The CPA ceased operation on 28 June 2004, ceding power to an interim 
government.466  Allawi served as interim Prime Minister on the Iraqi Governing Council 
(IGC) from June 2004 to January 2005.467   Chalabi was also selected to serve on the 
IGC, where among other duties, he headed the “de-Baathification” effort. 468  Allawi and 
the interim government lost credibility over time because of their inability to reduce 
violence and their support for the coalition campaign in Fallujah in November 2004.469 
a. Najaf and Fallujah, Fall 2004 
Throughout the summer and early fall of 2004, Sadr’s Mahdi Army grew 
in strength and boldness, challenging coalition and government forces in Sadr City, 
Najaf, and other Shi’i areas.  On 5 August 2004, Sadr called for his forces to rise up 
against the United States, and attacks intensified.  His violent opposition climaxed in 
battles around the Imam Ali Shrine in Najaf in November of 2004, in which his forces 
were soundly defeated but allowed to exit the battlefield.  After this defeat, Sadr was 
forced to turn away from most violent resistance, but political deals preserved his Mahdi 
Army. 470   
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b. Zarqawi’s War on the Shia  
While coalition errors created an environment of general disorder, the 
sectarian conflict in Iraq has been stoked most effectively by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, 
who has deliberately attempted to provoke a Sunni-Shi’a civil war.  Zarqawi has used 
references to Alqami among other rhetoric meant to condemn Shi’i heresy and 
treachery.471  While radical Sunni clerics and the five Sunni insurgent groups have all 
condemned Zarqawi’s campaign against the Shi’a,472 Shi’i factions have responded to 
Zarqawi’s provocations by retaliating against Sunnis, thereby furthering the advancement 
of ascribed identities and sectarian conflict.   
c. Abu Ghraib 
The Abu Ghraib prison scandal further alienated Shi’a from the 
Americans, undermined the rhetoric of democracy and human rights, and confirmed the 
Iraqis’ fears of abuse by the U.S. occupiers.  Most significantly, it solidified Iraqi 
perception of disrespects on the part of the Americans, making it harder for Iraqis to trust 
and cooperate with them.473 
2. The Transitional Government 
a. The Formation of the United Iraqi Alliance under Sistani 
Sistani played an instrumental role in building the UIA slate for the 
January 2005 elections and may have ensured the slate’s victory through his 
endorsement.474  Sistani’s political influence was directly observable in the discrepancy 
between Shi’i votes for the transitional national assembly and for the governing council.  
He endorsed candidates only for the transitional assembly.  Despite the fact that many 
parties nominated candidates for both elections, Shi’a voted in a unified manner only for 
the transitional assembly.475  Chalabi ran on the UIA list in the January 2005 elections. 
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b. The Shi’i Religious Parties Take Office 
In the elections of January 2005, Allawi was voted out of office.477  A 
new government was formed in April, led by the Da’wa Party’s Ibrahim al-Jaafari.  
Jaafari had fled to Iran in 1980, but later moved to London to distance himself from the 
Iranians.478   Chalabi, who served as one of the three deputy prime ministers, remained 
responsible for the de-Baatification program.479  The tenure of the new government was 
marked by indecision and continued violence.480 
c. The New Government and Iran 
In July 2005, Jaafari visited Iran and met with leaders including Supreme 
Leader Khameini.  During the visit, Jaafari and other Iraqi officials took responsibility for 
starting the Iran-Iraq War, blamed Saddam Hussein for using chemical weapons in that 
conflict, and condemned Israel.  The two countries agreed to open diplomatic facilities in 
Basra and Karbala,481 the Iranians agreed to invest in a proposed multi-million dollar 
airport in southern Iraq, and the leaders signed a deal for an oil pipeline from Basra to 
refining facilities in Abadan Iran.482  As a result of these developing ties, one a Western 
diplomat assessed that “We have to think anything we tell or share with the Iraqi 
government ends up in Tehran.” 483    
Despite this official relationship, even those Shi’a most connected to the 
Iranian regime continue to profess Iraqi nationalism.  Badr leader Hadi al-Amri, for 
example, has said, “We are sons of Iraq.  The circumstances that forced me to leave did 
not change my identity.”  He pointed out that though his organization cooperated proudly 
with the IRGC in the days of Saddam, it did so only “to the limits of our interests.”484   
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d. Shi’i Factions Take Over the Security Services  
With Shi’i Islamists at the head of the new government, Shi’i factions 
quickly took over the vital security services.  In 2004, in an effort to improve the 
effectiveness of the police forces, the Iraqi Interior Ministry had begun building 
commando units, drawing veterans of the Republican Guard and other security forces.  
When the Sunni Interior Minister Falah al-Nakib turned over his office to Bayan Jabr of 
SCIRI (and formerly Badr) in the spring of 2005, he knew that those units would soon be 
stocked with Shi’i militiamen.485 
Badr already provided security for many Shi’i religious sites and 
community leaders, including Grand Ayatollah Sistani, and the Badr Organization and 
the Mahdi Army soon controlled much of the security apparatus.486  Those new ties to 
security services made actors and connections uncertain. “The difference between the 
Ministry of the Interior and the Badr Brigade has become very blurry,” said one human 
rights investigator. “You have these people in the security services, and they have 
different masters,” noted a U.S. official in Baghdad. “There isn't a clear understanding of 
who is in charge.”487   
The so-called Wolf Brigade is one of several official affiliates of Badr to 
be incorporated into the Interior Ministry,488  as is the Volcano Brigade.  The Volcanoes 
allegedly massacred 36 Sunnis on 23 August 2005 in the Baghdad neighborhood of 
Dolay, although Volcano Brigade commander Bassem Gharawi denied those accusations.  
Other government sources contradict him, however.489  A Sunni group investigating 
incidents says it has documented the death or disappearance of seven hundred Sunni 
civilians between August and November 2005.490  A senior U.S. military officer 
characterize the situation this way: “The Mahdi Army’s got the Iraqi police and Badr’s 
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got the commandos.  Everybody’s got their own death squads.”491  Many Sunnis now 
view the Badr Organization as Iran’s chosen instrument for domination in Iraq, and Sunni 
organizations including Zarqawi’s “Umar” unit have formed to hunt down Badr 
members.492 
In the summer of 2005, the Mahdi Army reorganized under a national 
command in Baghdad that centralized its command and control.493  In a report in the San 
Francisco Chronicle, dozens of officers in the 1st Brigade Special Police Commando 
Unit, also known as the Lion Brigade, identified themselves to journalists as followers of 
al-Sadr.494   The Sadr movement issues identification cards, which are required to enter 
Sadr city and other areas controlled by the movement.495  Some reports in the late fall of 
2005 indicate that roughly 90 percent of the police in northeast Baghdad at the time had 
ties to the Sadr movement and were actively cleansing Sunnis from Shi’i 
neighborhoods.496  Sadr has controlled the Health Ministry since mid 2005, and in the 
guise of the Facilities Protection Service, his Mahdi militiamen have also taken over 
security at hospitals and morgues.  Sunni leaders claim that, so far in 2006, 275 Sunnis 
have been killed or abducted in health ministry facilities.497  The Facility Protection 
Service is to be closely examined and brought under more centralized control as part of 
efforts to rein in militias.498 
In mid November 2005 U.S. troops discovered a secret Iraqi prison in 
Baghdad holding 173 malnourished and abused prisoners, mostly Sunnis, some showing 
signs of torture.  Sunni politicians protested the site, claiming it was one of many, and 
demanded an investigation by the U.N.  Some Shi’i guards at the site expressed little                                                  
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remorse, characterizing the prisoners as “terrorists.”499  The prison was said to be run by 
the Secret Investigative Unit, under the command of a brigadier and a colonel.  The 
colonel was allegedly in charge of infiltrating Badr members into the police and had a 
direct-reporting relationship to Jabr.500  U.S. officials pledged a thorough investigation, 
while Shi’i leaders said the incident was an attempt to discredit the Shia-led government 
ahead of the 15 December elections.501    
In fact, some Shi’i leaders have appealed for more leeway in conducting 
operations.  In late November 2005, SCIRI leader Abdul Aziz Hakim asserted that U.S. 
officials were restricting Iraqi forces from pursuing more aggressive tactics.  While 
denying allegations of death squads, militia infiltration, and Iranian influence, Hakim 
criticized U.S. restraint and called for a southern Shi’i region.  He did not specify what 
measures would be more appropriate, and he indicated a strong distrust of the United 
States.502  
U.S. military officers have acknowledged the need to control sectarian 
forces within the police services.  “2006 we’re going to call the year of the police,” said 
Lieutenant Colonel Fred Wellman, a spokesman for the military.   In 2005, U.S. officials 
announced plans to embed U.S. troops within Iraqi police units.503  While this may 
constitute a possible solution to militia infiltration of the police, it would seem to call into 
question Iraqi sovereignty and may potentially set U.S. forces up for a confrontation with 
elected Iraqi officials.  A senior U.S. military officer acknowledged the dilemma in late 
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elected.  And they say he’s appointed a bunch of Badr guys.  We have a Republican 
Administration in American and guess what?  They’ve appointed a lot of Republicans.  
You elected SCIRI, and SCIRI is Badr.”504 
E. SADR REBUILDS 
In the middle of 2005, Sadr turned to formal political participation.  He was able 
to gather support due to other Shi’i factions’ corruption and incompetence.  During the 
summer, he began an effort to collect one million signatures on a petition demanding the 
withdrawal of the Coalition.505  His supporters ran for office in the January 2005 
elections without his direct involvement, and in their aftermath, he took control of the 
health and transportation ministries and purged them, claiming to be “cleansing [them of] 
Saddamists.”506 
The Mahdi Army also began to display its reconstituted strength, holding parades 
or otherwise operating openly in Basra, Amarah, Nasiriyah, Najaf, and Qut.  While these 
activities were not as aggressive as in the past, they effectively demonstrated the potential 
of the Sadr movement.  By late spring of 2005, it was clear that the Mahdi Army was the 
largest militia in Basra, held significant force in Amarah, and cooperated with police in 
Nasiriya. 507    
F. THE TRIUMPH OF THE IRANIAN CONSERVATIVE HARD-LINERS 
1. New Ties between Iran and Iraq 
Recently, the ties between Iraq and Iran have increased on both formal and 
informal levels.  In the absence of strong authority and border controls, cross-border 
smuggling between the two nations has greatly increased in the last three years.  The flow 
of pilgrims from Iran to the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala also has increased steadily 
since 2003, slowing only after insurgent attacks.  An estimated two million pilgrims a 
year now make the journey from Iran.508  The burial trade to the Wadi al-Salam cemetery 
outside the Imam Ali mosque in Najaf has also greatly increased and brought significant 
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revenue.  In an indirect reflection of Iran’s influence, the southern city of Basra has 
gradually changed from a Western-oriented metropolis full of nightlife to a theocratic city 
patrolled by religious police and governed by edicts, similar to the early days of the 
Islamic Republic in Iran.509 
2. The Iranian Elections of July 2005  
Shortly after the Shi’i Islamists took power in Iraq, religious conservatives in Iran 
completed their political triumph, culminating in the victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, 
the mayor of Tehran, in the presidential election of June 2005.510  A “conservative coup” 
in February 2004, caused by the Guardian Council’s disqualification of 3,600 reformist 
legislature candidates, had prompted many reformers to ponder the usefulness of 
elections.511  Reformist forces had been disillusioned by politics under Khatami and 
responded to calls for a boycott.512  The 2005 presidential elections thus became a 
mechanism for conservative factions to resolve their differences.513 
Though Ahmadinejad’s win reflected the power of conservative forces, it did not 
indicate that they enjoyed a majority of popular support.514  Khatami and his allies had 
emphasized political and cultural reforms, but did not address the economic concerns of 
the lower class.515 Ahmadinejad’s victory signaled a transfer of political power to the 
post-revolutionary generation and from middle-class interests to the lower class.516  
Ahmandinejad campaigned on economic issues.  Focusing on economic 
inequality and corruption, he promised to stabilize prices, boost wages, and even income 
disparities.  This approach garnered significant popular support among the forty percent 
of Iranians who live in poverty.  Inflation runs at 16 percent, and official statistics rate 
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unemployment at 15 percent, though unofficial estimates go as high as 30 percent.517  
Two-third’s of Iran's population are under thirty years old.518  The conservative hard-
liners face continued opposition from some religious quarters.  Grand Ayatollah 
Montazeri, now 84, still opposes the Tehran regime from his home in Qom.  He is joined 
in this effort by Grand Ayatollah Yusuf Saanei, 68, who has praised Sistani for avoiding 
direct involvement in politics and points to him as a model for other religious leaders.519  
3. Iranian Attacks on American Targets 
Press reports blame Iran for training and equipping insurgents to target U.S. 
forces and for introducing new shaped-charge improvised explosive devices into the 
country. 520   According to U.S. intelligence, the IRGC plans “non-attributable attacks” 
through deniable proxies, though their sources are uncertain which Iranian organizations 
and leaders direct such attacks.  They claim, however, that General Sullaimani told his 
forces in 2004 that “any move that would wear out the U.S. forces in Iraq should be done.  
Every possible means should be used to keep the U.S. forces in Iraq.”521  Rumsfeld said 
in August 2005, “It is true that weapons clearly, unambiguously from Iraq have been 
found in Iraq.”522   
G. EMERGING ISSUES, LATE 2005 
Once it is formed, the new Iraqi government will face many serious challenges.  
Most important, it must address several issues left unresolved or ambiguous by the 
recently approved constitution.  Left unmodified, the constitution could increase political 
tension and sectarian conflicts, possibly leading to ethnic cleansing, especially if the 
Kurds consolidate their dominance of Kirkuk.523 
1. Writing the Constitution 
In the summer of 2005, when the Shi’i negotiators began talks over the new 
constitution, they initially opposed the idea of federalism, preferring a state with strong 
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central authority.  Once they realized that Kurdish autonomy was a fact that could not be 
undone, however, some began to support similar autonomy for themselves. 524   
In the 15 October 2005 Constitutional referendum, the majority Sunni provinces 
of Anbar and Salahuddin voted 97 percent and 82 percent respectively against the 
constitution.  Another majority Sunni province, Ninevah, voted 55 percent against, while 
the mostly Sunni Diyala province voted 51 percent in favor.  Despite the strong Sunni 
opposition, opponents of the constitution did not achieve the two-thirds rejection vote in 
three provinces required to defeat the draft.  The U.S. administration praised the large 
Sunni turnout as a sign of political engagement, but critics saw the largely anti-
constitution vote as a foreshadowing of future political problems. 525  Coupled with the 
recent election returns, this dynamic could dramatically increase sectarian tensions. In the 
aftermath of its approval, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khameini, praised the new 
constitution as “blessed” and urged Iraqis to turn out in large numbers for the elections on 
15 December.526 
Nevertheless, the draft Iraqi constitution includes several articles that are likely to 
heighten tensions, particularly among Sunnis.  Article 109, for example, divides Iraqi oil 
revenues from all “current fields” among the population as a whole. It also authorizes “a 
set allotment for a set time for the damaged regions that were unjustly deprived by the 
former regime and the regions that were damaged later on.”  The “current fields” 
specification is controversial to the Sunnis, because it suggests that revenues from future 
fields will not be divided and the Sunni areas have neither current nor likely future fields.  
Exactly what is meant by “a set allotment for a set time” also remains unclear, but it 
could be construed to mean compensating Shi’i areas more than Sunni ones.  Article 113 
recognizes Kurdistan as a region and allows for the development of other regions.  
Article 114 says that the new government shall define procedures to form regions within 
six months of the formation of the new government.  Article 117 allows regions to pass 
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legislation that contradicts national legislation, says that regions shall establish their own 
offices in Iraqi embassies and diplomatic missions, and mandates that regions shall 
develop their own internal security forces.  Article 131 continues the mandate for the 
High Commission for De-Baathification, which may be an institution to discriminate 
against Sunnis.527 
Realizing that these elements and other issues would likely lead to higher 
tensions, Ambassador Khalilzad attempted to negotiate a mechanism that would allow 
modification of the draft and thus minimize its controversial aspects.  On 11 October 
2005 Shi’i and Kurdish officials and the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party agreed to add a 
provision calling for a panel to be seated after the December elections to recommend 
amendments within a four-month time-limit.  Any proposed amendments would then 
need approval by a majority Assembly vote and a public referendum.528  In light of these 
stipulations, the composition of the new Assembly and government will be critical to 
resolving controversial or ambiguous issues.  The apparent poor showing of Sunni 
factions, therefore, does not bode well for the resolution of their concerns. 
The constitutional referendum was widely seen as a defeat for Sunni interests, 
mainly due to the provisions on the future distribution of oil revenues.529  According to 
Iraqi exile and war supporter Kanan Makiya, “The 79 percent of people who voted in 
favor of a constitution that promotes ethnic and sectarian division are unwittingly paving 
the way for civil war that will cost hundreds of thousands of lives…Without the return of 
real power to the center, the ascent of sectarian and ethnic politics in Iraq to the point of 
complete societal breakdown cannot be checked.”530  Saleh al-Mutlaq, a Sunni Arab 
member of parliament, also finds that “If there is a civil war in Iraq, the constitution will 
be a big part of it, particularly the issue of federalism.”531 
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2. Security Forces and Militias 
The issue of Shi’i militias has taken on new urgency in the spring of 2006.  “It’s a 
far more serious problem now than it was before because of who is in power,” said a U.S. 
official.  “Until there’s a commitment on the part of the government, there will be no 
solution.”532  As discussed earlier, Article 9 of the Constitution prohibits armed forces or 
militias that are not part of the Iraqi Armed Forces, 533 but implementing that prohibition 
will be one of the most difficult tests facing the new government. Though the constitution 
mandates specifically that there will be no militias “outside of the army,” the question is, 
“Can militias exist within the army?”534   
The Shi'i militias have been able to grow in part by not presenting a threat to the 
Americans. “The so-called Sunni insurgency is active in hostilities toward the Americans, 
while Badr-and perhaps the Mahdi Army-is not attacking Americans,” said Adnan 
Pachachi, a secular Sunni politician.  “Badr has been rather careful not to antagonize the 
Americans, not to provoke them.”535 
According to some reports, the Sunni character of the insurgency and the poor 
quality of the Shi’i army units has meant that the central government has become heavily 
reliant on Kurdish forces, which are generally better trained and motivated.536  Kurdish 
leaders claim to have 100,000 peshmerga under arms and insist on keeping them intact to 
guarantee Kurdish security.537  
3. Federalism and Regions 
The struggle over the Constitution highlights the most pressing issue facing Iraq 
today:  the struggle over federalism and regional autonomy.  This issue has its roots in the 
de facto independent Kurdish state (or, more properly, states) in northern Iraq, but it has 
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now become relevant in the south as well.  In early August 2005, in a speech 
commemorating the death of his brother, the SCIRI leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim 
advocated the creation of a Shi’i region composed of nine provinces.  This proposed 
southern region controls 80-90 percent of the country’s oil reserves, and its only ports.538  
Not surprisingly, Sunnis were dismayed by the proposal. “We hoped this day would 
never come,” a Sunni politician, Saleh al-Mutlak, told Reuters news agency, “We believe 
that the Arabs, whether Sunni or Shia, are one.”539    
While Hakim’s statement was publicized by the press, it did not reflect a major 
shift in Shi’i nationalism.  Previously, Ahmad Chalabi had been the strongest voice in 
favor of regional autonomy in the south, while Moqtada al-Sadr and Ayatollah 
Muhammad Yacoubi continue to oppose such a region,540 because much of their political 
base lies in Baghdad, outside the proposed region.  Jaafari called Hakim's proposal “a bad 
idea,”541 and Sistani aide Thafir Taqi spoke for the hawza, saying: “The Shi’ites in the 
south cannot live on their own without their brothers from other sects and vice 
versa…Even though a few people are demanding federalism, this does not mean that Iraq 
should be divided.”542  Thus, to some extent, Hakim remains isolated in his calls for a 
southern region, although the idea may be attracting more support in light of the 
increasing sectarian tension and violence. 
Nevertheless, events on the ground propelled federalism as an issue.  In a visible 
sign of their autonomy, in late November 2005 Kurdish leaders authorized the Norwegian 
company DNO to begin drilling for oil near the city of Zakho.  During the ceremony 
marking the start of the project, the Kurdish regional prime minister, Nechirvan Barzani, 
stated that “there is no way Kurdistan would accept that the central government will 
control our resources.”  Leaders from the Shi’i and Sunni communities were notably 
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shocked and upset by this news.543  Recently, southern oil interests have taken actions 
similar to the Kurds.  In March 2006, the Basra city council rejected a British proposal 
for investment in the area’s oil, an action that occurred as a dispute festered between the 
British and Basran officials over alleged British mistreatment of Iraqis.544 The new oil 
minister, Hussein al-Shahristani, has recently announced that all oil contracts should be 
handled by the central government, possibly setting him on a path to confrontation with 
the Kurds and the Basran government.545 
4. The Elections of December 2005 
a. Sadr Joins the United Iraqi Alliance  
For the elections of December 2005, the UIA once again prepared a list of 
Islamist parties, including Dawa, Fadila, the Centrist Coalition, the Badr Organization, 
SCIRI, and others.546  On 27 October 2005, Sadr entered into a political agreement with 
Dawa and SCIRI and joined the list.  Before joining the UIA, the Sadr Movement 
insisted on two conditions: parity with SCIRI in representation, and a pledge not to 
recognize “the Zionist entity” [Israel].547  Sadr placed thirty candidates on the UIA slate, 
as many as SCIRI and Dawa.548    
On 3 December 2005, Sistani told followers to turn out to vote on election 
day, to avoid voting for any list whose leader was not religious, and to avoid voting for 
“weak” lists so as not to split the Shi’a vote.  Together, this was seen as a coded 
endorsement of the UIA and a blow to the lists of Allawi and Chalabi.549   
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b. The Election Results 
On 15 December 2005, Iraqis went to the polls.  Turnout was strong, 
averaging almost 70 percent across the nation.550 The elections were notable not just for 
the high voter participation, but also for the apparent sectarian and ethnic character of the 
results.  Ninety percent of voters in Shi’i southern Iraq voted for Shi’i religious parties, 
ninety percent of voters in Sunni central and western Iraq voted for Sunni parties, and 
ninety percent of those in Kurdish provinces voted for Kurdish candidates.  Thus, less 
than ten percent of the voters nationwide voted outside their sectarian or ethnic 
identities.551   
The UIA list emerged as the winner, winning majorities in nine southern 
provinces as well as in Baghdad,552 and ending up with 128 seats out of 275.  Sadr’s 
faction won 29 parliament seats within the UIA coalition,553 and counting Sadr factions 
outside the UIA, he now controls thirty-two seats in parliament, the most of any 
faction.554  Allawi’s electoral list won only 14.5 percent of the vote in Baghdad province, 
and performed even more poorly in other provinces.  Chalabi’s list, now separate form 
the UIA, won only 0.5 percent of the vote in Baghdad province, not enough for even one 
seat in the Assembly.555  While Chalabi is noted for his repeated revivals from political 
obscurity, he seems significantly and perhaps permanently weakened by these results.556  
With only 46 percent of the votes, the UIA needs to work with other factions, and 
remains vulnerable to no-confidence votes.557 
During the campaign, General Casey accused Iran of interfering in the 
December elections, claiming, “They’re putting millions of dollars into the south to 
influence the elections.”  Hadi al-Amri, who in the past played down Badr’s connections 
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to Iran, countered such accusations by contrasting his organization with its rivals and 
their sponsors:  “Allawi receives money from America, from the CIA, but nobody talks 
about that.  All they talk about is our funding from Iran.  We are funded by some Gulf 
countries and the Islamic Republic of Iran.  We don’t hide it.”558   
H. POST-ELECTION POLITICS 
The winter of 2005/2006 saw a bitter competition for the post of prime minister.  
Sadr’s UIA parliamentarians made the crucial difference in the contest to nominate the 
Alliance next candidate for prime minister.  Without the support of the Sadr movement, 
incumbent Prime Minister Jafaari would have lost to his rival from SCIRI.559 Jaafari 
defeated SCIRI’s Abdel-Mahdi by only a single vote in an internal UIA vote.560   Sadr 
backed Jafaari only after the prime minister agreed to a fourteen-point list of demands.  
These included the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq, an agreement to delay any 
efforts to establish federal regions, a pledge for greater efforts to release prisoners held in 
U.S. and Iraqi detention facilities, and a strong commitment to keep Kirkuk from being 
ethnically cleansed of non-Kurds.  When the Kurds, likely encouraged by the Americans, 
threatened to dissolve the coalition with the Shi’a and to form a new bloc with Allawi and 
the Sunnis, Sadr simply threatened to abandon the Kurds and form an anti-American bloc 
himself with the Sunnis.  The Kurds backed down.  Sadr reportedly told other politicians 
that if Jaafari did not win the prime minister post, there would be civil war.  When such 
tactics worked, “everyone was stunned; it was a coup d'etat,” said a senior member of the 
UIA.  Sadr seems to posses enough political power to sabotage any initiatives that 
displease him.  Whether he has also enough power to accomplish positive outcomes 
remains to be seen.  A Western diplomat noted that “It will be harder to take on the 
Mahdi Army with Jaafari as prime minister.”561   
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Sadr’s role in the selection brought him to the forefront of Iraqi politics as the 
“kingmaker,” according to Amatzia Baram of the Woodrow Wilson International Center 
for Scholars.  In exchange for his support of Jaafari, Sadr retained control of the Health, 
Education, and Transportation ministries.  “He will do this Hamas thing,” continued 
Baram, he “will establish himself, he will get large budgets, he will do what needs to be 
done, and the people will be beholden to him for services, not the state, but him, and his 
picture will be in each hospital and school.”562  Sadr and Sistani met in late February, 
apparently as part of an effort to improve relations between them.563 
American officials in Iraq opposed Jaafari’s retention as prime minister, accusing 
him of having close ties to Iran, among other faults.  To defeat Jaafari, Khalilzad helped 
put together a coalition of Kurdish and Sunni factions whose 143 seats outweighed the 
UIA's 128.564  Jaafari resisted this pressure for many weeks.  In mid-April, United 
Nations representative Ashraf Qazi met with Sistani and apparently convinced him that 
Jaafari’s intransigence was greatly heightening sectarian tensions.  There were also 
rumors of a coup plot, especially after Allawi suggested on television that it might be 
necessary to empower an “emergency government.”  In any case, shortly after Qazi's 
meeting with Sistani, Jaafari removed himself from consideration.565 
The man who took Jaafari’s place as the new prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, is 
fifty-five years old and a senior member of Dawa.  He was active in the post-Saddam de-
Baathification efforts, which could antagonize Sunnis, and had a leading role in drafting 
the constitution.  He has pledged to act firmly against Sunni insurgents and Shi’i 
militias.566  Before the vote to approve him, he told members of parliament that he 
opposed strong regions and was not close to Iran.567  As he took over the leadership, 
                                                 
562 Quoted in Sharon Behn, “Militant Cleric Wields Influence with al-Jaafari,” Washington Times, 14 
February 2006, 13. 
563 Abbas Kadhim, “Iraqi Media Watch: March 3, 2006,” Center for Contemporary Conflict, Naval 
Postgraduate School.  
564 David Ignatius, “In Iraq's Choice, A Chance for Unity,” Washington Post, 26 April 2006, A25. 
565 Tony Karon, “Iraq After Jaafari,” Time, 20 April 2006, 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1185825,00.html (accessed 12 June 2006). 
566 Nelson Hernandez and K.I. Ibrahim, “Parliament Approves 7 Officials To Lead Iraq,” Washington 
Post, 23 April 2006, A12. 
567 Sabrina Tavernise, "Warily, Iraqis Investing Hope in New Leaders," New York Times, 24 April 
2006, A1. 
115 
Maliki thanked Iran, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey for hosting Iraqi refugees 
from Saddam, but said that Iraqis now would not tolerate “security interference” or 
foreign involvement with “certain movements inside Iraq,” apparently, a veiled reference 
to Iran and Syria.568 
In a surprisingly open endorsement of Maliki, Khalilzad described him as 
“someone who is independent of Iran.”  “The Iranian pressured for Jafari to stay,” 
continued the ambassador.  Jaafari's defeat “showed great courage on the part of key Shia 
leaders,” he said.  “It showed that Sistani doesn’t take Iranian direction.  It showed that 
Abdul Aziz Hakim doesn’t succumb to Iranian pressure.  He stood up to Iran.  It showed 
the same thing about Kurdish leaders.”569   
1. The Sadr Movement’s Philosophy and Base of Support 
Even as a key player in Iraqi politics, Moqtada al-Sadr has not promoted a specific 
political vision or ideology.570  When asked what he represented, Sadr listed not 
philosophical ideals, but concrete achievements such as security and social services, 
concluding, “What I can do, I do.”571  Sadr’s ambiguity and ideological flexibility gives 
him freedom to adapt to evolving political opportunities and to enlist otherwise unlikely 
allies.  According to David L. Phillips of the Council on Foreign Relations, what Sadr 
really wants is a part in enforcing sharia through the constitutional court in Baghdad.  
Amatzia Baram is more explicit: “He sees himself as the Khomeini of Iraq.”572   
The Sadr movement is class-based, grounded in the urban poor repressed by the 
Ba’athist regime.  It does not tolerate dissent or challenges to its leaders’ authority.  The 
movement seeks to form an Islamic republic, although the shape of such a state may 
differ from that of Iran.573  The movement has three supporting elements: religious 
leaders, mostly young and junior in rank, who transferred their loyalty from Sadr II to 
                                                 
568 “Al-Maliki to Neighbors: Don't Interfere,” Associated Press, 25 April 2006. 
569 Quoted in David Ignatius, “In Iraq's Choice, A Chance for Unity,” Washington Post, 26 April 
2006, A25. 
570 Jabar, 25.  
571 Quoted in Shadid, 175. 
572 Quoted in Craig S. Smith, “The Man Who Would Set Shiite Against Shiite,” New York Times, 11 
September 2005, 4.7. 
573 Cole, “Shiite Religious Parties Fill Vacuum in Southern Iraq.” 
116 
Moqtada; those who benefit from its charity networks; and street agitators, who can 
quickly assemble violent crowds at important moments.574   
Moqtada has contempt for Sistani's alleged “silence” n the face of Saddam's 
oppression. 575  He has called Sistani a Persian, and thus not an Iraqi.  One of his aides, 
Sheikh Rida al-Nu’mani, made this case in the summer of 2003.  “As for Sayyid Sistani,” 
he said, “with all due respect, he cannot involve himself in political action in Iraq because 
he is not Iraqi and he does not have Iraqi citizenship; he has Iranian documents.”576  
Sistani’s survival throughout the Saddam years is also used against him and contrasted 
negatively with the martyrdom of Sadr II.577 
Nationalism plays a large part in the Sadr movement, although it can be seen 
more specifically as a vision of Iraqi Shi’ism that rejects outside interference.  Slogans 
such as “No Shiites, No Sunnis…Unity, Islamic Unity” epitomize its aspirations to 
leadership of all Iraqis.  The movement also prominently displays the Iraqi flag, which is 
looked down on by other religious factions who see it as a symbol of Saddam. 578   
a. Sadr’s Post-Election Diplomacy 
Following the elections, Sadr began a tour of neighboring nations, 
including Saudi Arabia, Iran, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon.  While in Saudi Arabia, he 
pressed King Abdullah to advocate a firm date for a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq.  In late 
January 2006, he visited Tehran, and, while there, promised to defend Iran if it came 
under attack.  This statement, along with his visit to Syria the next month, further stoked 
the already palpable fears of an emerging “Shia Crescent.”579 
b. Sadr and the Other Shi’i Factions 
Sadr despises the returned exiles.580  “The people who deserve to rule are 
the ones who stayed here,” he said in one interview.581  His position has led to conflict 
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with all of the prominent Shi’i organizations, including most notably Dawa and SCIRI.  
These clashes also constitute a family rivalry with the al-Hakim, al-Mudarisi, and al-
Kho’i clans.582  Sadr bolsters his claim to the legacy of the larger Sadr clan by reference 
to his marriage to Mohammed Baqir Sadr’s daughter.583 
c. Sadr and the Sunnis 
The Sadr movement is currently the only major political entity to reach 
across sectarian lines, although ties between its Shi’i members and its Sunni allies may be 
somewhat opportunistic.584  Moqtada enjoys support among the Sunni community 
because he stands firmly against the occupation, passionately promotes Iraqi nationalism, 
and opposes federalism.  He supported the resistance in Fallujah in November 2004, has 
celebrated the Eid al-Fitr feast ending Ramadan on the Saudi date rather than the Iranian 
one, and promoted the story of Sunnis saving Shi’a during the Kadhemiya bridge disaster 
of August 2005.585 
In late August 2005, Isam Kadhem al-Rawi, a member of the Muslim 
Scholars Association, told the International Crisis Group why he supported Sadr.  
“Muqtada is a real Iraqi and a real Arab,” he said.  “We share the same basic principles: 
We are Iraqis, and we aspire to national unity.  He is not like al-Hakim or al-Ja’fari.  
Those guys are Persians.  I respect Muqtada al-Sadr, and I have a good relationship with 
his followers.”586   
One might think that Sadr would be hesitant to reach out to the same 
community whose members killed his father, brothers, cousin, and other family members.  
However, many members of his movement have reciprocated the affection of their Sunni 
sympathizers.587 Sadr has expressed a willingness to cooperate with anyone except 
“Saddamists” and takfiris.  By specifying “Saddamists,” not “Ba’athists,” he broadens the 
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scope of his potential political partners significantly.  Takfiris refuse to acknowledge that 
Shi’a are even Muslims, so he cannot work with them.588 
The journalist Nir Rosen experienced firsthand the interaction between 
Sadr supporters and their Sunni allies as he waited for an interview with Saleh al Mutlaq 
of the National Dialogue Council.  Mutlaq in his role as “the political face of the 
resistance,” apparently represents at least some portion of the Sunni insurgency.  As 
Rosen sat in his waiting room, Seyid Hassan Naji al-Mussawi arrived for an appointment.  
Mussawi is the leader of the Mahdi Army in Baghdad and one of Sadr’s senior advisors.  
He allegedly served as a Ba’athist agent under Saddam, as did up to a third of the men in 
the Mahdi Army.589 
Despite their apparent solidarity with Sunnis, Sadrists have committed 
sectarian attacks, events that contribute to the opaque nature of the movement.  There is 
also strong evidence that Sadr’s nationalism is largely inspired by tactical considerations 
and is “in sum, politically expedient.”590  Some Shi’i forces are convinced that they will 
triumph over Sunni insurgents in any future conflict.  “We will take care of the 
[sectarian] problem” when U.S forces pull out, one Sadr supporter told interviewers from 
the International Crisis Group.591 
In addition to his Shi’i bastions in Baghdad and southern Iraq, Sadr enjoys 
some support in the north.  Almost half of Iraqi Turkomen are Shi’i, and many of these 
are devotees of Sadr II.  Many live in the pivotal city of Kirkuk and oppose Kurdish 
autonomy.  Sadr has said that a Kurdish federation will not be necessary after foreign 
forces leave Iraq.  He has also asserted that oil-rich Kirkuk belongs to all Iraqis.592  
Thomas Wise, the political counselor for the U.S. Embassy’s Kirkuk regional office, 
alleges that the Mahdi Army deployed two companies of 120 men each to Kirkuk in 
April 2006. The local Sadr leader Abdul Karim Khalifa informed U.S. officials that more 
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militiamen would be sent and that the seven to ten thousand Shi'i residents of the city 
would join the militia in any fighting.  Badr has apparently also increased its presence in 
the disputed city.  Kurdish officials have expressed their alarm at these developments.593 
d. Sadr and Iran 
Sadr’s relationship with Iran has gone through phases of amity and 
ambivalence.  Observers at first saw him as another Iranian agent, then watched him 
distance himself from Iran, and finally saw him reach out in partnership to Iran’s new 
leadership.  The connections between Iran and the Sadr movement remain vague. 
As a result of his designation as Ayatollah Ha’iri’s representative 
immediately after the U.S. invasion, Sadr was perceived to be a follower of Ha’iri, who 
in turn enjoys close relations with the ruling clerics in Tehran.  Whatever the true extent 
of this relationship at one time, however, it appears to have deteriorated.594  In spring of 
2004, Ha’iri’s younger brother Muhammad stated that, “Sadr speaks for himself and we 
speak for ourselves.  People thought that everything he said he got directly from 
Ayatollah Ha’iri.  But we’ve said that’s not true.  As a result, the Sadr group doesn’t have 
much of a relationship with the ayatollah anymore.”595 
For their part, members of the Sadr movement have distanced themselves 
from Iran.  “Sadrists often define themselves as anti-Iranian and accuse SCIRI of being 
Iranian stooges,” according to Rory Stewart, a former Coalition Provisional Authority 
official who was stationed in the southern city of Amara, a Mahdi Army stronghold. “It's 
the main reason why people like them.”596  
Iranian officials have said in the past that they do not support Sadr.  Some 
Iranian officials have even labeled him a “nuisance.”  Commenting on Sadr’s standoff in 
Najaf in 2004, senior Iranian Foreign Ministry official Mostafa Zahrani expressed 
disapproval, saying, “based on Shiite thinking, no one approves of bloodshed, especially 
when it comes to the holy shrine.”  Iranians have praised him, however, even as they                                                  
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keep him at a rhetorical distance.  In the same interview, Zahrani was upfront in stating 
that “the consequences of what Sadr is doing may be beneficial for Iran.”  Former 
President Rafsanjani supported Sadr’s initial armed opposition against coalition forces.  
“Contrary to these terrorist groups in Iraq,” he said, “there are powerful bodies which 
contribute to the security of the nation…among them is the Mahdi Army, made up of 
heroic young people.”  The Iranian Foreign Minister, speaking to American journalists in 
September 2004, laid out the official Iranian stance toward Sadr and his movement.  “We 
have not been guiding [Muqtada al-Sadr], we have not been financing him, but we have 
been trying to moderate him, control him.”597 
Western sources generally agree that even if initial Iranian assistance to 
Sadr transcended efforts to “moderate” him, the Iranians quickly reduced their support.  
The IRGC may have supported Sadr at the beginning of the Najaf crisis, claimed one EU 
diplomat, “but as the war went on, he [IRGC commander Qassim Sulaimani] withdrew 
his support.”  “Al-Sadr is useful to an extent,” according to another EU diplomat, “and 
they [Iran] have provided him with funding and arms.  But I don’t think they want him to 
remain a prominent political figure in Iraq…He’s too wild to control.”598  Iran most 
likely continues to support Sadr in some fashion, however, as part of its strategy of both 
benefiting from managed chaos within Iraq and maintaining a diversified portfolio of 
Iraqi clients.599 
Cooperation between Iran and Sadr may have been improved by the 
ascension of the new Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.  Both leaders put anti-
Americanism at the center of their political agendas, and both share similar religious 
beliefs.  According to Babak Rahimi, professor of Islamic and Iranian studies at the 
University of California at San Diego, “Sadr is wisely realizing that he needs the support 
of Iran.  Both men see each other as brothers in arms.”600 
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2. Sistani’s Goals and Methods 
Rather than imposing an Iranian-style vilat-i-faqih (guardianship of the 
jurisconsult) theocracy, Sistani seems to want to guide society in following strict Islamic 
norms, although his true intentions are unknown, as are his political beliefs prior to 
2003.601  Babak Rahimi argues that “quietism” and “activism” are false categories, and 
that the authority of mujtahids has always been ambiguous and subject to historical, 
cultural and political context.602  Sistani has proven to be very active over time, although 
he has also been careful to maintain the appearance of being above politics. 
Despite his apparent opposition to theocratic vilayat-i faqih, Sistani has a strong 
Islamic ideology that he cannot violate without compromising his legitimacy.  As the 
senior religious authority, he must push for implementation of the sharia.603  Sistani’s 
son has said that Islam encourages democracy, and reportedly became angry when Babak 
Rahimi asked if his father supports vilayat-i faqih.  Some experts believe that Sistani 
truly supports pluralism and democratic competition; that in fact he is creating a new 
itjihad (Islamic legal opinion) for Islamic democracy.  Some believe that he sees his role 
as a guardian, akin to the Pope in some Christian nations, shaping society but not running 
the government.604   
Reidar Visser has suggested that models of Sistani as either a “quietist” or a 
Machiavellian schemer rely on flimsy evidence.605  Visser argues that only 
announcements bearing Sistani’s seal and issued since 2003 can be relied on as evidence 
of his political philosophy.606  Under this criteria, there is little evidence to support 
assertions that Sistani endorsed lists in either the January or December 2005 elections, 
and that the popularly cited endorsements were either exaggerations, distortions, or based 
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on opinions of assistants with no authority to declare his views.607  He argues that Sistani 
quickly recognized the Iraqi state as a political entity after Saddam.608  Visser notes that 
Jawad Sharistani controls Sistani’s web site from the Qom office, and suggests that it is 
possible that Sharistani may use this position to serve his Iranian hosts by selectively 
publicizing Sistani’s fatwas.609  Visser further argues that Sistani cannot support a Shi’i 
federal region without worrying that such an entity would be absorbed by Iran, 
potentially subjecting him to the authority of Khameini.610 
3. To the Brink 
a. The Bombing of the al-Askari Mosque  
On 22 February 2006, explosives set by terrorists destroyed the Golden 
Dome of the al-Askari Mosque in Samarra, shrine to the Tenth and Eleventh Imams, and 
next to the site of the occultation of the Twelfth Imam. This set off a wave of sectarian 
violence across the nation.  At least 3,800 civilians were killed in Baghdad in the first 
three months of 2006, many by death squads in summary executions.  In May 2006, U.S. 
military figures showed such violence surged 86 percent over the nine weeks following 
the Samarra bombing.611  The Iraqi Red Crescent claimed that 100,000 Iraqis had 
abandoned their homes since the Samarra bombing.612   
After Samarra, public opinion turned decidedly pessimistic.  In December 
2005, 49 percent of those polled said that Iraq was headed in the right direction while 36 
percent said wrong direction.  By late March 2006, 52 percent said that Iraq was now 
headed in the wrong direction and only 30 percent thought it was headed in the right 
direction.613  53 percent of Iraqis rated economic conditions as poor, while 76 percent 
rated security as poor.614   
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b. Sadr and Sistani’s Control Erodes? 
Some observers argue that ethnic and sectarian divisions are not the 
product of political entrepreneurs among the leadership, noting that “in many cases, they 
are far more conciliatory than their constituencies.”615  Some believe that Sistani has 
been the single decisive factor in preventing civil war in Iraq.  Sunni terrorists target the 
Shi’i community to provoke retaliation, but after each attack Sistani preaches restraint 
and reins in the Shi’i militias.616   After the Samarra bombing, many young Shi’a 
disregarded Sistani’s calls for restraint and instead struck out against Sunnis.  Many 
Mahdi Army personnel also ignored Sadr’s similar calls.  Abdul Aziz Hakim, in contrast, 
declared that Shi’a had a right to seek revenge and partially blamed Khalilzad for the 
attack.  Sistani called on “believers” to defend holy sites in the absence of capable 
government security forces.  According to Joost Hilterman of the International Crisis 
Group, members of the Shi’i community have put a lot of pressure on Sistani in the last 
year to authorize revenge.  He says that “People are just not listening anymore in the face 
of these sick outrages.”617 
c. Festering Civil Disorder and Economic Breakdown 
The Samarra bombing accelerated the decline of the security situation, 
leaving little possibility for reconstruction.  From 2004 to 2005, insurgent attacks, car 
bombs, and roadside bombs all increased significantly.618   In mid-May 2006, the U.S. 
military reported than Iraqi deaths had increased from fifty-five a day to eighty after the 
Samarra bombing.  Major General Rick Lynch said that attacks on noncombatants were 
up eighty percent from December 2005.619 As of March 2006, an estimated thirty to forty 
people were being kidnapped each day across the country.620  Daily insurgent attacks 
seem to have leveled off at about seventy-five throughout the first five months of 
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2006.621  According to the Arabic paper Al-Zaman, security in Basra deteriorated sharply 
in the spring of 2006, as Iranian and Kuwait intelligence services funded various local 
militias.622   
Hashim noticed a sharp difference in sectarian tension from 2004 to 2005.  
As late as March 2004, he heard Iraqis disparaging other sects and joking about them, but 
noted that most voiced hopes of avoiding civil war.  On his return to Iraq in the summer 
of 2005, people were no longer joking and voiced little optimism of preventing civil 
war.623  Only 11 percent of Sunnis reported feeling personally safer since the fall of 
Saddam, while 80 percent of Shia and 94 percent of Kurds reported feeling safer.624  
Between August 2005 and May 2006, the Iraqi government has issued passports to 1.85 
million Iraqis, seven percent of the population,625 suggesting that a sizable portion of the 
population is preparing to or already has fled the country. 
In such an environment, reconstruction and economic growth is difficult at 
best.  American attempts to impose a neoliberal/Washington Consensus development 
program erred by not appreciating the reality of the conditions on the ground.  The 
development planners did not seek input from a representative sample of Iraqis, did not 
calculate the effect of uncertainty about security on private investment, did not create 
institutions to protect free markets, failed to create an information campaign to counter 
accusations of economic imperialism, and did not effectively address problems with the 
vast shadow economy.  In short, “the economic system to date has been much more 
effective at creating an environment for criminals and extremists to thrive than it has for 
private investors.”626 
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On the positive side, Iraqi GDP is expected to grow at 16.8 percent in 
2006, while inflation is forecast to fall from 2005’s twenty percent to twelve percent in 
2006.627  Car traffic has increased by a factor of five from prewar levels.628  The number 
of registered cars has doubled, telephone subscribers have ballooned from 833,000 to 
6,836,854, and internet subscribers have grown from 4,500 to 147,076.629 
Still, the challenges are almost overwhelming.  Current water-treatment 
facilities in Baghdad meet only sixty percent of demand.  Garbage is rarely collected, as 
over 300 sanitation workers have been assassinated in Baghdad in the first five months of 
2006 in an insurgent campaign against government workers.  Dozens of gas stations 
throughout the capital have closed rather than risk terror attacks, adding to pressures that 
have caused gas prices to increase by a factor of four since the 2003 invasion.630  In April 
2006, Baghdad averaged four hours of electricity a day,631  and the unemployment rate 
was estimated between twenty-five and forty percent.632 The United Nations Children’s 
Fund reported in May 2006 that one-third of Iraqi children are malnourished and 
underweight, and rates are higher in the impoverished south.633 
Oil provides 98 percent of export revenues,634 but a May 2006 report 
shows that, in December 2005, oil production fell to 1.1 million barrels, a new low.635   
Crude oil production has been rising since then, but as of April 2006 stood at just 2.14 
million barrels a day, still below the prewar level of 2.5 million a day.636  In February 
2006, the 15,000 employees of the Southern Oil Company sent a letter to Baghdad 
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protesting the lack of investment in their oil infrastructure.  Many of the 850 major wells 
in the south are now “dead,” having been overexploited in the 1990s.637 
To add to this, unplanned security costs have reduced the available $18.4 
billion set aside by the United States for reconstruction, and by spring 2006 those funds 
were almost totally depleted.  According to noted economist Robert Looney, “Many 
Iraqis cannot understand why-two and half years after the Americans arrived-electricity 
and sewage are not more reliable, why more reconstruction projects have not reached 
their neighborhoods, why corruption remains so prevalent and why their local (and in 
many cases democratically elected) officials have not changed things for the better.”638   
4. New Activism from the Hawza 
In late April, Sistani took his most active political step thus far when he declared: 
“Weapons must be in the hands of government security forces that should not be tied to 
political parties but to the nation.  The first task for the government is fighting insecurity 
and putting an end to the terrorist acts that threaten innocents with death and 
kidnapping.”  While this statement seems at first reasonable and even helpful, it marked 
the potential start of a process of “monitoring” the new government in an unprecedented 
manner.  The hawza was quite explicit on this point.  As Sheik Abu Mohammed 
Baghdadi, a cleric based in Najaf, acknowledged, “The marjaiyah intends to interfere in 
some issues.  This monitoring and direct interference is an essential matter that has never 
before been proposed by the clergy.  The marjaiyah, through this act, is expressing the 
voice of the people.”  Some Sunnis expressed discomfort with this stance, labeling it 
undemocratic.639   
5. The Shi’a Turn Against America? 
Since the beginning of 2006, Shi’i public opinion seems to have turned decisively 
anti-American.  A banner hung on the fence surrounding the tombs of Husayn and Abbas 
recently said: “the American Ambassador is the gate through which terrorism enters 
Iraq.”  According to Mohammed Bashir Najafi, son of one of the four senior mujtahids, 
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“The country is occupied, and this occupation is a weight on the chest of Iraq…The 
marjaiyah is calculating things and counting things according to the benefit of the Iraqi 
street.  It wants independence with a minimum of losses and a maximum of profit.  The 
marjaiyah has not ruled out the option of calling for jihad, and the Americans and their 
allies best not forget that.”640 
A violent incident involving U.S. troops at the Husainiya al-Mustafa near Sadr 
City in March 2006 brought protests from Shi’i groups.  Nouri al-Malaki, who would 
soon be nominated for the prime minister post, called for security responsibilities to be 
turned over from the Americans to Iraqi forces.  The provincial governor of Baghdad, 
Hussein al-Tahan, ordered a temporary halt to all cooperation with Americans.  
According to Joost Hilterman, “The Shiites now believe the Americans, who brought 
them to power, are engaged in what they call the second betrayal.   First the Americans 
abandoned them in the first Gulf War and now they believe the Americans are turning 
their back on them.”641  After the raid on the Husainiya al-Mustafa, many Shi’a began to 
demand that Khalilzad be fired and replaced by a “non-Arab, non-Islamic person.”  
Numerous articles emphasized his Sunni background and accused him of bias toward 
Sunnis.642   
The Shi’a were embarrassed that they had not been able to liberate themselves, 
and had to rely on foreigners to overthrow the hated Saddam.  As a practical measure 
they have worked with the foreigners, however, as they lacked the capacity to fight the 
Sunni insurgency.643  The growth of Shi’i-led security services over the last year may be 
narrowing this capability gap, however, and may lead the Shi’a to decide that U.S. 
assistance is no longer required.  
I. CONCLUSION 
The Americans came to Iraq with assumptions and plans that did not match the 
reality they found there.  The U.S. plans anticipated the development of a secular and 
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pro-Western regime, to be led by actors familiar to Washington officials and to be built 
rapidly in a permissive environment.  The plans had little margin for error, however, and 
little flexibility for unforeseen circumstances.  Those who implemented the plans 
compounded those flaws by making a series of counterproductive decisions, both actively 
and passively. 
The failure to provide security was the most significant error of the American 
occupation, and set a precedent for all that would follow.  By not imposing authority, 
America convinced its Sunni opponents that they could organize resistance, while at the 
same time showing the Shi’a that they had only themselves and other allies to rely on for 
protection and reconstruction.  These dynamics fed off one another, and propelled by 
Kurdish rejections of attempts to rebuild a Weberian state, led to an escalating cycle of 
sectarian conflict and ascribed identity.  In that tense atmosphere, the most important 
Shi’i ally, by default, is Iran.  Thus American errors since the invasion have driven Iraqi 
Shi’a toward their Persian co-religionists. 
Since the invasion, domestic Shi’i leaders have emerged, most notably Grand 
Ayatollah Sistani and Moqtada al-Sadr.  Whatever their other faults, these men and the 
other Shi’i leaders have placed what they see as the interests of Iraq above those of Iran.  
They have accommodated Iran on many issues, but only when it has been in their 
interest.  They have also been willing to partner with Americans, despite events that have 
tested that relationship.  They continue to support a strong and active American presence 
in the country.  All in all, their position and general attitude suggest that the competition 
for partnership with the Shi’a is not zero-sum: that there are still many opportunities for 
the United States to advance its interests.   
The military has one duty in a situation like this, and that is to provide 
security for the indigenous people.  It’s the windbreak behind which 
everything else can happen.  But we didn’t do it, and the bottom line was 
the loss of security. 
       -Lieutenant General Mattis644 
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The bottom line is we’ll be judged on whether the lights are on or not--and 
the lights aren’t on…We have promised again and again to get the 
electrical grid up.  And what you get from every Iraqi; you hear this 
repeatedly, ‘You guys can land a man on the moon, but you can’t get the 
electricity up.’ 
    - Michael Rubin, the American Enterprise Institute645 
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The Shia’ of Iraq have been persecuted for centuries.  The United States brought 
this official subjugation to an end by reversing the political order in Iraq, acting in hopes 
that the Shi’a would embrace Western attitudes and norms.  Now, these hopes appear less 
realistic, and Shi’i attitudes toward the United States seem to be declining.  Meanwhile, 
America’s Sunni allies have accused the Shi’a of having primary loyalty to Iran; of 
building a “Shi’a Crescent” led by Iran.  American policy makers should be very careful 
when evaluating these charges.  Some observers argue that Iran has won the war in Iraq, 
and that increasing sectarian conflict will create a vacuum that Iran will dominate.  Iran 
has certainly benefited from the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and cessation of hostile 
Sunni Arab rule in Iraq.  It enjoys more freedom of action with the removal of the 
Ba’athist state and the commitment of U.S. forces to counter-insurgency efforts in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.  Iran cannot be happy to have tens of thousands of American troops 
surrounding it, however, and its leaders must fear the demonstration effect of the 
relatively free Iraqi elections and the religious legitimacy of Ayatollah Sistani. 
In the past, American policy decisions have been based on erroneous assumptions 
about the Shi’a, to the detriment of both the United States and the people of Iraq.  
American leaders should realize that the Shi’a of Iraq are loyal to their own nation, not to 
Iran.  While they may cooperate with and seek assistance from their Iranian neighbors, 
this does not necessarily create a zero-sum situation in which the United States will not 
be able to advance its interests.  America should avoid creating such a scenario by 
acknowledging the Shi’a as they are, not as our Sunni Arab allies portray them. 
B. REVIEW OF THE SHI’A OF IRAQ 
This thesis explains that Shi’ism began in Arab territory, and that Arabs such as 
Ali and Husayn formed its first figures.  It notes the many holy Shi’i sites in Iraq, and the 
fact that most of the holy documents are written in Arabic.  It shows that most Iraqis in 
fact remained Sunni until relatively recently, when they converted in part due to political 
and military imperatives.  It shows that as the Shi’i clergy became more assertive, they 
promoted an independent Iraq, but that their defeat led to decades more of repression.  It 
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explains that political and economic factors drove the rise of Shi’i fundamentalism in 
both Iran and Iraq, but that the different contexts within the two countries meant that the 
movement manifested itself differently in each country.  It shows that the Iranian Islamic 
Revolution was seen as the beginning of an effort to unite the Shi’i world, but that the 
revolution failed as its promoters did not understand the different contexts in Iran and 
Iraq, prosecuted a wasteful war, and gradually lost religious legitimacy.  It shows that the 
Shi’a in Iraq experienced harsh conditions throughout the 1990s, and developed their 
own sources of authority in response; sources which proved in the post-Saddam era to be 
more credible than returning exiles.  It shows that even today, few Shi’i actors promote 
even the concept of a Shi’i region, which conceivably would be more allied to Iran than a 
more united Iraq.  In short, the examination of the history and present condition of the 
Shi’a of Iraq reveals that they have a strong Iraqi Arab identity, and have not expressed a 
desire to unite with Iran or to place its interests over their own.  The Shi’a of Iraq are not 
most loyal to Iran.  They are Iraqis. 
C. THE SITUATION FACING THE SHI’A TODAY 
1. Waning U.S. Influence 
The United States has dominated Iraq for three years, but its influence may now 
be waning.  U.S. leaders face domestic pressure for withdrawal, concerns about stress on 
the military, and increasing Iraqi independence.  While these factors have not yet 
combined to constrain U.S. actions, they may portend future trends. 
U.S. public opinion was grown weary of the war as it progresses through its 
fourth year.  Polls have show declining support for the U.S. effort, and increasing doubts 
about the righteousness of the cause.646  As of 21 May 2006, 2,457 U.S. troops had died 
in Iraq, with 18,088 wounded.647  U.S. Marines will be criminally prosecuted for an 
incident involving the deaths of Iraqi civilians on 19 November 2005 and for another 
incident 26 April 2006,648 which may further erode American enthusiasm for the 
mission. These factors may shape the Congressional elections in the fall of 2006, which 
in turn could affect the duration of the U.S. commitment in Iraq.  Ambassador Khalilzad 
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has said that the duration of the United States commitment to Iraq depends on one 
primary condition: “Whether we, the people who have responsibility here and in 
Washington, project to the people that we know what we’re doing: that we have 
reasonable goals, that we have a means to achieve those goals, and that we’re making 
progress.”649 
Iraqi voices have begun to seriously raise the issue of American withdrawal.  
Before the December elections, aides to Ayatollah Sistani circulated a proposal calling on 
the new government to demand an American withdrawal.  Prime Minister Maliki’s Dawa 
Party has said it would support such a call if made.  Talabani and Jaafari have warned 
against a premature U.S. exit, but would likely be unable to oppose Sistani.650  In a recent 
interview with Newsweek magazine, Moqtada al-Sadr was unequivocal: “The most 
important issue is the timetable for the U.S. withdrawal…I demand a timetable.  Even if 
is for a long time, it doesn’t mean it isn’t possible to have a timetable for it.”651  Sadr has 
said that he will not meet with Americans until U.S. troops leave Iraq.652  Prime Minister 
Maliki has not laid out a timetable for a U.S. withdrawal, but he recently said that Iraqi 
forces should be able to take responsibility for security within eighteen months.653  It is 
important to note, however, that even American opponents such as Sadr have not 
demanded an immediate U.S. withdrawal. 
2. Iran’s Position 
Iran has grown more confident in the last three years. Talking about SCIRI and 
Dawa, scholar Juan Cole noted, “Khomeini dreamed of putting them in power in 
Baghdad.  Bush and Rumsfeld have fulfilled that dream.”654  Even so, Iran still seeks to 
avoid negative outcomes, ranging from the success of democracy to the outbreak of 
massive civil and even regional war.   
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Three factors have coalesced in tandem to boost the confidence of Iranian 
hardliners.  First, the war in Iraq has bogged down the U.S. in an unexpected insurgency.  
Meanwhile, the hardliners consolidated their victory over their reformist brethren in the 
Iranian parliament and later in the office of the presidency.  Lastly, the international 
effort to prevent an Iranian nuclear program has resulted in domestic support for hard-
line policies among those who would otherwise be reformers but are more strongly 
shaped by nationalism.655 
If the IAEA refers Iran to the U.N. Security Council for possible sanctions over its 
nuclear program, or if Iran faces possible military action from the U.S. or Israel, Iranian 
officials may decide to foster greater instability in Iraq or Afghanistan.656  The IRGC 
could likely rapidly move several brigade equivalents, or possibly a division equivalent 
into Iraq at the invitation of a friendly force, or could more discretely infiltrate forces in 
smaller but still significant numbers.657  The commander of the IRGC recently warned 
Americans against attacking his country.  “You can start a war but it won’t be you who 
finishes it,” General Yahya Rahim Safavi said.  “The Americans know better than anyone 
that their troops in the region and in Iraq are vulnerable.  I would advise them not to 
commit such a strategic error.  I would advise them to first get out of their quagmire in 
Iraq before getting into an even bigger one,” he said with a smile.  “We have American 
forces in the region under total surveillance.  For the past two years, we have been ready 
for any scenario, whether sanctions or attack.”658  Retired U.S. Army General Barry 
McCaffrey recently concluded that “a military confrontation with Iran could result in 
Sadr attacking our forces in Baghdad - or along our 400 mile line of communication out 
of Iraq to the sea.”659 
Iraqi Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi recently warned the United States not to 
attack Iran.  “We will not allow anyone to attack Iran,” he said.  “We think that the use of 
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force is not appropriate for solving any problem.”  With regards to proposed talks 
between Iran and America, he said “We promote any measure to help Iraq live in peace.  
We want to develop our relations with Iran and also with the United States.”660  While 
Sadr has pledged to fight America if Iran is attacked, and Mahdi opposes such an attack, 
Iraqis as a whole may be weary of serving as yet another battleground. 
Lieutenant General Vines recently said “Iran wants us out, but not too soon—after 
a Shi’ite government friendly to Iran is established.  Iran’s view is that the current 
government is not strong enough, and if we pulled out now, there would be a low-level 
civil war.”661 
The U.S. has recognized the extent of Iran’s power within Iraq and has taken steps 
to engage Iran.  U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad has recently been given 
authority to hold talks with Iranian officials. “It's a very narrow mandate that he has,'' 
said his spokesman, “And it deals specifically with issues related to Iraq.'' According to 
the spokesman, U.S. policy holds that, “Iran and Iraq should have the kind of good 
relations that most neighbors enjoy (and) that those relations be governed by mutual 
respect and by transparency.''662  Khalilzad himself has stated, “I have said to Iraqis that 
we do not seek to impose our differences with Iran on them.  But we do not want Iranian 
interference in Iraq.”663 
3. Future Trends 
a. Whither the Hawza? 
  In light of recent statements, it is unclear what relationship the Najaf 
hawza will seek with the new government.  If its members do pursue a more overtly 
active role approaching vilayat-i faqih, they will do so in the face of popular preferences, 
which as reported by a recent ABC News poll, manifest only 12% support for an Iranian-
style Islamic state among the general Iraqi population, and only 24% support among the 
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Shi’i population.664  On a personal level, Grand Ayatollah Sistani is now about 78 years 
old.  He has experienced some medical problems in his advancing age, and sought 
treatment in the United Kingdom in August 2004.665  It remains to be seen how 
influential his successor may be. 
  b. Rising Regional Conflict? 
  As seen in the statements of Mubarak, Abdullah, and Sultan, the tensions 
in Iraq have propagated throughout the Middle East.  All of Iraq’s neighbors seem 
concerned at the prospect of a widening war.  This fear may make them amenable to a 
shared strategy on containing the violence and pacifying Iraq. The Turkish Foreign 
Minister has recently called for foreign troops to remain in Iraq for the time being.  “The 
Iraqis should be able to administer themselves, but we say the withdrawal of coalition 
forces before these things can happen would cause a vacuum, a gap,” he told reporters.666 
D. U.S. POLICY 
1. Limitations 
In addition to constraints arising from U.S. public opinion, American leaders may 
soon face tangible limits to American power.  Figures in and out of the military have 
expressed increasingly urgent concerns about the effect of the war on the U.S. armed 
forces. The Congressional Budget Office estimated in October 2005 that the U.S. military 
could sustain a force of 123,000 personnel in Iraq indefinitely.667  This number is 
significantly below the 132,000 troops in Iraq today. General McCaffrey told Time 
Magazine in the winter of 2004 that “the Army’s wheels are going to come off in the next 
twenty-four months” if the military maintains its current posture in Iraq.668  Lieutenant 
General John R. Vines, commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps and leader of coalition 
force in Iraq from January 2005 to January 2006, recently discussed the strain on the  
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military.  "There is an incredible amount of stress and I'm worried about it.  The war has 
been going on nearly as long as the Second World War and we're asking a lot of our 
forces."669 
At the same time, U.S. officials are limited by their perceptions of the 
consequences of a reduced American role in Iraq.  Ambassador Khalilzad gave his 
definition of the scope of the problem in December 2005:   
People need to be clear what the stakes are here.  If we were to do a 
premature withdrawal, there could be a Shia-Sunni war here that could 
spread beyond Iraq.  And you could have Iran backing the Shias and Sunni 
Arab states backing the Sunnis.  You could have a regional war that could 
go on for a very long time, and affect the security of oil supplies.  
Terrorists could take over part of the country and expand from here.  And 
given the resources of Iraq, given the technical expertise of its people, it 
will make Afghanistan looked like child’s play.670 
He went on:   
A Pandora’s box has been opened.  The future of the world is at stake 
because this region, Iraq, is the defining challenge of our time…We need 
to close this in a way that does not produce huge problems down the road, 
that ultimately produces isolationism at home and a world with far more 
security problems than at present.671 
It remains unclear how the United States can resolve this contradiction. 
2. Goals 
The United States is not going to achieve its original maximalist goals in Iraq.  At 
least for the foreseeable future, Iraq will not have the secular and pro-Western orientation 
that pre-war plans anticipated.  America can still achieve positive outcomes in Iraq, 
however, but to do so needs to fully understand the Shi’a.  The United States should seek 
a peaceful and unified Iraq that has rule of law and protections for minorities and women, 
does not threaten its neighbors, and is not a proxy battlefield for outsiders.  By thereby  
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reestablishing stability in the region, the United States will benefit from less volatile 
energy markets, less ideological support and political space for jihadism, and an 
improved international image.  
3. Recommended Actions 
U.S. policies have alienated many Iraqis over the last three years, but many 
continue to work with America.  It is essential to retain our friends and allies, and to 
avoid creating still more enemies.   
As part of an effort to do so, the United States should make it clear that it does not 
seek long-term basing right in Iraq.  Foreign military bases have long been a tense issue 
in Iraqi politics, and America could dampen some hostility by making it clear that is has 
no enduring designs on Iraqi facilities.   
The United States has a firm interest in Iraqi unity.  It must continue to emphasize 
this interest, and must avoid to the greatest extent possible any perceptions of favoring 
one faction over another.  It should especially attempt to avoid being seen as complicit in 
any divisions in Iraq. 
U.S. officials should also recognize the sovereignty of the Iraqi government.  If 
the new government does decide that its wants U.S. forces to withdraw, American 
officials should respect that decision.  At the same time, the United States has a 
tremendous amount at stake in Iraq, and has sacrificed a great deal there.  It should 
remain assertive in advancing its own interests. 
U.S. officials must realize that any success in Iraq depends on cooperation with 
the Shi’a.  Therefore, they must not fall pray to the rhetoric of their Sunni Arab allies.  If 
they begin to see the Shi’a as inevitable servants of Iran, they may push the Shi’a away 
from any cooperation. 
The United States should build goodwill by providing more funding and 
personnel for reconstruction.  World Bank estimates in January 2004 determined that Iraq 
needed almost $36 billion for reconstruction.  A CPA estimate added close to another $20 
billion for other requirement.  The United States has appropriated $20.9 billion in aid for 
Iraq, but has only disbursed $13.8 billion as of April.672 Army Command Sergeant Major 
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Gregory Glen of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers recently estimated that total cost for 
Iraqi reconstruction may top $100 billion.673  U.S. funding has been almost completely 
depleted.  If this struggle is as vital as Ambassador Khalilzad believes, the United States 
must devote more resources to it, both militarily and economically.  General McCaffrey 
says that “we will fail to achieve our political-military objectives in the coming 24 
months if we do not continue economic support on the order of $5-10 billion per 
year.”674 
As part of a more robust reconstruction effort, the United States should promote 
an economic program with an evolutionary approach and work to include more Iraqi 
voices in its formulation.  Rather than the top-down programs that U.S. officials have 
promoted with little success, emphasis should be on a bottom-up approach focusing on 
community development and institution building.  Specifically, successful programs such 
as the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP), Local Governance Project 
(LGP) and Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) could be better funded and integrated 
into a more comprehensive strategy.675  In terms of major projects, the United States 
must focus on investment in the vital oil sector. 
American leaders must also prepare quietly for the possibility of a full-scale civil 
war.  U.S. forces should seek to contain and then dampen any such expansion of 
violence.  This may require cooperation with Iraq’s neighbors, to include Iran. 
In hopes of preventing such violence, the United States should promote a political 
solution in Iraq that respects its domestic actors while incorporating all of its neighbors.  
It should consider some form of treaty to guarantee Iraq’s territorial integrity.  
Ambassador Khalilzad’s proposed bilateral talks with Iranian officials should be 
encouraged, but should be augmented by including Iran in the wider regional dialogue, 
and ensuring that Iraqi leaders are not made to feel that America and Iran are plotting 
without their input.  Even as they pursues such talks, however, U.S. officials must 
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remember that most regional leaders cannot focus on long-term initiatives even if they 
would prefer to, because their own survival in the short-term must take precedence.  
E. CONCLUSION 
The United States has invested hundreds of billions of dollars and 2,500 lives of 
its soldiers, however, as well as its reputation.  If these are to be anything other than sunk 
costs, America should build on its relations with the Shi’a of Iraq rather than turn against 
them as supposed allies of Iran.  It should not treat Iraq as the prize in a zero-sum game 
between a mythical “Shi’a Crescent” and itself and its Sunni allies.  It should instead 
avoid stereotyping, and continue to work with all the willing partners it can. 
If calls for an American withdrawal increase among the Shi’a, it may be tempting 
for U.S. policy makers to view the Shi’a as ungrateful, or to heed Sunni warnings of a 
Shi’i conspiracy led by Iran.  Such attitudes, while comforting to some, would not serve 
U.S. interests and would jeopardize whatever toward the United States that remains in the 
Shi’i community.  The United States can off the Shi’a protection from foreign threats.  It 
can also facilitate investment in Iraq’s critical energy sector.  The Shi’a, meanwhile, can 
salvage the U.S. project in Iraq and can potentially even provide a bridge toward better 
relations with Iran. 
The United States began its intervention in Iraq believing that the Shi’a were 
“good,” secular, and pro-Western.  It saw the Shi’a as inevitable close allies.  These 
comforting and facile misperceptions have led to much tragedy and disappointment over 
the last three years.  It would be even more tragic if American leaders now convince 
themselves that the Shi’a are in fact “bad” religious fanatics in the service of Iran and 
intractable enemies, they risk an even more damaging error. 
After a careful study of the history and present condition of the Shi’a of Iraq, 
observers should conclude that Iraqi Shi’a have a strong identity as Arabs and as Iraqis.  
Although Arab Sunnis may accuse them of divided loyalties and treachery, they are not 
loyal first and foremost to Iran.  Saddam raised the story of Alqami in part to libel the 
Shi’a by accusing them of betraying Iraq.  What Saddam would never acknowledge was 
that the Shi’a could not betray Iraq, for by sheer weight of numbers, they are Iraq.  
In their heart of hearts, Iraq’s Shi’is like things to grow from their own soil. 
       -unknown Dawa leader676                                                  
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